Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

395. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, August 11, 1971, 0242Z.

2229. Subj: Chirep: Aug 11 Mtg.

1. Summary. At mtg of inner core group of potential cosponsors Aug 11, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Philippines, Thailand and Belgium all volunteered (some on personal basis) that it is necessary to include language awarding SC seat to PRC in order to convince others of sincerity of our effort and to achieve maximum vote. Philippines suggested utility of separate agenda item with title which appears in US DR res draft. All agreed seek authorization cosponsor separate item prior to deadline for submission of supplementary items (30 days before GA opening Sept 21). New Zealand made point that, while decision to cosponsor and circulation of our draft reses could take place after that deadline, it would help if members of group also had prior authorization cosponsor reses. Next potential cosponsors mtg tentatively set for Aug 17. End summary.

2. At Bush invitation, reps of six Missions met Aug 11 discuss Chirep. Represented at mtg were Australia (Ashwin), Belgium (Longerstaey), Japan (Ogiso), New Zealand (Scott), Philippines (Reyes), and Thailand (Klos Visessurakarn). Phillips, Bennett, PolCouns, Legal Adviser and MisOffs also present.

3. Bush opened mtg by stressing US determination, confirmed by conversations past few days with President, Secretary and Kissinger, to succeed in new Chirep policy, specifically to offer PRC seat and to insure continued representation of ROC. Assured reps that administration giving full backing to deadly serious and priority USUN effort to have UNGA accept both procedural and substantive reses, whether incorporating precise US texts of amended through consultations. Bush emphasized that rumors and press reports to contrary are without basis.

4. Bush reported that we in process of meeting with some 80 other Missions, starting with 22-nation mtg Aug 3. Said generally we feel response had been quite good but many govts still considering positions. Although not full agreement, consensus of those we have contacted appears be that we have close but reasonable chance to succeed. Virtually none have rejected US approach out of hand and reactions here reflected overlapping majority desires to see PRC seated and ROC stay seated.

5. Bush said purpose his calling mtg was to move process one step forward, to invite criticism of US drafts. While he did not want put any rep on spot, he hoped for frank discussion. Based on contacts to date, US somewhat more optimistic now than when operation began. Asked for reports on what others have found and comments on US approach and on substance.

6. Scott said New Zealand also taking issue seriously and welcomed opportunity for consultations. Generally, NZ position well known since PM and FonMin have made statements. Scott said he could say clearly that his govt had same objectives as others in room: to devise a formula for retaining ROC seat while being prepared to vote for PRC. Since all sharing these goals were starting late and AR sponsors started early, we faced with problem that requires all to focus on best way to cope. Not simple problem. Any formula we propose must take account of “erosion of support for ROC and increase in support for PRC.”

7. Scott said he felt sponsors should pay special attention to “floating vote,” those who are concerned about ROC expulsion but have no strong commitment. On other hand, trend in UN is that there will be strong majority, but perhaps not two-thirds, for bringing Peking in. Any res, Scott said, must cover certain points. Major point is, which govt should occupy SC seat. It can of course be argued that UNGA does not need to comment on this. But GA members want to know our view and our intention in regard to SC seat. New Zealand feels there should be no doubt as to which China reps proponents of reses feel should occupy SC seat. NZ aware this not spelled out in draft reses. Frankly, NZ feels that to have best chance of success—and issue is tricky and will require work in any event—situation requires specific mention of SC seat.

8. How can this be done? Scott asked. Even though language specifying SC seat not in draft res, sponsors could make clear in introducing reses their attitude on SC seat. This would invite amendment to res, which would result in language regarding SC in final text. However, this such serious question that most govts by time of any amendment would have been fully briefed and comparatively locked in to fixed and unhelpful position based on lack of SC language in res. Relying on change in res text at that time, therefore, is not best. NZ believes that if language is to be changed to include SC seat it should be done at beginning of process.

9. Bush asked if Missions are far enough along in their consultations with other reps to say that presence or absence of language on SC would have effect on votes. Are contacts saying, for example, that they would support a res with SC language and would not support without. If such an accommodation is necessary, US is flexible. On basis our consultations thus far, we not yet at point of being able say presence or absence of SC seat language would, for example, make ten vote difference.

10. Scott said he not in position to discuss numbers of votes, but he pointed out that AR does specifically mention SC seat and we will need to counter this in our res.

11. Longerstaey (Belgium) earlier had highlighted problem created by summer absence from Brussels, resulting in no firm GOB decision this issue. He now said, however, that US draft reses very close to lines of what Belgium has been supporting. But main difference is that mentioned by Scott. Belgians believe language on SC seat should be included. Belgians think it would have influence. There have been doubts about seriousness of US purpose. Inclusion of language would help resolve these doubts.

12. Longerstaey noted that our efforts are now proceeding in a new pro-PRC environment, not as favorable a climate as existed year ago. He expressed conviction there is built-in majority for dual representation. Problem is to bring it into open and that many will abstain even though they among a majority. Reason is that they influenced by new environment. Longerstaey said he believes legal basis for draft reses is weak. We should admit to ourselves that this a very “soft spot.” He concluded by apologizing foregoing must be considered only as personal view.

13. Ashwin (Australia) said he would like make two points. First, Australia “agrees entirely with Belgian and NZ positions.” Reality is that SC seat should go to Peking. This should be reflected in res to attract more votes. Second, Australia has always accepted ICJ position that question of representation should be decided by GA rather than subsidiary organs of UN, including SC. PolCouns explained implications of 1950 ICJ ruling.

14. Reyes (Philippines) recalled his comments at Aug 3 mtg (when he pointed out that AR specifically mentions SC seat but he felt SC, regardless of GA should insist on SC competence to decide—USUN 2099).² Reyes recalled he had asked for clarification of US position on SC seat. Reason was not that Philippines eager see PRC become perm member but Philippines looking to 26th GA, foreseeing that IQ might get priority but that vote on representation res would be influenced by precisely what alternative offered to AR language. US-sponsored alternative draft should be as acceptable and attractive as possible.

15. Reyes said he had not yet received response from FonMin on this question, although he had explained difficulty in denying SC seat to Peking. Reyes said he wanted identify himself with remarks of previous speakers. Question of SC, Reyes said, “must be dealt with in drafts in some form.”

16. Reyes introduced question of inscribing separate item or modifying AR item language so as not to prejudice reception of our draft. Term “restoration” could be to our procedural disadvantage. Reyes said he and Scott had discussed this problem before today’s mtg. Issue could be dealt with in General Comite or in some other fashion.

17. Phillips suggested this could be handled in manner similar to our handling of Korea item. Newlin, after draft text of China item distributed (text septel), noted that it could be inscribed as separate item or could be combined with AR.

18. Longerstaey suggested better have own item but predicted items would finally be combined.

19. Bush asked if any others wished comment. Ogiso, who had been silent at Aug 3 mtg and had said nothing yet this mtg, asked if Secretary Rogers’ remark to press that US prepared follow majority view on SC seat necessarily referred to majority expression by GA. Or could it mean majority expressions in informal prior consultations. Bush responded that Secretary merely indicating US flexibility and willingness to follow majority lead. Representation for both Chinese govts principal issue and Secretary simply intended convey impression of flexibility on SC issue. If this will of GA members and is what they feel is required, then US would agree. US not going to walk out if majority felt that way.

20. Ogiso asked: does this therefore mean that Secretary’s statement does not prevent US from accepting SC seat allocation to PRC? Bush confirmed this meaning, adding that, while all in room are sympathetic to ROC, question was simply one of votes. Bush said he had clear impression from discussion that reps present feel that representation res would be better with SC seat included. If this what it will take, US is flexible. Mtg very helpful in clarifying this point.

21. Scott commented that SC seat ref in res text would “greatly improve credibility of our seriousness.” With such language, we couldn’t be criticized for going insufficient distance to meet Peking. Scott agreed with Longerstaey that inclusion of language would neutralize rumors that US approach is gimmick.

22. Longerstaey returned to legal question. Suppose, he asked, res does not dispose of SC seat. Is ROC veto possible? Legal Adviser (Reis) explained that atmosphere in GA would be reflected in SC. Thus veto might be attempted but it probably would not be sustained. Reis said he would like make another point on legalities. Perhaps US approach does not touch all legal points but even AR expulsion of ROC is of doubtful legality.

23. Ashwin said that everybody he had discussed US approach with had raised legal questions, particularly centered on legality of providing second China seat without proper admission procedures. Because of this legal question, Ashwin said, many were opposed to our approach. Reis, mentioning Byelorussia and Ukraine, pointed out that UN incorporated anomalies when founded. Mentioned India status. Noted Charter nowhere defines member or state. Reis added: is it not worthwhile ask if Charter not flexible enough to accommodate this proposal.

24. Ogiso asked to turn to different issue. For Japan, he said, study of SC question is very important. On this question, Ogiso said “Personally, I am in full agreement with what Scott said about need to mention SC seat.” Furthermore, he added, inclusion of SC clause might have impact on voting on procedure and on possibility of obtaining priority. To avoid dels concluding IQ res simply same device for same purpose as in prior years, we must demonstrate relationship between IQ and representation res, making clear their bearing on SC question.

25. Ogiso said he had been asked certain questions by dels he had contacted. If our approach succeeds this year, what happens next? If ROC is finally expelled next year then others doubt they should support this year. These reps doubt that next year US will make same effort as this year. If US willing make effort only this year, then they doubt should support. Ogiso said that speaking personally he felt that if US formula gets majority this year it could provide basis for compromise between two Chinese sides. What bearing does this have on US policy?

26. Bush replied that we do not know what exact bearing Kissinger and Nixon visits will have on this question. There is no way of substantiating a link. But who can foretell Peking flexibility particularly when we see how Taiwan’s position has developed over short period?

27. Klos (Thailand) said his govt favors some specific ref to SC, and said he agreed with Scott.

28. Bush excused self, explaining he must leave to make call on another Mission to seek support for Chirep policy. Phillips (returning to question raised by Reyes) suggested mtg discuss agenda item, noting that he understood that only item itself and not necessarily explanatory memo need be submitted by 30-day deadline.

29. Belgian Deputy PermRep Van Ussel, who accompanied Longerstaey to mtg, interrupted to refer to rep res pream para referring to UN as “center for harmonizing actions of nations.” Would implications for universality be harmful? Newlin and Reis explained rationale for para, pointing out that it provides useful talking point and that we felt we could find way to explain it to GVN, ROK and FRG. Scott felt this para helpful toward enlisting neutrals support.

30. Scott, returning to subject of agenda item, asked if we felt we should submit separate item before deadline for supplementary items and if his understanding correct that did not need table res at that time. Phillips confirmed both. Scott asked how closely list of co-sponsors of item should reflect list of co-sponsors of res. Phillips and Reis replied that there no requirement of which we aware and that precedents exist for more co-sponsors for inscription than for res itself. Normally, list expected be same, in that case, Scott concluded, it important at time of submitting item to have as wide agreement as possible on text of res.

31. Phillips said we had been assuming mtg next week to include those likely to co-sponsor. Suggested mtg Aug 17. Reps agreed that potential co-sponsors would need two–three days for instruction prior to mtg, thus requiring preliminary efforts with these dels starting this week. Agreed tentatively schedule potential co-sponsors mtg 11:00 am Aug 17.

32. Ogiso asked when we would circulate draft explanatory memo, urging that we do so Aug 13 at latest. We agreed complete ASAP.

33. Scott asked if he understood correctly that US would give consideration between now and Aug 17 to question of amending rep res to include SC seat. Phillips confirmed that we would give serious attention.

34. Longerstaey volunteered that he believed reps attending mtg had been unanimous that SC seat should be mentioned in res. He asked if we could provide figure on reaction of other dels to absence of SC clause in draft res. We said roughly 15–20 others had raised question, many stressing importance of addressing SC issue in res.

Bush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Canberra, Bangkok, Brussels, Manila, Taipei, Tokyo, and Wellington.
2. Not printed.