77. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
  • Soviet Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin
  • Secretary Rogers
  • Mr. Kissinger
  • Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • William D. Krimer, Interpreter, State Department

[Omitted here is the opening portion of the conversation, in which Nixon welcomed Gromyko, suggested topics for discussion, and invited Gromyko’s response. Gromyko began by expressing his government’s concern about the tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations, which he said seemed to be at variance with the President’s stated intent to convert an era of confrontation into an era of negotiation. Speaking for his government, he said the Soviet Union would like to see a lessening of tensions and an improvement and expansion of relations with the United States.]

The President replied that with respect to the bilateral relations between our two countries, Mr. Gromyko had indeed described his policy correctly, the policy on moving from an era of confrontation into a era of negotiation. The President also agreed with Mr. Gromyko’s comments to the effect that the internal situation of a country should not be allowed to influence its foreign relations. However, since both countries are great powers, he was enough of a realist to know that when great powers are involved there were inevitably bound to be some misunderstandings. He thought Mr. Gromyko would agree that the President had been extremely careful to try to limit differences between them to private discussions rather than discussions in public. Mr. Gromyko, being a realist, would know that in our country whenever elections approached political leaders were tempted to take a belligerent anti-Communist line. As for the President personally, he did not consider such an approach to be in the interests of world peace or of Soviet-American relations. For this reason, he had personally tried to avoid any statement that might make the situation worse.

The President continued that he felt very strongly that both sides, allies during World War II, who were instrumental in bringing into [Page 271] being the United Nations, must realize on this 25th anniversary of the UN that the relations and the interests of the two great powers could hardly be submitted to the United Nations where their differences would be publicly resolved [exposed?]. Mr. Gromyko had spoken before the General Assembly yesterday and the President intended to do so tomorrow. However, in the next 25 years, world peace in general and, more precisely even, avoidance of smaller wars would depend to a much greater extent on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union than on anything else. For this reason, he felt unhappy that the relations between our countries were now the coolest since the cold war began. He had been very careful not to contribute to the difficult situation by rhetoric. He thought it was of greatest importance now to give a signal to the world that the United States and the Soviet Union were not looking for areas in which to confront each other. To be honest, we had to realize that our interests in many parts of the world differed and that on some questions it would be most difficult to reach agreed positions. However, it was clearly in the common interests of both great powers to limit the burden of armaments, to increase trade and communications between them. It was in this spirit that he was resolved to view our bilateral relations.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he found the President’s appraisal of the situation to be a reasonable one. He asked the President’s permission to summarize what had been said to the effect that the policy of the United States would be directed at reducing the tensions which were bound to arise from time to time and that the President’s formula of negotiation rather than confrontation remained in effect; also that the President personally intended to work for an improvement and deepening of the relations between the two countries and the international situation in general.

The President agreed that this was correct and added the further point that in the past we had been reasonably successful and it was his hope that we would be even more successful in the future whenever difficulties arose to keep them in private channels rather than expose them in public. In the past we may have been at fault to some extent, and so was the Soviet Union, in publicizing our differences. This was in the past, however, and it would be important to avoid that in the future.

Mr. Gromyko said this was correct. Articles in the Soviet press in the past reporting what was being said in the United States in regard to the Soviet Union had been but a small fraction of unfavorable American statements about the Soviet Union. After all, when hostile statements appeared in the U.S., what was there left for the Soviet Union to do but to react accordingly? The Soviet side would not remain indebted when it came to hostile statements. This was not the right path, however. He [Page 272] noted that the President had mentioned the development of trade relations between the two countries. In this respect, we were faced by almost a vacuum. Was this indeed the policy of the United States Government? He simply would like to know the President’s attitude to this question.

The President said that there were possibilities in this field. He thought one would have to be realistic and say that some of the other problems come into play when it comes to considering the possibility of increasing trade between the two countries. For example, the Vietnam war, which involved our primary and basic interests, was bound to have an inhibiting influence upon the possibilities of trade. Due to the fact that under our legislative arrangements some items which could be used to aid North Vietnam could not be exported to the Soviet Union. We were indeed prepared to explore ways in which trade between our two countries could be increased. He did not like to use the word “linkage”, but it was true nevertheless that a settlement of these other matters would lead to increasing economic exchanges between us. He therefore felt that if our political relations improved, increased trade would follow naturally. This was in our interest as well as in the interest of the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, Berlin, Vietnam, the SALT negotiations, and the possibility of convening a European security conference.]

Conclusion

The President said he believed we have covered most of the subjects that required discussion. Referring to earlier discussions, he said that as realists we knew and Mr. Gromyko knew that the question of the future of Europe, as well as the question of arms control would depend upon whether the United States and the Soviet Union could work out solutions aimed at strengthening peace. We recognized that there are also a number of other factors threatening peace, but if the great powers worked together, the peace could be kept. As practical men, we knew that US-Soviet understanding was essential for the future of the world. He wanted to be sure that Mr. Gromyko would not leave with the impression that the internal political situation in the United States would lead the President to take a course opposite to the one he had followed until now. He noted that Mr. Gromyko had made a temperate speech before the UN yesterday, and said that he would make a temperate speech there tomorrow. Both Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Dobrynin were well acquainted with U.S. politics. Both had been in this room before with President Johnson and President Kennedy. The President said that he was in an unusual position. When he was elected to office [Page 273] it was said that President Nixon would not be able to work with the Soviet leaders because of his past background of anti-Communism. He did not believe this to be so. More than any other President since World War II, he felt that he could be flexible. He was prepared to be flexible in all negotiations with the Soviet Union and wanted Mr. Gromyko to realize that his approach would not be doctrinaire on any subject, but, rather, pragmatic in all cases.

Mr. Gromyko thanked the President for his views and said that the President had correctly emphasized the role of the Soviet Union and the United States as the two great powers responsible for keeping peace in the world. The Soviet leadership was in full agreement with the premise that the future of the world depended to an enormous extent upon the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. If the U.S. Government worked in the direction of peace, if it respected the interests of the Soviet Union, it would find a vigorous, energetic and determined partner in its search for ways to improve relations. This policy of the Soviet Union was not new. It had been inviolable since the very inception of the Soviet State. It was important, however, to stress the concept of reciprocity. Mr. Gromyko repeated this statement for emphasis. As for what the President had said about the internal political situation influencing American foreign policy, it was not for him to offer any evaluation of this influence. He repeated however that his government sometimes had the impression that the U.S. Government paid some tribute to the internal political situation in the U.S. in the conduct of foreign affairs. If this was indeed so, it could only be harmful to the relations between our two countries. Mr. Gromyko said that he was gratified to learn that President Nixon’s speech before the UN would be temperate. One should be able to rise above transitory phenomena and guide our two countries to work for the interests of peace.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 71, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Gromyko 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation was held in the Oval Office of the White House.