Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

314. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 25, 1970, 2300Z.

3383. Subj: Chirep—Further Considerations on This Year’s Vote. Ref: USUN 3295.²

1. Reftel reported our immediate and largely statistical analysis of the two Chirep votes at 25th UNGA. Over following weeks we will report on conversations with other missions on this question, a process already begun, and hope to develop and comment on alternatives for coming year. We strongly recommend, and are sure Dept will wish to undertake, a most rigorous analysis of where we stand and where we want to go. Naturally, Mission would like to participate in this. For moment, we would make following observations:

A. In years past, for passage of IQ and defeat of Albanian res (AR), we have depended upon coalition of Western Europeans, Latin Americans, black Africa, and non-Communist Asia. Though we suffered some defections on IQ, this coalition held together this year, leading to our 66–52–7 victory. On AR, however, we lost Western Europe, the Andean LAs, and significant support among black Africans.

B. It seems unmistakably clear that without high level messages, démarches in numerous capitals and strenuous lobbying here on part GRC, US and Japan, AR vote would have been even more adverse. Before the round of approaches in capitals and letters was undertaken, it was not only possible but likely that AR would obtain plurality of six instead of plurality of two. In a sense, however, this result carries with it certain contradictory elements. In corridors word is spreading quickly that in representations, US asked for support this year on understanding we would have a new policy next year, and AR cosponsors have been quick to point out that despite a major effort both in NY and in capitals US could no longer command a simple majority against AR.

C. It seems to us that coalition which held together on IQ is far from stable. Peking will exert very strong pressure on the five states which recognize PRC but which nevertheless voted for IQ this year, and AR cosponsors will lobby very hard on this issue. With 66-52 vote, shift of seven votes from “yes” to “no” would produce tie, as would fourteen yeses shifting to abstention. While far too early to predict next year’s voting behavior, it seems to us we can no longer count on “yes” votes from many WEOs and must also expect defections from some Africans as well.

D. With exception of Bolivia, we can probably hold LA support we now have both on IQ and AR. We have already lost Eur support on AR and (as noted above) must realistically expect to do so on IQ as well. We should be able to hold island states of Asia, though Japan and New Zealand will come under great public pressure. (We have impression Tsuruoka of Japan lobbied much harder than FonOff wished.) NEA countries, where we already have little support, will probably continue to vote much as they did this year (though further shifts by Cyprus, Lebanon and Kuwait are distinct possibility). The swing continent seems to be Africa.

E. African vote on AR this year split 18–18–5. Yet this split masks an underlying unity. Three AF states which voted for AR made statements in favor of dual representation (Ghana, Morocco and Nigeria). Ethiopia (which did not speak at all during Chirep debate) reportedly favors two-Chinas solution, and Tunisia’s statements have already been reported. In their debate speech, Zambia, an AR cosponsor, never once called for ROC expulsion. Similarly many Africans who voted against AR privately or publicly advocate seating PRC. It seems to us there is unmistakeable African consensus that Peking should be seated but Taiwan should not be expelled. We believe it is only realistic to take as our frame of reference that consensus.

2. We have read with much interest Hong Kong 4725.³ “One-China-two-delegations” proposal, one of several possible variants of two-para res (along with two-Chinas, one-China-one-Taiwan, one-China-two-governments), merits study along with other possibilities such as universality res, one-para res, etc. In this connection, Japanese Minister Yoshida today suggested to us one-para res which would make no mention of PRC but would express Assembly view ROC should not be expelled. Such a res might obviate necessity for IQ, would take advantage of African consensus mentioned above, and might place AR cosponsors in a most difficult position. Finally, we should also take into account alternative of continuing on our present course in knowledge that though defeat likely, other alternatives could be still less attractive.

3. In reviewing all policy options, Mission believes Dept should take into account:

A. Damage we would suffer if PRC entry were seen as resounding defeat for us. Such damage would be not only to our prestige and hence our ability to influence events in UN, but to our ability to deal with Peking, in or out of UN, as well.

B. Effect on public and Congressional opinion if PRC were voted in over our strong opposition.

C. Fact that delegates, and thus presumably member states, worldwide want to see this problem solved next year and that if US is seen as blocking “equitable and realistic” solution we would be swimming against entirely adverse tide.

D. Fact there is strong UNGA consensus which believes PRC should be in, but views with impatience and frustration limitation to “either-or” choice.

Yost

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.
2. See footnote 2, Document 313.
3. Document 313.