58. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara1
Dear Bob:
We may be close enough to agreement on the contents of a comprehensive U.S. air defense package for India so that it would be worthwhile for me to try to set them down in writing. My objective is to secure Executive Branch agreement on this now. As you probably know, for the immediate present we are deferring presentation of any comprehensive air package in order to avoid introducing a jarring note during the Indo-Pak honeymoon which seems to be in process. In this regard I might add that Pak Foreign Minister Bhutto has already publicly criticized our recent announcement to the press of additional military assistance to India at a time when Pakistan is trying to improve its relations with India. He has done this despite the obvious restraint imposed by his government on critical press reaction to the announcement.
So that we will be in a position to move when the time is ripe—and we have our eyes very much on possible Soviet moves and the timing of any Indian military mission to Moscow—I suggest an air package on the following order: [Page 127]
- 1.
- F6A’s. Three squadrons of (72) F6A’s. (We have, of course, already discussed these with the Indians. I should express our strong view that we should not go in with the F6A’s alone but that they should be only a part of a comprehensive package.)
- 2.
- HF–24. If our feasibility studies are positive, we would be willing to provide technical assistance in adapting a Western engine to the HF–24 airframe, and other technical assistance in developing this airplane into an operational Mach 2 interceptor.
- 3.
- Supersonics. If, after a year or so of joint efforts to develop the HF–24, this aircraft does not seem likely to become an operational Mach 2 interceptor, we would be prepared to help the Indians find suitable Western supersonics. We now see our way clear to offering some 36 of these. We would tell the Indians this when we present the comprehensive air package. If the Indians should come back and say that this package is not responsive to their desire for some sort of domestic assembly—which the MIG deal would permit—I should hope that we would be prepared to look most closely into what could be done to meet this point.
For planning purposes I believe we need now an Executive Branch determination that these 36 aircraft could be F–104G’s, although I would hope that we could get the Indians to settle on some other interceptor, such as the F5A or F–104 A/B. (We have gone beyond the 24 F–104’s which you suggested as we don’t believe we could sell the package at this level; at 36 we would have something which would give us a chance with the Indians. We would not expect in any event that deliveries of U.S. supersonics to India over the next five years would get ahead of deliveries to Pakistan.)
I am particularly persuaded that this entire package, including individual components such as the F6A’s, should be offered only on the condition that India drop its plans for obtaining MIG 21’s beyond rounding out a single squadron of no more than 24 aircraft. Our position with Pakistan would be greatly weakened if the Indians were able to secure substantial combat air assistance from both blocs. Furthermore, I am greatly concerned regarding the reaction on the Hill should we help the Indians with combat air while they build up their stock of MIG 21’s. Reaction on the Hill may be hard enough to deal with after an Indian MIG deal even if we do not help the Indians in the combat air field.
I hope you agree that we can move forward with our planning on this basis.
Sincerely,
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, India 381. Secret. Received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on June 18 at 11:22 a.m. A stamped notation on the letter reads: “SecDef has seen, 20 June 1964.”↩