69. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson1
When Chiang Kai-shek handed the attached long rambling letter2 to our Ambassador he asked that you be told of his feeling that with the ChiCom test the situation in Asia had entered a critical stage—more critical than at any previous time.
The gist of the letter itself is that (1) the ChiComs, not the Soviets, are the greatest threat today; (2) they are engaged in a protracted war of attrition in Southeast Asia, the only answer to which is a quick US victory; and (3) the ChiCom nuclear test poses a new dimension of threat, chiefly to the morale of Free Asians.
The Gimo then calls on the US to: (1) urgently develop a strategy for quickly winning the war in Vietnam; (2) take leadership in developing an “overall plan” for concerted action by the Free Asian peoples themselves to overthrow the ChiComs before it is too late (e.g. equip and unleash the GRC); and (3) if this is not possible just now, immediately give the GRC the wherewithal to destroy the ChiCom nuclear installations. He asks for an urgent reply.
We see this letter as essentially aimed at reminding you of the Gimo’s well-known views at a time when he senses we must be rethinking our China policy. While he couches his letter in terms of a series of proposals he knows we can’t accept, his chief aim is probably to forestall any weakening of our position on the ChiRep issue in the UN. State will draft a proposed answer.
- R.W. Komer
- McG. B.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, China, Vol. I. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates Johnson saw it.↩
- Telegram 452 from Taipei, November 23, transmitted the text of the letter. Telegram 456, November 24, reported Chiang’s comments to Wright when he gave him the letter. Both are attached to the source text. Copies are also in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 US/JOHNSON.↩