Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

69. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, August 27, 1964, 9 p.m.

677. On August 26 at 6 PM I met with Lal Bahadur Shastri for 45 minutes. Shastri opened conversation by apologizing for having postponed our meeting which was originally planned for noon of that day. He had decided, at the last moment, to have frank meeting with all top civil servants and meeting had lasted for over two hours. He had emphasized need for much greater administrative effort, longer hours, elimination of red tape, courage to make decisions, etc.

The primary purpose of my visit was to communicate our views on military aid situation before Chavan’s departure for Moscow August 28. On this subject conversation developed along following lines:

1. Since previous conversations with Chavan, Patil and TTK had made it clear that right now GOI feels itself to be under particular pressure from us in regard to economic, military and other matters, I opened discussion by frankly acknowledging difficulties that exist when one country gives another major sums of money.

However, we did not see the situation as a one way street. Although our aid might be important to India, her success was vital to our security and hopes for a more rational world. Such a relationship called for frankness in discussing our respective problems.

I then reviewed original military aid discussions last October and my understanding that if our assistance was reasonably large and maintained over period of years, GOI would not find it necessary to rely in any significant way on USSR in defense area.

US military aid program which was finally agreed to in June represented substantial sum with assurances, with certain qualifications, that it will be continued for five years. Shortly thereafter Khera told us that the MIG deal, on which we had had much contradictory information, was settled, and we also heard that two Soviet SAM complexes were agreed to. All of this plus Chavan’s departure for Moscow created certain complications for all of us which I wanted PriMin to understand.

I was not questioning India’s policy of nonalignment which we understood. I was, however, concerned that India was putting too much trust in a nation which Shastri, as a former Home Minister, knew did not necessarily have India’s best interests at heart.

I added that there was no need for him to comment on a subject which probably involved certain difficulties for him. I simply wanted him to understand our reasoning and particularly my own reaction in view of long negotiations which I had been conducting with his government for last ten months.

2. Shastri replied that I had clarified several questions which he had not thoroughly understood. He was particularly disturbed that we had not been told more precisely about MIG decision which had been made personally by former PriMin Nehru and April in face of some differences of opinion within GOI.

Although under these conditions he would find it impossible to revise this decision unless Soviets themselves reneged, he would talk further with Chavan before he left and do all he could to handle situation in a way that would cause the least possible embarrassment.

3. Shastri then turned to question of HF–24 which he said was creating all kinds of difficulties for India with UAR. He described his Ambassador in Cairo as an emotional man who sent back messages stating that unless India did precisely what UAR wanted her to do, present friendly relations between UAR and India might be destroyed.

This impressed Shastri as unreasonable since as far as he knew UAR was in no position to provide fully acceptable engine within reasonable period of time. Furthermore UAR proposal called for the engine to be built in Cairo and the air frame in Bangalore. This was contrary to India’s interests since her major objective was to produce an indigenous plane.

Nevertheless with nonaligned conference coming up in October, situation did create a formidable political problem and it would be necessary to mark time until dust settled.

4. I suggested that all nations face somewhat similar political problems in regard to development of their defenses. For instance, many of our cities and states bring heavy pressure to bear on federal government to continue production of obsolete and semi-obsolete equipment on grounds that curtailment would create local unemployment and political difficulties. A major achievement of present US administration has been its willingness to face up to these pressures and to insist on best possible defense for smallest amount of money.

India, facing huge economic requests, could not afford to build her armed forces on a political basis. The MIG deal was primarily based on the questionable hope that it would involve Russians on Indian side in case Chinese attacked. An agreement with the UAR in regard to HF–24 was in India’s interest if it provided better plane, but if it were designed to placate Nasser it might prove to be an expensive undertaking.

Shastri accepted this and I believe over a period of time, he will act in accordance with it. In the present situation, he is involved with decisions made by the already legendary Jawaharlal Nehru which, barring a fumble by the Soviets which we have no reason to anticipate, he cannot be expected to reverse.

Throughout discussion Shastri acted very much like the PriMin of India and once again I was impressed with his intellectual capacity and his direct, earthy approach. If he keeps his health, he will do well, perhaps very well.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US–INDIA. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Karachi, London, Moscow, Kathmandu, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, and also sent to CINCMEAFSA/POLAD.