Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

44. Letter From the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Wright) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)¹

Taipei, August 26, 1964.

Dear Averell:

I well recall our conversations of a little over a year ago in which the subject of “return to the mainland” was given extensive coverage. I recall also that Ambassador Kirk’s principal concern was the possibility of a move towards a channel crossing by the GRC which might get underway without our knowledge. Following my several conversations with you, I explored this problem in considerable detail with him with a view to continuation of the informative and preventative measures which he proposed.

Over the past year a noticeable change has taken place in the attitude of the GRC toward “mainland recovery”. There has been a very definite quiescence on the extensive preparations and planning which took place in late 1962 and early 1963. During this period you will recall the planning agencies of the Ministry of National Defense were burning the midnight oil to crank out plans for operations toward this objective.

During the past six months there has been a noticeable slacking off, if not disappearance, of this intensive effort and in its place we find a rather keen and increasing interest in developments in Southeast Asia, particularly in Laos and South Vietnam.

I have covered in greater detail the changes which I have noted and the reasons therefor in my Embassy A–138,² of which I am enclosing a copy in the event you care to examine these details.

I could summarize the situation by relating two circumstances which have deviated the attention of the GRC from across-the-channel amphibious operations to developments in Southeast Asia as follows:

1) The very excellent step taken by Ambassador Kirk in setting up the “Blue Lion” planning committee, consisting of the Ambassador and the Minister of National Defense, in which the GRC detailed plans for cross channel operations were examined by our staff and their inadequacies and deficiencies thoroughly developed. These shortcomings, I am sure, reached the eyes and ears of the President and were instrumental in convincing him of the gargantuan nature of such an operation and the need for massive U.S. support.

2) The worsening situation in Southeast Asia has, I believe, revealed to the President the possibilities of getting into China by the Southern route rather than by the route of direct amphibious assault.

This change in their approach does not signify in any sense a reduction in their desire to return to the mainland but rather a change in the method and approach as to how this might be accomplished.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bill Bundy in order that he may know of my communication with you.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

Jerry W.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files: Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Subject File, Wooe-Wz. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. Airgram A–138 from Taipei, August 21, noted that GRC infiltration attempts and commando raids had not revealed any weak spots in the mainland coastal defenses; on the contrary, the loss well out to sea of two commando teams in July had been a severe setback to the program and had forced a reevaluation of GRC strategy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CHINAT-US)