370. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 1

6561. Subj: Chirep.

Summary: FornMin officials dealing with Chirep now virtually unanimous in strongly recommending: a) separate resolution making expulsion of GRC an IQ; and b) subsequent and separate simple dual representation resolution for admitting PRC. They stress urgency in view of fact that Albanian resolution may be tabled in mid-July, which would put our side at great disadvantage tactically.

FornMin DirGen UN Affairs Nishibori pulled me aside at lunch for Congressman Danielson July 6 to request that we telegraph Washington [Page 721]of increasing concern here re Chirep situation. He said cable going forward to Japanese Embassy in Washington on same subject.
According to Nishibori, every day which passes is probably losing one vote for position which both our governments wish to see prevail on Chirep issue. He said GOJ information is that Algerians or others will inscribe Chirep issue on or before July 15, and will probably at same time propose Albanian resolution. This will put our side in most difficult tactical position.
Although new FornMin Fukuda still not had time to focus on Chirep problem, Nishibori said general consensus in Foreign Ministry has now developed strongly favoring: a) separate and special resolution specifying that expulsion of member nation, i.e. GRC, is Important Question and will require two-thirds vote; and b) subsequent and separate simple dual representation resolution passable by simple majority. DR resolution would not include reference to SC seat, but undoubtedly attempts at amendment would be made.
Re SC seat, as Nishibori sees it, even though UNGA resolution would only be recommendation, it would be virtually impossible for GRC to hold UNSC seat when issue would be raised, as it undoubtedly would, in UNSC itself. Double veto would not prevail, and most our side could count on would be six votes, including Belgium which Nishibori considers highly doubtful.
Because luncheon requirements precluded extensive discussion, Nishibori was able only to convey above essence of GOJ position. He said he had been instructed by Hogen to inform me of above, including fact that all working levels of Foreign Ministry are now of same opinion.

Comment: Hogen two days ago also stressed to me importance of tactics, i.e. that inscription can take place 60 days before UNGA which means circa July 21 and that AR supporters likely to beat us to the draw.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Hong Kong, Taipei, and USUN. Also sent to Secretary Rogers at San Clemente, California, on July 7 as telegram 121378. (Ibid.)