Office of the Historian

345. Memorandum From Melvin H. Levine of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, April 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

  • Chirep

A number of erosive developments on Chirep are worth bringing to your notice:

  • —USUN reports that the ping pong visit to China is having a considerable impact at the UN, where it is the main subject of corridor discussions. The general impression is that the visit bolsters Peking’s campaign to enter the UN this year. There is also a growing impression among other Delegates, despite negative noises by USUN, that the visit means the U.S. has completed our policy review on Chirep and has decided to go for dual representation.2
  • —In a round-up cable of opinion on the China question, Embassy Canberra reports that the events of the past week have given a psychological lift to advocates of a new China policy, and put the Australian Government on the defensive.3
  • —In another somber comment, USUN predicts that there will be three (Bhutan, Bahrein, Qatar) and perhaps four (Oman) new UN members [Page 661] at the beginning of this fall’s General Assembly. All of those can be expected to oppose our traditional position on the Important Question and the Albanian Resolution.4 Hal Saunders agrees with this analysis.
  • —State is concerned by a report that the Chicoms are trying to keep the snowball on recognition growing by asking the Mauritanians to work on the Senegalese. There have been other reports along this line. The list of potential candidates for diplomatic recognition of Peking may be widening.
  • —ROC Ambassador (and Foreign Minister-designate) Chow Shukai paid a farewell call on Assistant Secretaries DePalma and Green last Friday.5 Chow was accompanied by UN Ambassador Liu.

Chow and Liu stressed the importance of maintaining the Important Question resolution in our Chirep strategy. Asked about the possibility of a modified I.Q. (limited to Taipei’s expulsion) they didn’t rule the idea out, but apparently preferred the traditional model.

Green and DePalma made clear that the USG has reached no final decisions on Chirep, although the situation regarding our traditional policy has continued to worsen.

In a brief discussion of a possible “third resolution”, Chow said he personally liked the idea of a relatively vague resolution seating both Peking and Taipei without going into legal and political cases. Chow thought he could sell such an idea in Taipei if it would effectively combat the Albanian Resolution and would give the ROC the protections the Charter affords to a member (now of doubtful availability since the issue is representation not membership). However, Chow closed the conversation on a rather hard line by stating that there might be considerations more important to Taipei than UN membership.

Comment: In addition to the foregoing items, our own gestures toward Peking—including today’s announcement—will add to its international respectability. Although we will not be able to assess the full effects with precision for some time, we can expect a further weakening of support for our traditional Chirep position.

John Holdridge concurs in this memo and Hal Saunders.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 300, Agency Files, USUN, January–May 1971, Vol. VI. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped: “HAK has seen,” with the date June 4, 1971.↩
  2. Telegram 924 from USUN, April 13. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CUL 16 US)↩
  3. Telegram 2134 from Canberra, April 14. (Ibid., POL 16 CHICOM)↩
  4. Telegram 928 from USUN, April 14. (Ibid.)↩
  5. A memorandum of conversation of this April 5 meeting is ibid., UN 6 CHICOM.↩