66. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Dear Mac:
By the time you receive this letter you will perhaps have read and digested our Embtel 1432 in which I outlined the situation I found on my return to India in regard to military assistance in general and the proposed Air Force package in particular.
Although the GOI was greatly pleased by our willingness to provide grant and loan assistance on a five year basis, they became convinced some time in late June that we are not prepared to provide the assistance to the Indian Air Force which was the primary item on Chavan’s shopping list.3 At the same time, they decided that the British, to whom we referred them, would not come up with a submarine to match the one we gave the Pakistanis.
This gives the USSR the opportunity to enter the Indian defense situation by the dramatic measures which we had sought to deny them. Khera will be in Moscow sometime in August and the Chavan mission arrives there on August 28. In the normal course of events, we may expect announcements in the Indian and United States press in early September stating that the Soviet Union has agreed to provide surface-to-air missiles for the protection of north Indian cities, twelve additional MIG-21s to make an active squadron of sixteen, an assembly line to produce MIG-21s here in India, and possibly one or more submarines.
Such announcements in the midst of a particularly bitter United States election debate on foreign policy will provide an open invitation to the more irresponsible elements at home, and consequently our [Page 140] difficulties in dealing rationally with the Indian subcontinent will be further compounded.
As you know, this is precisely the kind of situation that we have been warning against for months. Indeed you may find it worthwhile to reread the memorandum which I prepared on November 124 for my visit to Washington just before Jack Kennedy died. (There is a copy in your files.)
I think you will be impressed all over again with the opportunity which we had then to evolve a realistic South Asian military-political policy which would take into account our relations with India and Pakistan, reconcile the defense needs of each nation in a balanced fashion, encourage a greater Indian involvement in South Asia and keep the Soviets away from the more sensitive and dramatic military areas—all at a modest cost to ourselves.
If we had been free to offer at an earlier date the five year $50 million grant-$50 million loan military program outlined in the McNamara-Chavan exchange plus the aircraft proposal which Rusk recommended to McNamara (and which he largely accepted) we could have largely pre-empted the military situation in India in a way that would be greatly to our advantage and that of the Paks.
Although I am most appreciative of your support and that of Bob Komer and Jim Grant, I am deeply distressed over my own failure to break through the wall of timidity and inertia that I encountered in other quarters.
However, this is water over the dam; our task now is to consider what we can do to make the best of a situation which still contains many major elements of strength.
As soon as T.T. Krishnamachari has a chance to settle down after his visit to London, I shall describe to him the implications of this situation in our forthcoming election and stress the importance (a) of making sure that the Khera-Chavan purchases in the Soviet Union do not result in India’s exceeding our agreed ceiling on foreign exchange expenditures and (b) the advisability of keeping publicity regarding whatever agreements may be reached with the USSR to an absolute minimum, and, if at all possible, of spreading these agreements over a period of several months in order to cushion the public impact here and in the United States.
[Page 141]I will see that this message comes through loud and clear to TTK and to Shastri. However, it is important that the United States Government at this stage avoid any appearance of petulance or frustration in India and so I plan to limit myself to casual comments on this particular subject in discussions with other members of the Cabinet and the press.
For the time being this is about all we can expect to accomplish here within our present authority. However, to establish the optimum tactical position a further step is essential, i.e., well in advance of Chavan’s visit to the USSR we should casually establish the fact that if the GOI had chosen to follow a different course, we would have been prepared to provide India with a comprehensive and fully adequate Air Force defense program including some arrangement for F–104s.
With a little elbow room and a few well placed but hazy conversations, I believe I can establish the impression that the present situation was India’s deliberate choice. This may help persuade the Indians to keep their present air defense dealings with the Soviets in a low key; above all it will prepare the ground first with the Indian Government and later, if necessary, with key members of the Indian press when the announcement comes that the Pakistanis are getting their additional squadron of F–104s.
It is particularly important, Mac, that I quietly establish this point soon; otherwise it will look like the comment of a petulant loser on the eve of the Soviet-Indian negotiations in Moscow. I’ll be deeply grateful for your support and help.
In the meantime, we are proceeding vigorously with our analysis of the overlapping interests of Pakistan and India in economic, military and political fields, which I am hopeful can be used effectively in our dealings with both governments.
I am also embarking on a renewed effort to persuade the GOI and key members of the Indian press not only of India’s stake in keeping the communists out of Southeast Asia (which they already accept) but also the similarity of United States-Indian interests in this area and the expedient character of the whole Soviet operation there (witness USSR support for Sukarno against Malaysia). With a little luck perhaps I can bring them into some degree of conflict with the Soviets on this question and eventually persuade them to take a somewhat more active role.
It is folly for either the United States or the Indians to assume that they can count on Soviet policies in Asia paralleling our own interests. To be sure, there may be occasions when for tactical reasons we will momentarily find ourselves on the same side of the table. But a little more than three years ago Khrushchev was threatening Jack Kennedy with oblivion if we failed to get out of Berlin and less than two years [Page 142] ago he was busily planting missiles in Cuba. The Indians must gradually be convinced of these realities.5
In the meantime, United States influence is bound to suffer in some degree because of the deep concern over the news of the Goldwater nomination. The fact that he was nominated by the Senate minority leader and seconded by the leader of the House and that all the other Republican candidates promptly moved to make the nomination unanimous has compounded the impression that a major segment of the American people actually favor a program of reckless adventurism in world affairs, and the abandonment of our present efforts in the developing nations.
The possibilities are rather frightening and I only hope that our good Republican business friends such as Jack McCloy, as well as Nelson Rockefeller and other political leaders, will see the urgent need to help us assure not only Goldwater’s defeat but his political destruction.
Warmest regards.
Sincerely,
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. III, Cables, 7/64–11/64. Secret; Eyes Only. Bundy sent this letter to Komer on July 24 with a handwritten note that reads: “What can we do for him?”↩
- Bowles used telegram 143 from New Delhi, July 16, to express in more detail the concerns and proposed solutions set forth in this letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US–INDIA)↩
- India Desk Officer Anthony Lakeland discussed the Chavan visit with Chavan in Bombay on July 7 and drew a different conclusion concerning Chavan’s view of potential U.S. assistance for the Indian Air Force. According to Lakeland’s record of the conversation, Chavan considered the question of India’s requirement for a supersonic fighter to be still open for discussion and he urged that it remain so. (Memorandum of conversation, July 7; ibid., NEA/INC Files: Lot 68 D 207, POL 15–1, Y.B. Chavan Defense Minister)↩
- This memorandum, entitled “Toward a Balance of Political and Military Forces in South Asia,” is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Security, 1963. The memorandum is summarized in a November 12, 1963, memorandum from Komer to President Kennedy, printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIX, Document 337.↩
- Joint State/Defense telegram 190, July 24, replied to Bowles that the conclusions drawn in Washington from the military assistance negotiations with the Indians differed from his. Washington officials thought India had achieved most of what it had sought in the Chavan talks and was not likely to abandon the possibility of air defense assistance from the West, whatever the outcome of negotiations in Moscow. They expected India, as a non-aligned power, to shop broadly for military supplies and assistance. The telegram concluded: “So long as we demonstrate responsiveness and steady support for principal Indian requirements in military field, we do not see Soviet aid, including that in the military field, as seriously threatening over the long term our present basic level of influence in India or India’s capability to maintain its independence and integrity.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US–INDIA)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩