Office of the Historian

383. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1

Taipei, July 27, 1971, 1037Z.

3665. Subj: Chirep: GRC Partial Decision. Ref: Taipei 3632.2

1.
FonMin Chow Shu-kai saw me at his request at 8:45 this morning to inform me of GRC decision on Chirep which was taken yesterday [Page 753] afternoon. He said the decision was taken “at the highest levels” of the govt and was influenced by Secretary’s July 23 conversation with Amb. Shen, as well as my conversations with Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo July 23 and FonMin July 26. He said Shen had been instructed to convey this decision to Sec. Rogers soonest and had in fact already done so, at 2:30 P.M. yesterday.
2.
He then read me the GRC decision (translating ad lib from the Chinese text) as follows:
A.
In view of the advice given the GRC by the US Government after consultation with various governments that it would not be feasible or effective to resort to the old strategy, the GRC has now decided to accept this advice and will consider the use of some other formula than that used (IQ) in previous years.
B.
Since the US and other countries, especially Japan, have repeatedly expressed the earnest desire to make it possible for the GRC to remain in the UN and since they are prepared to use all devices within the framework of the Charter, including the principle of the IQ as embodied in Article 18, to propose a formula whereby any attempt to deprive the GRC of its seat in the UN is subject to a two-thirds majority vote, the GRC has therefore decided to accede to this suggestion—namely, the US, Japan and others will propose a resolution to protect the position of the ROC in the UN.
C.
The Chinese Government earnestly hopes and requests that the [US]Government, in conjunction with other friendly powers, will do everything possible to defeat the Albanian type of proposal for the expulsion of the GRC and admission of the Chinese Communists.
3.
FonMin said that he would add certain supplementary points in the strictest confidence. He asked that these supplementary points not be disclosed under any circumstances. He preferred that they not be included in any minutes of conversations:
A.
If the US and other friendly governments deem it really necessary to propose a so-called “DR” resolution in order to get approval of the “IQ variation” to defeat the Albanian resolution, the GRC will understand. What we earnestly request is that this DR resolution should not include the Security Council seat held by the ROC.
B.
If any other country or countries should inject the issue of the SC seat, either by amendment or by separate resolution, aimed at depriving the ROC of its status in the SC, we strongly urge the US not to co-sponsor any such resolution or be a party to such an amendment. We also hope the USG would not vote for such resolution or amendment. (The GRC will of course have to speak against any form of DR resolution because of the inclusion of provision for invitation to Communist China.)
4.
I told Chow that this GRC decision as read did not appear to cover the fundamental question, which was, “Would the GRC consent to remain in the UNGA in the event of the passage of an Assembly resolution which included a recommendation for the transfer of the Security Council seat to the Chicoms?” I reminded him that we urgently needed an authoritative answer to this 64 dollar question for our own confidential background use in determining our own Chirep tactics. The PriMin conceded that this question had not been answered, merely adding that this aspect of the problem would have to be considered further.
5.
I also noted that we could not be sure that the “modified IQ approach” would be saleable to all the UN members whose votes would be needed to assure a majority for a DR resolution.
6.
Comment on this rather evasive reply will follow in septel.
McConaughy
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Nodis.↩
  2. See footnote 3, Document 382.↩