Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

365. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Herz) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, June 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Chirep: Getting the “Go” Signal from the President

In accordance with your conversation with the President on May 27 about Chinese Representation,² you will now wish to obtain from him the decision on whether we are to promote a Dual Representation resolution in the next General Assembly. It is understood, of course, that that decision would not be made public until later. It is urgent, however, that it be made soon because potential supporters for the formula that we have in mind would have to be rallied if they are not to be lost. Erosion is continuing as Communist China pursues its diplomatic initiatives.

The President’s approval for consultations has so far been limited to our NATO allies most concerned, plus Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the GRC. There are a number of other countries that have been among the GRC’s staunchest supporters in the past who have indicated to us that they are reviewing their policies and that the U.S. position will be an important factor in their decisions. Examples are Thailand, Greece, Togo, Spain and South Africa. Then there are countries like Tunisia, Ghana, Mexico and Ivory Coast, which want the PRC in the UN but might be brought to champion Dual Representation.

In your memorandum to the President of May 28, you explained that when he has made his decision, “we should then … begin to marshal maximum support for this position in the United Nations.” You also reminded him “it would be desirable also to touch base in the fairly near future with certain … key countries which have supported us on the Important Question over the years.”³

Expanding our consultations obviously increases the chances of leaks to the press. Leaks and speculations provide the PRC and its allies with much smaller targets than an officially announced position, and it is thus right to postpone the latter.

The President no doubt appreciates that our new strategy, if he approves it now, will not automatically win acceptance by a majority. A great deal of hard work will be required. We now believe that if the selling job is to be effective, the U.S. will have to act as co-sponsor of the kind of Dual Representation resolution that we have in mind. If we don’t act as co-sponsors, there is also a high probability that a paragraph on the Security Council would be included in the resolution even before it is tabled.

Recommendation:

That you talk with the President along the above lines, using talking points as attached.

Attachment

TALKING POINTS ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION

1. You will wish to inform the President of your discussions with the UK, France and Japan and of Mr. Green’s conversations with Australia and New Zealand.

2. You believe wider consultations would add little to this and you hope the President could now decide to proceed with a Dual Representation policy. A decision now to go the Dual Representation route does not mean a public announcement need be made before the middle of July. But we should go ahead to seek support from more governments as soon as possible.

3. With most of them it will be better to talk on the basis of a policy conclusion on our part and to be seeking their support. Examples: (a) Countries that have been staunch supporters of the GRC but which are reconsidering their position—Thailand, Greece, Spain, Togo; and (b) countries that want the PRC in the UN but could be brought to champion Dual Representation—Tunisia, Ghana, Mexico, Ivory Coast.

4. Once we start consulting more widely, there will inevitably be leaks and speculations, but these will furnish a smaller target to the PRC than would an official announcement at this time.

5. Getting a majority in the General Assembly in favor of the kind of Dual Representation resolution that we have in mind won’t be easy. We shall have to exert leadership, which means that we shall have to act as co-sponsors. If we don’t, there would also be a great likelihood that a paragraph about the Security Council would be included in the resolution even before it is tabled.

6. Another matter which will require early decision if the President chooses the Dual Representation approach is whether and to what extent the concept of “universality” should be utilized. If it is decided to use that concept you would like to consult with Japan, the FRG, the ROK and the GVN.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Herz. Sent through Pedersen and Under Secretary Johnson. The memorandum was initialed by Rogers, who added, “Noted by Secretary, 6/15.”
2. See Document 358.
3. Presumably a reference to Rogers’ memorandum mentioned in footnote 2, Document 359.