Office of the Historian

56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1

Washington, June 10, 1964, 9:40 p.m.

2573. New Delhi’s 3685 to Dept,2 repeated Karachi 1631, CINCMEAFSA unnumbered.

Air Defense Assistance. During year and half of Indo-Pak tensions since Chicom attack we have not permitted Pak objections to stand in way of larger US interest in strengthening Indian forces against threat Chicom aggression. At same time we have done what possible to encourage Pak-Indian accommodation in realization that any lasting security of subcontinent requires Indo-Pak cooperation. Nehru’s death, accession of moderate Shastri government, and friendly reaction of Ayub has opened new vista of possible Pak-Indian accommodation. Under these circumstances believe main play of USG for coming weeks should be to leave field open for possible development of forces leading toward accommodation and avoid actions which might tend rekindle [Page 124] flames of subcontinent controversy. Underlying this policy is thesis that as prospects for Indo-Pak accommodation improve, long run security of subcontinent requires that major determinant US policy be what will contribute to proper climate for accommodation.

Judged against this background, we believe Memorandum of Understanding recently concluded with GOI is about as far as we can go at this moment without risking injecting new disruptive factor into Indo-Pak relations. Therefore, while we believe we should meet our commitment to continue discussing air defense assistance with Indians, we should defer for time being presenting comprehensive package for air assistance. Accordingly, Embassy should delay continuation of current talks on comprehensive aircraft assistance. We will follow-up in later message with strategy by which we propose to meet commitment to continue discussions while deferring any new offer. FYI: We are planning continue our initiative with Indians for comprehensive feasibility study of HF–24 while deferring discussion with Indians of possible backup of project with US supersonic aircraft.3 End FYI.

We believe Memorandum of Understanding has already effectively demonstrated for the present our support of new government. Your reports show that Indian officials are quite pleased results Chavan mission. Moreover, talks with Rao and Khera indicate Indians may be further down MIG-21 road than we had previously realized. Under circumstances described above seems our best tactic now would be to do what we can to encourage Indians keep available options open (i.e., MIG-21 and HF–24) until they have facts which would enable them in making decisions to take into account technical and military factors, as well as their evident preference for domestic production. Feasibility study of HF–24 is essential ingredient of this tactic.

We count on you to help reduce sense of immediacy which has been built up around this subject. Your return to US would in itself contribute to this.

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–INDIA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by Talbot, Cameron, Solbert (substance), and Freshman (G/PM) (substance); and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi, London, and CINCSTRIKE for POLAD.↩
  2. In telegram 3685 from New Delhi, June 6, Bowles argued for building upon the success achieved with the memorandum of understanding on military assistance by negotiating an agreement to meet the Indian Government’s desire to upgrade the Indian Air Force. (Ibid.)↩
  3. On June 17 the Department instructed the Embassy to implement this strategy in discussing the requirements of the Indian Air Force. (Telegram 2624 to New Delhi; ibid., DEF 19–3 US–INDIA)↩