397. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1
Washington, August 18, 1971, 2059Z.
- For Accra, Ankara, Asuncion, Athens, Bangkok, Bathurst, Blantyre,
Bogota, Brazilia, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas,
Gaborone, Kigali, Lagos, Libreville, Lome, Luxembourg, Madrid,
Managua, Manila, Maseru, Mbabane, Mexico City, Niamey, Ouagadougou,
Panama City, Port au Prince, Quito, San Jose, San Domingo, Suva, The
Hague, Tokyo, Tunis, Wellington:
- Meeting of friendly delegations in New York Aug 17 (their capitals listed in para above) was helpful in advancing our initiatives but did not result in commitments regarding co-sponsorship of IQ and DR resolutions. The time has come therefore to make approaches at addressee posts, to follow up on the discussion in New York, obtain pledges of co-sponsorship, or where this is not possible elicit suggestions re what we can do to make such co-sponsorship possible. We realize in particular that two points in the representation resolution seem to give most trouble:
- One point is preference of some countries that representation resolution refer to “Taiwan” rather than ROC. We believe you have adequate material in para 7 Ref B to explain why substitution of Taiwan for ROC, far from making the res more saleable, would actually increase PRC and other opposition to it. Where govt is troubled that use of term ROC in resolutions somehow might be taken to imply acceptance of ROC claim to represent all of China, you could make these points: (1) Use of term in no way entails acceptance of such claims, and co-sponsorship would in no way prevent host govt from making its views on this point clear in public; (2) normal UN practice is to use names by which countries refer to themselves; (3) if Chirep problem [Page 787]is to be settled at all in a realistic way, resolutions must steer clear of seeming to endorse either set of conflicting claims.
- The other point has to do with the fact that our draft resolution does not include language recommending that Security Council seat be given to PRC. If this is what gives host government trouble you should refer to Secretary’s statement Aug 2 that we will abide by views of the majority on SC seat and assure them that you will immediately report their views to us. FYI. This is of course the most delicate aspect and most difficult for ROC to accept. We have not yet decided how or when to handle it, but clearly our most important objective is to retain UN membership for the ROC. End FYI. If host government is not prepared to co-sponsor res as it now stands, you should ask them if they would be prepared to co-sponsor if it were amended to include recommendation on Security Council. In any case, info on degree to which this matter will affect vote of host government will be valuable to us in deciding next steps.
- Addressees other than those listed in para 1 we regard as unlikely to be co-sponsors although we hope to have their support for our resolutions. Accordingly, those addressees should explore host government attitude to our resolutions and when indicated also try to elicit information on extent to which Security Council issue in DR resolution would affect their ability to lend support (or might lead them to abstain rather than oppose).
- All addressee posts should report again even where this info has previously been reported, so that we will have most up-to-date picture enabling us to decide on next moves.
- Some addressee posts have reported special factors (e.g., absence of key govt figures) which have made host govt unable to express firm views at this time. At such posts, in Ambassador’s discretion, his own assessment of host govt attitudes would be helpful pending opportunity to approach host govt.
- If question of timing of submission of resolutions to UN is raised, you should say that matter is open, but that we think it advisable to table resolutions well before beginning of General Debate at UNGA. Hence we are anxious to ascertain very soon the potential list of co-sponsors, and what needs to be done to make it as broad and representative as possible.
- FYI. We recognize that we may not in every case be able to get support for both the IQ and representation resolutions and may have to settle for support for only one of them. However, at this stage we should avoid any indication that we would settle for support of the one resolution alone. End FYI.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Herz; cleared by George N. Monsma, John D. Rendahl, James H. Boughton, Peter C. Walker, C. Robert Moore, Winthrop G. Brown, Pedersen, and Eliot; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Sent to Accra, Ankara, Asuncion, Athens, Bangkok, Beirut, Blantyre, Bogota, Brasilia, Bridgetown, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Caracas, Dakar, Djakarta, Dublin, Fort Lamy, Gaborone, The Hague, Kampala, Kigali, Kuala Lumpur, Kuwait, Lagos, La Paz, Libreville, Lima, Lome, Lusaka, Luxembourg, Madrid, Managua, Manila, Maseru, Mbabane, Mexico City, Montevideo, Nairobi, Nicosia, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Panama, Port-au-Prince, Port of Spain, Quito, Rabat, Reykjavik, San Jose, Santo Domingo, Singapore, Suva, Tehran, Tokyo, Tunis, Vienna, Vientiane, and Wellington. Repeated to USUN, Taipei, Rio de Janeiro, Dakar, and Bathurst.↩
- Telegram 2297 from USUN, August 18, reported on the August 17 meeting. (Ibid.)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 387.↩