Office of the Historian

392. Memorandum From John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, August 6, 1971.

SUBJECT

  • Chirep

The attached cable from George Bush recommends that the U.S. draft resolution on Chirep include at least a preambular paragraph that the Security Council Seat should go to Peking.2 Bush thinks we need this to get the Australians and New Zealanders on board, and that we should line up the Japanese and then rapidly inform the GRC.

Putting this reference in the resolution could be interpreted in Taipei as going beyond what we have told them we intended on the Security Council Seat. This is that we are, in the words of Secretary Rogers’ statement, “prepared to have this question resolved on the basis of a decision of members of the United Nations.”

If it should be USUN and State’s judgment that including this reference to the Security Council in our resolution is essential to the success of our efforts, we should at least tell the GRC this and give them a chance to react before we talk with the Australians, New Zealanders, and Japanese. Otherwise, they may accuse us of breaking faith (and they may do that anyway if they believe we have given them a commitment).

Another point is involved here: the question of whether Peking does or does not consider that we will sponsor a Chirep resolution supporting the continued seating of the GRC, as opposed to only supporting such a resolution. Winston Lord has sent you the pages from the transcript of the Peking talks on this subject and believes that you did not commit yourself to Chou. If you believe that we should not act as a sponsor (or in this case, co-sponsor) we will need to move rapidly to stop the process, which is clearly well advanced.

[Page 775]

Recommendations:3

1.
That you call Rogers or Johnson concerning inclusion of Security Council in our resolution.
2.
That you review Peking transcript on Vietnam to ensure you see no problem with our sponsoring resolution rather than just supporting.
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Materials. Secret. Sent for action. An attached memorandum from Winston Lord to Kissinger, also dated August 6, includes a handwritten note from Holdridge reading: “HAK—I called Eliot to be sure nothing got out. He told me Rogers told Bush to knock it off. We’re not ready for this kind of thing yet.”↩
  2. Telegram 2125 from USUN, August 6. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Neither the approve nor disapprove option is checked or initialed.↩