135. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1

3735. Subject: Possible S.C. Meeting in Panama.

At Iranian lunch yesterday, I had individual discussions re above subject with Nakagawa (Japan), McIntyre (Australia) and Boyd (Panama).

1.
I described the US position to Nakagawa. He seemed sympathetic in spite of fact that Boyd had told me that Nakagawa made commitment to him to have mtg in Panama. Nakagawa suggested best way to avert mtg was to have some visible progress underway before spring on Panama Canal bilateral talks. Nakagawa immediately understood our reservations about trying to solve bilateral problems by bringing pressure to bear on question through démarche of SC mtg in area. I said, “Today it’s Panama; tomorrow it may be some other international [Page 256]dispute between two countries.” He nodded vigorously and seemed anxious to help US find a way out.
2.
McIntyre is totally in accord with our views, I am convinced, and will help US in any way we desire.
3.
When I talked with Boyd, it was almost a re-hash of my two previous conversations with him on this subject. I told him that we now had firm instructions and that I wanted to do him the courtesy of notifying him immediately. He seemed concerned but immediately repeated that he had a great deal of support for the meeting being held in Panama.

After repeating the entire litany in support of our position, I made a personal observation, telling Boyd very forcefully and very directly that if he thought he was going to influence President Nixon or American public opinion through this device, he was simply misjudging our political process. I told him he was going about it just backwards. I offered to convey this to anyone in his govt, should he feel this would be helpful.

He made some very flattering comments about our own personal relationship in the presence of Amb McIntyre and insisted that he would always “keep the door open” and stay in close touch.

Comment: Boyd appears to be uncomfortable about all of this. I think he is really worried about the Marxists, should the Canal issue not be resolved. (He whispered and pointed once or twice at Amb. Malik (USSR) and the Cuban Ambassador, who were sitting across from us, indicating we must “avoid that kind of thing”.) I will stay in close touch with Boyd and try to keep the climate right for continuing discussions.

Bush
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 3 SC. Confidential. Repeated to Panama, Canberra, London, and Tokyo.