65. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Mr. Kissinger’s Meeting with Eleven Students and Five Faculty Members of Stanford University2
Mr. Kissinger opened by stating the ground rules for the meeting; namely, that he did not mind how they characterized or described the meeting, but that in the interest of promoting a frank discussion he did not want to be quoted. They agreed.
Q: Patrick Shea, Student Body President from Stanford, read part of a resolution adopted by the Stanford Academic Senate which, in effect, stated that they believed that the machinery which was used for making decisions in the country did not seem legitimate and that they were therefore sending a delegation to express their concern to the President and to deliver to him a petition signed by 3,800 students from Stanford. Mr. Shea stated that the violence, which seemed to be increasing, was outrageous and that the situation was becoming impossible; but that the students could not condemn the violence here when what the U.S. government was doing in Southeast Asia was so violent. He continued that there was what he called a “generational solidarity” developing which was more than a gap and that the student generation was seeking to mobilize itself to solve the problems which the older generation did not seem to be able to solve.
A: Mr. Kissinger was asked if he had any comments. He replied that he thought Mr. Shea’s remarks were too sweeping for direct comment but that he would like to start by stating a few of his observations on the current situation. He stated that we must assume that both sides realize that no one has a monopoly on righteousness and that, as a former professor, [Page 212] what students thought and felt was of great significance to him. Mr. Kissinger then expressed his own personal view, drawing upon his practice while at Harvard to meet with the SDS members there in order to find out what they represented. He concluded that they were characterized by two things: one, extraordinary intensity and two, an extraordinarily superficial knowledge of the facts.
Mr. Kissinger continued that we agree on ending the war in Vietnam; there is no doubt about that. We also agree that it should be ended as quickly as possible. Our only difference is in what is meant by “as quickly as possible.” This in his view was not worth tearing the country apart. He then commented on the problem of the generation gap which he felt was inevitable. In the present circumstances, however, the younger generation had very good reason to attack the older generation because, in Mr. Kissinger’s opinion, his generation had failed—it had become cynical and skeptical. It had “taken the clock apart” without being able to put it together and it collapses and turns into mush when it is pushed.
Q: Mr. Shea commented that in the past a war would destroy lives and property, but that today it might destroy humanity.
A: Mr. Kissinger agreed and went on to point out that even if we did away with all the nuclear weapons in the world we would not have solved the problem of being able to destroy humanity since you cannot destroy the technology—men would still know how to produce nuclear weapons. The problem is how to relate knowledge to the preservation of humanity.
Q: Professor Lewis asked what had occurred within the Administration since March 18, the date of the Cambodian coup. It had been his understanding that the Administration’s policy was to contain the war but that it now appeared that it was being expanded. China was even being brought into it in view of its expressed solidarity with the Indochinese people. The resulting situation therefore is not what he had understood the Administration’s objective to be. In short, what puzzled him was that it seemed that certain political ramifications were not anticipated. Do the professors know more than the policy-makers?
A: Mr. Kissinger replied that he would first like to make some general comments before answering the specific question. In the process by which decisions are made it is possible for a judgment to be wrong, but that does not justify attacking the fabric of the society. The press has characterized this as an “invasion” of Cambodia. But this territory was not controlled by the Cambodians. The primary objective of the operation was simply to remove supplies, and it is limited in time. (Shea interjected, “Even if Phnom Penh falls”?, and Mr. Kissinger replied, “We intend to stick by what we have said.”)
[Page 213]On the disaffection of political science professors, Mr. Kissinger stated that he had seen the impact of the war on academicians and that he understood their misgivings. He pointed out that the thrust of their point of view had always been against the war and that it was difficult for them to believe that anything we did could be an improvement. Vietnamization was not a brilliant choice, but it was the best we had in January of 1969. We had to respond not in light of what people would think tomorrow but in light of what people would think five years from now.
In regard to the events since March 18, Mr. Kissinger stated that it may be difficult for the persons present to believe but we had nothing to do with the overthrow of Sihanouk. There were no CIA personnel there and, in fact, we did not even have an Ambassador, but only a chargé d’affaires there. Indeed, it would have been better for us to have Sihanouk in Cambodia with a rough equilibrium than to have the conflict expand. We were, are, and remain committed to extricating ourselves from Vietnam and ending the war. We have made very strenuous efforts to bring about serious negotiations, some of which cannot be made public at this time, and we continue to keep these channels open.
In response to the question of whether or not the Administration had reversed its policy and was now expanding the war, Mr. Kissinger replied, “No, we were not altering our policy.” In fact, the Administration believed that what it had done would shorten the war.
Q: Mr. Shea mentioned that earlier today they had talked with Congressman McCloskey who stated that Mr. Kissinger had recently told him that one of the two alternatives of the Nixon plan for ending the war had failed.
A: Mr. Kissinger replied that this was untrue. What Mr. McCloskey may have been thinking of was that our policy is based on two tracks—one negotiation, and two, Vietnamization—and that Mr. Kissinger had told him that the negotiations were not proceeding as rapidly as everyone had hoped.
Q: Professor Lewis then asked how much political input there had been in the decision to attack the sanctuaries in Cambodia, whether it was based on soft or hard intelligence, and why we had not let the dust settle before making our decision.
A: Mr. Kissinger replied that he seems to always be conducting both tactical and theoretical conversations simultaneously. On the tactical side, there is no doubt that we ought to talk to concerned people as to whether or not the tactical decision was wise, but it does not seem to be worth tearing our campuses apart. On the theoretical side, Mr. Kissinger stated that his own conclusions, for what they were worth, were as follows: The North Vietnamese people were a very heroic and [Page 214] tenacious people and they were very good at making war, as their history proves. But the question remains as to whether or not they can also make peace. Mr. Kissinger noted that we also see this problem in the Middle East.
The North Vietnamese tactic has been to sell us the beginning of negotiations over and over again. Some people think that negotiating with them is like a detective story in which they throw out vague clues and it is up to us to discover them. There are a number of channels through which they can communicate with us directly, and we believe that when they are serious about negotiating they will not let us know through vague clues. The more fundamental problem, however, is that they cannot conceive of sharing political power. They want it foreordained that they will have control.
Q: Professor Lewis then asked whether we had given sufficient attention to Sihanouk’s position or whether we had gotten him into the situation which brought about the coup.
A: Mr. Kissinger replied that, for what it was worth, his analysis of what caused Sihanouk’s downfall was as follows: First of all, Mr. Kissinger stated that he considered Sihanouk a political genius in that he managed to keep himself in power between the right and the left. This depended on his maintaining Cambodia’s international neutrality and his manipulating the internal political structure so that he appeared to the Communists to be as far left as he could be without provoking a reaction from the right. Sihanouk therefore needed a strong right, and it was he who put Lon Nol and Matak into power. Sihanouk, when he left the country, was trying through political means to squeeze the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese there. He had gone to Paris and was on his way to Moscow and Peking to pursue this course on the diplomatic front. Consequently, he approved of Lon Nol’s activities since they gave him evidence of the troubles he was having on his right. The result, however, was that the assumption by Lon Nol got out of hand and the right wing took over. The problem now is that if Sihanouk came back he would not be the same because the balance has changed. For this reason, we cannot seek to bring him back. Our position has been the same as the French, the U.K., and most every other nation (even the Chinese until yesterday) in that we have continued to deal with the existing government.
As a result of the Lon Nol takeover, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese started to expand their sanctuaries. We warned them, publicly and privately, and we even approached the Russians to try to discourage such expansion. Finally we did not act against the sanctuaries until they moved out.
Q: A professor of anthropology stated that he wanted to impress upon Mr. Kissinger the gravity of the situation on the campuses, that [Page 215] the middle ground had disappeared, and that there had been a drastic change. After Cambodia it was not just a strike but a complete stoppage in order to determine a political consensus as to what was to be done. This dissent was not going to fade away and there was a growing feeling that one could not work through the existing political structure.
Q: Another professor stated that in view of the report of the Cambodian tribesmen being trained by the Green Berets, does this mean that we are now going to go to “Cambodianization” and “Laosization.” He felt (1) that unless we stopped the war our credibility would be zero, (2) that there was growing feeling among academics that they could no longer be believed since their universities were so closely related to defense operations, and (3) that many of the students consider the war a racist war and that it was time for us to get back to the problems of the United States. In this connection, he mentioned that the attitude of the Vice President was not very helpful since it seemed to represent a repressive atmosphere.
Q: A Mexican-American student spoke next and explained how tired the minority groups were with handouts. He said that he also spoke for the Indian-American and Chinese-American students present in expressing the frustration and alienation they felt with the system. He stated that they did not feel that minority problems should be dealt with by programs. He also felt that it was inconsistent to fight Communism in Europe with Radio Free Europe but in Southeast Asia with bullets. He mentioned that minorities die in the war at a disproportionately higher rate than do whites. Finally, he stated that he was not concerned about saving the university since it was so closely associated and involved with the war-death machine.
Another professor stated that Cambodia really was the straw that broke the camel’s back, that there had been great division and distrust on the campuses already. He went on to state that if Cambodia is only a tactical question and Vietnam is the moral question, what are the Administration’s long-range plans; or what kind of peace are we planning for in Asia?
A: Mr. Kissinger replied that he thought the students had given a correct and factual description of the campuses of the country. The real question here is, faced with this situation, what can be done? Cambodia made it easy for some to do what they wanted to do anyway, but they confused a tactical question with a fundamental question. The real issue is that any society to survive must have a modicum of trust. The bureaucracy is the curse of the modern state, and there is profound dissatisfaction with it. Mr. Kissinger stated that on the other hand he did not know what student riots contributed to the solution of the problem. [Page 216] In order to have world order we must maintain a modicum of confidence in authority. Anything worth doing takes time and order.
It is a very simple rule but whenever the scope for action is the greatest, the knowledge of the facts is the least. Whether an assessment is right or wrong can never be proved until afterwards. Our view is that we must get out of Vietnam in a way that the peace does not divide the country more than the war. Historically, a student revolution has never succeeded. If there is a revolution, it will not be by a bunch of upper-middle class college students on the left, but by some other more uncivilized group on the right. We are not playing with lives to prove our manhood. It may be one of the curses of our age that to be thoughtful requires one to be tough.
Mr. Kissinger stated that the Administration had made an effort to look many years ahead and to make decisions which would produce the kind of world and peace vehicle we all sought. Politics, however, is a grubby business and the easy decision is usually the immediate tactical one. One does not always have the time or room to make the decision that is in the long-term best interests of world peace. There have been institutions, however, in which we have had room to make long-range decisions such as in the SALT talks, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Chemical and Biological Warfare decision.
In Southeast Asia we do not believe that the situation is going to be improved simply by giving economic aid. Nor do we subscribe to the more conservative view that guerrilla warfare can solve all these problems. We are trying to ask the right questions, to stop the pedantic Americanization approach, and to get more regional cooperation. Our specific answers are not going to be very profound but they will be even less promising if we have to take a good part of our energy to deal with the present problems on our own campuses.
Q: Dean Gibbs interrupted here to ask why there was so much reverse rhetoric, for instance, from the Vice President, which in no way seemed conducive to a forward look.
A: Mr. Kissinger replied that the Administration had a spectrum of opinion and that each person there knew how difficult it would have been for Mr. Kissinger to have the dialogue he had had with them today if they had met on the campus at Stanford. He concluded by saying that he recognized the inadequacies of his own side, but that he also thought the universities should recognize the inadequacies on their part and on the part of their faculties. It seemed that too many professors were more interested in being popular than in being right, and that a resolution voted on in a large academic senate would tend to be the result of the emotions of the moment.
[Page 217]Mr. Patrick Shea, the incoming Student Body President, summed up the attitude of the students in a prepared statement saying that they hoped the Administration would re-evaluate its position in Southeast Asia.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 340, Subject Files, Stanford University, May 1970. No classification marking. Drafted by David Young of Kissinger’s office and initialed by Kissinger. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House.↩
- The reaction on the campuses of American colleges and universities to what was generally perceived as the “invasion” of Cambodia was widespread, largely peaceful, but occasionally violent. It turned tragic on May 4 at Kent State University in Ohio when anti-war demonstrators were killed by Ohio National Guardsmen. The effects of anti-war demonstrations are not often cited in official documents but as Haldeman makes clear in The Haldeman Diaries, pp. 158-164, they had a profound effect on the state of mind of the President and his advisers. Kissinger recalls in White House Years, p. 510, that he met with 10 student groups on Cambodia during May 1970 alone. Memoranda of these conversations are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, CL 268, Memoranda of Conversation, 1968-1977, Dec 1968-Nov 1970.↩