274. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1

679. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 028278.2

1.
We would appreciate Dept’s analysis of possible implications of third of “three constant principles” which ChiComs gave Canadians per reftel.
2.
Under third principle Canada, and any other country wishing diplomatic relations with CPR, “must give support to restoration of rightful place and legitimate rights of CPR in UN and no longer give any backing to retention of so-called representatives of Chiang Kai-shek in any organization of this international body.”
3.
Three aspects appear noteworthy in comparison previous stands taken by Peking re UN:
A.
Question of their representation in UN is given prominence by its injection as one of only three conditions related to bilateral relations. Peking has not often shown this much interest in UN.
B.
Similarly, surprisingly positive interest is indicated by formulation which puts clause re Peking representation in UN ahead of that re GRC representation.
C.
Perhaps most surprising is “soft” formulation re GRC; instead of demanding active support for expulsion, Peking asks that Canada merely cease their support.
4.
We recognize Peking may have selected language calculated avoid jeopardizing relations with Canada. Nonetheless we would have expected Peking require active Canadian support for “expulsion of illegal reps so that PRC could take its rightful place.”
5.
We also recognize present hard line being taken by Peking makes it doubtful Peking is moderating its view of outside world.
6.
Nonetheless we would appreciate comments on possibility Peking may be becoming more interested in entering UN. (Indian source here in late Jan speculated that then-current moderation out of Peking Foreign Ministry suggested Chinese realize how dangerous their isolation is under conditions of mounting hostility with Moscow. He speculated Peking may have realized importance to Czechoslovakia of having a voice at the UN last August, and this may have contributed to policy shift to seek improved relations with outside world and press energetically for seat in UN.)
7.
Whether or not formulation of third principle represents policy shift by Peking, we are concerned that as knowledge of it spreads its effect may be to increase difficulty in holding line here at next GA in terms of defending GRC right to continued representation. This is because strength of US position against any proposal to throw GRC out of UN has rested in part on idea that Peking is disinterested in entering UN, as evidenced by their rigid insistence on explicit conditions whereby GRC will first be expelled.
Yost
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis.
  2. Dated February 24. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 CHICOM)