Office of the Historian

7. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

Washington, January 25, 1964.

Here are the instructions we’ve sent out to Ray Cline in our backdoor effort to bring the Gimo around. You’ll note we’ve gone no further than to say he’s coming at your request.

His instructions (attached)2 take a fairly tough line, as Rusk did with the GRC Ambassador. This includes implied threat that if GRC won’t listen to us, we may not be able to work so closely with it

McCone favors a softer line, even promising the Gimo again what Kennedy did at the time of the 1962 Outer Mongolia flap, i.e. that we’d [Page 13] use every means, including the veto, to keep Chicoms out of the UN.3 But State thinks this would rob us of any freedom of action if things went sour and we wanted to pursue a flexible strategy at the UN.4

R.W. Komer 5
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Recognition of Communist China, Vol. II. Secret.↩
  2. Telegram 648 to Taipei, January 24, stated that Cline was going to Taipei at Johnson’s request to talk to Chiang Ching-kuo and, if it appeared desirable, to President Chiang; he was to explain the U.S. position and give advice but not to make deals or negotiate. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CHICOM-FR)↩
  3. Reference is to an oral message to Chiang, delivered by Ambassador Drumright on October 17, 1961, in which Kennedy stated that “if at any time a U.S. veto is necessary and will be effective in preventing Chinese Communist entry into the U.N., the U.S. will use that veto.” See telegram 259 to Taipei, October 16, 1961, in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXII, p. 160.↩
  4. McCone stated his views in a January 24 telephone conversation with Harriman and in messages that Acting DCI Carter transmitted in letters of January 24, 25, and 27 to Harriman. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject Files, Cline, Ray S.; also Central Intelligence Agency, McCone Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 5, Folder 3, DCI European Trip, January 1964) Harriman told Ball in a January 26 telephone conversation that McCone was “quite upset” but that Harriman, Rusk, and Komer agreed that it was impossible to give Cline any negotiating authority. (Johnson Library, Ball papers, China (Taiwan))↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩