Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

526. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, November 23, 1968, 0156Z.

276950. Subject: U.S. Military Supply Policy. Ref: New Delhi’s 22784.²

1. We know of your strong views on tanks for Pakistan but for reasons you are aware, decision has been made to proceed if Pakistan and Turkey can work out arrangements. For reasons set forth in previous communications, most recently in report of Hart/Jung conversation (274522),³ we do not believe long-pending tank transaction poses problem of major proportion, unless GOI decides to exaggerate its significance. We do not believe tank deal should logically contribute to escalation of arms race, any more than U.K. sale of Hawker-Hunter aircraft to India contributed.

2. We appreciate fact GOI is aroused by prospects of sale and they fear that tanks might somehow encourage Pakistanis to some adventure against India. Judging, however, by your conversation with Kaul (New Delhi’s 22700)⁴ there may also be element of self-justification for impending Indian arms purchase from Soviet Union, negotiations for which were under way well before tank deal with Pakistan was revived.

3. We have reviewed points made in para 4 of reftel. As you know, our present military supply policy would exclude direct U.S. sale of light tanks, armored personnel carriers and armored reconnaissance airborne assault vehicles to India. Our policy would permit, however, case-by-case examination of third country arrangements for sales these three items, if and when we are approached. Current policy would also exclude licensing arrangement for indigenous production of fighter-interceptor aircraft (though defense production projects such as Varangaon acceptable). In all cases, we would want to examine each purchase request carefully in order to avoid any escalation of subcontinent arms race and unnecessary diversion of resources from economic development.

4. We will keep you posted regarding tank transaction⁵ and meanwhile hope you can use points made to Jung to temper Indian reaction. Our comments on sale of 106 mm ammunition under existing policy (DRI 837 68 of 20 Nov)⁶ will be forwarded separately.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Grant E. Mouser (NEA/INC) on November 22; cleared by Van Hollen, Colonel Kravitz (DOD/ISA), and General Doyle (DOD/Joint Staff/J–5), and in draft by Schmelzer and Spain; and approved by Handley. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA.
2. In telegram 22784 from New Delhi, November 20, from Bowles to the Secretary, Bowles reiterated his conviction that the United States should not sell or countenance the sale of lethal weapons to India or Pakistan. If, however, the sale of Patton tanks by Turkey to Pakistan was irreversible, Bowles stated that the impact of the sale in India might be muted somewhat by a concomitant decision to sell or authorize the sale of lethal weapons to India. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 274522 to New Delhi, November 20, reported on a conversation on November 19 between Assistant Secretary Hart and Indian Ambassador Jung in which Jung registered his country’s concern over reports of a sale of U.S.-originated tanks to Pakistan. Hart noted that the sale remained to be consummated, but stated that if it occurred it could serve the purpose of preventing Pakistan from becoming completely dependent upon Communist sources for military equipment. (Ibid.)
4. See footnote 2, Document 525.
5. On December 26 Oehlert reported that he had learned from the Pakistani Foreign Office that the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Turkey had reached agreement on the sale of Turkish tanks to Pakistan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK)
6. Not found.