Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

519. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 25, 1968, 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Tanks for Pakistan

At Tab A² Nick Katzenbach advises that we have reached the decision point in the nagging year-old effort to find Patton tanks for Ayub. If you feel strongly about this obligation, he recommends that we pay the cost ($3 million) of arranging an interim sale through Turkey, the only feasible third-country deal we’ve been able to turn up. Failing a Turkish deal, Katzenbach thinks we should tell Ayub we have honestly done our best and he will have to look elsewhere. With the support of his SIG colleagues, Nick lays out your main options:

1. Turkish sale: The Turks apparently won’t sell 100 M–47’s to Pakistan unless they can get 100 refurbished M–48’s for themselves in the bargain. This will cost us about $3 million; Nitze is prepared to find the money within current budget limits. But this would take care of only half of the 200 tanks Ayub wants. Defense is not ready to chip in another $3 million for another round of the Turk-to-Pak tank switch. Katzenbach and Co. recommend you can and should leave the second 100 tanks for your successor. One hundred now at $3 million and 100 left hanging is the preferred course.

2. Iran: The Shah will sell 100 old M–47’s to Ayub if we replace them with new M–60’s. This would add $22 million to Iran’s planned purchases. Thus it would fly in the face of our budget-cutting advice to the Shah and probably raise a storm on the Hill. No one recommends this alternative.

3. Change policy for one-time exception: You could lift the current ban on direct U.S. weapons sales to the subcontinent just to sell Ayub these tanks. Your advisors think this would be the worst of worlds. It would mock a policy we’ve all defended up to this moment, be certain to bring an outcry from the Hill, and deeply embitter the Indians, who have always feared that we didn’t mean our even-handed policy following the 1965 war. Chet Bowles feels strongly that it’s far better to remove the arms ban for good—whatever flak this would bring in India—rather than try to carry off a one-time exception for Pak arms clearly aimed at the Indians.

4. Reverse current policy: You could lift the South Asian arms ban altogether because of (a) the demonstrable argument that third country sales just don’t work, and (b) the policy judgment that arms sales are the only way to get the seat we want at Pak and Indian tables to influence—and, hopefully, restrain—their inevitable military spending. As with all military sales, we would be deciding sales to India and Pakistan case-by-case on the grounds of legitimate need and aiming at ultimate limitation of arms spending.

Nick would like to see us do everything we can to make the Turkish sale work because removing the ban altogether will surely present us with a sizeable and expensive shopping list from the Paks. And though they would make righteous noises at first about our policy switch, the Indians would also soon be pressing to buy. Certainly we could call the shots on what we even consider selling. But no one can be sure that lifting the ban, arousing expectations, and then turning down numerous requests wouldn’t leave us with less leverage on the Indians and Paks than we have now. Whatever its effect abroad, a change in policy would bring sharp reaction from the Hill.

Despite these strong arguments against lifting the ban, Nick and his colleagues feel that if the Turkish deal is unworkable—and you personally feel a commitment to Ayub—the next best way to get him the tanks would be to change present policy across the board. We hoped third-country purchases would add enough flexibility to our policy to make it livable. If that door just won’t open, then we have to make the hard choice between abandoning the military field in the subcontinent altogether and staying in the game. Nick would argue for staying in the game, but he’d prefer to see that choice left to your successor. That’s why he thinks it’s worth $3 million to make the Turkish deal work.

Indian Reaction

It goes without saying that any of the above actions which get Ayub his tanks will make us unpopular in India for awhile. Even though the Indians have made major purchases from the Soviets, even if the tanks got to Ayub via a third country entirely in the context of our current no-favorites arms policy, and even though we approved a British sale of Hawker-Hunters to the Indians under the same policy provision, this deal would be our first involvement in a major Pakistani arms purchase since the 1965 war.

Peshawar Negotiations

Nick believes—and I tend to agree—that the tanks should be kept separate from Peshawar talks. Ben Oehlert has long felt that the tanks would enable us to make the best of our withdrawal from the base. You should know, however, that it looks as if Ayub has already turned around and largely met our request for an extension of certain facilities several months beyond the July 1969 close-out of the agreement. Ayub will see this as a major concession; Ben points out (Tab B) that Ayub talked about tanks in the same breath.³

Recommendation

This is a mixed bag. Following Nick’s recommendation and offering $3 million in replacement tanks to the Turks is clearly the easiest way out. But we should consider that we are only prolonging the agony in South Asian arms policy. It could be argued that this is the time to scrap current policy as plainly unworkable, take the public heat and let the new Administration see if open sales can work at all. Your successor would probably find it easier to clamp back on the ban than to take it off.

On balance, my own vote goes with Katzenbach to make the Turkish deal work.

Walt

Try Turkish deal with sweetener as last effort⁴

Turkish deal with sweetener but fall back to changing policy

Change policy now

One-time exception

Let Turkish deal ride; tell Paks to come back to my successor

Call me

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Memos, 5/68–11/68. Secret/Sensitive. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates it was received at 4 p.m.
2. Reference is to an October 22 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President entitled “Tanks for Pakistan.” (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 101, Oct. 23–28, 1968) A copy is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK.
3. The reference should be to Tab C. Rostow added a handwritten note at this point that reads: “At Tab C is Oehlert’s personal message to you—arrived today back channel.” For the text of Oehlert’s message, see Document 518.
4. None of the options is checked. A handwritten note on the memorandum by Jim Jones indicates the President’s response: “Jim—Set up meeting soon to discuss this.”