Office of the Historian

367. Memorandum From Marshall Wright of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, June 24, 1971.

SUBJECT

  • Decision on Chirep

I am concerned that this matter seems to be languishing. I am told that Secretary Rogers has discussed the matter with the President since his return from NATO and has told his people to do nothing more to precipitate a decision. As you will remember, the previous expectation was that a Presidential decision would be made after Rogers’ return and that we would use the time before a pubic announcement to try to line up diplomatic support to avoid Taiwan’s expulsion.

We have reached the point where we are literally going to lose this by default. We may, in fact, have already reached that point. Attached is a cable reporting on the somber results of a Japanese survey of the views of 57 more or less well disposed countries.2

[Page 716]

I want to be certain that the hold-up here is not caused by the lack of initiative on my part. Should we be precipitating a final Presidential decision by giving him recommendations? Do you wish John Holdridge and me to provide you with such a memo? Or should we relax and try to enjoy it?

Give me a decision memo

Relax3

See me

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 521, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. VII. Secret. Sent for action.↩
  2. Not printed. The attached cable (5753 from Tokyo, June 15) stated that officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry were increasingly pessimistic about the likelihood of the Republic of China retaining its seat in the United Nations.↩
  3. Kissinger initialed this option. Wright added a handwritten paragraph at the bottom of the memorandum: “P.S. Incidentally, our continuing delay is inexplicable to most outsiders, and I have positive knowledge that several foreign and friendly embassies, part of the press, and the State Department, strongly suspect that the delay is deliberate, and intended to make a successful Dual Representation policy impossible. I would bet money that the Chinese are beginning to share that suspicion. MW.”↩