Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

498. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Rawalpindi, May 31, 1968, 1245Z.

5405. Ref: State 173271.² Please pass White House. From Ambassador.

1. Yesterday Chief of Army Staff General Yaqub gave General Geary the following information:

A. GOB³ offering only class 5 tanks, which are wrecks requiring complete overhaul.

B. As is price dollars twelve thousand including ten thousand USG residual (at which residual Yaqub expressed disappointment).

C. Overhaul quoted at dollars fifty thousand not including parts (which would vary from dollars ten to fifteen thousand) or engines (which would cost dollars twenty to twenty-five thousand).

D. Cost to get tanks here estimated at dollars five to seven thousand.

E. Therefore total cost delivered here would range from dollars ninety-seven thousand to dollars one hundred nine thousand.

2. Price is therefore double limits previously established by USG.

3. Paks indicated to General Geary that they could not contemplate such a transaction.

4. When I arrived at President’s house this morning I was ushered into an ante-room where I was immediately joined by the Defense Secretary, General Yaqub and General Rafi, who informed me that President Ayub had just overruled them and decided to purchase 100 Belgian tanks “as is” for dollars twelve thousand each and rehabilitate them here. The Secretary and Yaqub said that they hoped USG would waive or substantially reduce its dollars ten thousand residual. At that point I was called into Ayub’s office.

5. I had previously decided that I would not request Ayub to clarify the conflicting positions to me of his MFA and MOD, but would rather only ask him if I could give President Johnson a message from him that if President Johnson should subsequently have any suggestions about Peshawar the door would be open for future discussions. I had reached this decision because I felt that if I confronted him with a ministerial conflict his only options would be:

A. To refuse to answer: or

B. To disavow one or the other ministry’s position.

6. When I was ushered in both Foreign Secretary Yusuf and Presidential Adviser Fida Hassan were present, which confirmed in my mind the wisdom of not posing a ministerial confrontation.

7. After the usual exchange of pleasantries, he asked me to convey to President Johnson his deep appreciation for the arrival of the second watershed management team.

8. President Ayub then informed me that he had overruled his military people and decided to accept the 100 Belgian tanks as is and to rehabilitate them in this country. He said the tanks were really junk but that he was desperate, had to have some equipment and had no other place to turn. He said that whereas six months ago tanks had been available from Iran they no longer were because the Shah had decided to keep all his M–47’s and M–48’s and rehabilitate them himself. Ayub stated that he still needed more tanks than those first 100 and that there being no other source, he hoped that USG would sell him 100 directly.

I made no response to this except to say first that I would convey his message and second that I thought he realized how difficult such a thing would be in view of our present Congressional posture.

9. I then asked him if he had any other messages for me to convey to President Johnson.

10. He responded that he would appreciate it if I would convey to both the President and to Lady Bird his sincerest affection, his sympathy for the crushing burdens which the President bears, and his prayerful good wishes for the President’s success, good health and happiness.

11. I then stated that there was one message I would be pleased to be permitted to carry to President Johnson, namely: that if the President should subsequently have any suggestions about Peshawar the door would be open for future discussions.

12. For the first time in my fairly frequent contacts with him he showed visible signs of agitation. (Otherwise, in health, bearing, appearance and attitude he was his old self.)

13. He made a long and somewhat agitated statement that he had given the Peshawar matter the deepest of consideration, that he recognized its great importance to USG, that he had no desire to do anything to harm the USG, that he had the deepest affection for President Johnson, Vice-President Humphrey, Mr. McNamara and many other warm American friends, that he had been a comrade to arms with the American military and admired and respected them all (naming among others Admiral Radford and General Twining), but that the security of his country required that Peshawar be closed. He went on to say that at the time of the Powers U–2 incident Russia threatened him with nuclear attack; that at the time of the Cuban missile crisis the Russians informed him that if a conflict broke out Pakistan would receive one of the first waves of atomic missiles, and that the Russians had recently made it clear that if he permitted Peshawar to continue his country would be in grave danger. He then besought my sympathy for and understanding of his position and requested me to make that position clear to President Johnson and to express to the President Ayub’s hope and concern that the President too would sympathize and understand. It is to be noted that during this lengthy monologue he did not answer my question either affirmatively or negatively. It is also interesting to note that he did not mention China.

14. At the end of his dissertation, I repeated the question in somewhat different phraseology.

15. He responded with an almost identical soliloquy.

16. I rephrased the question a third time.

17. He stood up, held his head, and said that while he had not consulted any of his advisers about what he was about to say, the only possibility which he had been able to think of was that the facility might be installed on a smaller and less visible basis, in a different location, under complete Pakistani control.

18. Given the circumstances and my several instructions, I did not see my way clear to respond forcefully to Ayub’s presentation.

19. I rose again to take my leave, thanking him for the interview even though “the outcome had not been to my liking.” He asked me to remain for another cup of coffee, but the conversation was confined to platitudes about my wife, children and grandchildren, the USG presidential election, etc. etc.

20. He accepted my third attempt to leave, but once more repeated his observations of paragraph 17 above.

21. It is my considered opinion that Ayub has not chosen an MFA position over a MOD position but rather that the MFA position was Ayub’s position.

22. It is also my considered opinion that Ayub is convinced that closing Peshawar is required by his bilateral policy, and that:

A. He will suffer punishment or lose reward from Russia, or both, if he lets Peshawar remain open even for a short time after July 17, 1969; and

B. He will suffer no retribution from USG if he closes it.

23. It is further my considered opinion that Ayub will not modify his position unless he becomes convinced, either or both, that:

A. He will suffer massive aid punishment if he closes it; and/or

B. He will receive very substantial military equipment, but probably on a purchase basis, if he leaves it open for a time.

24. It is additionally my considered opinion that:

A. We should not either threaten (A) above or withdrawal present spare parts program unless we mean to carry it out:

B. We should not promise (B) above unless

(1) We consider it in our national interest to do so regardless of Peshawar; or

(2) The final evaluation of Peshawar is so high that we consider we must save it for at least a few years.

25. Present schedule is to leave Pindi noon Monday for Karachi and to leave Karachi 0600 hours Thursday for New York arriving Washington for consultations Monday June 17.

26. Please advise ASAP:

A. If wish further representations made to Ayub before departure; or

B. If wish me to postpone departure; or

C. If wish me arrive for consultations prior June 17.

27. Reference State 173125,⁴ I feel most strongly that under all the circumstances we should not respond in any way in Washington or here to the hardware list until after a full posture on both Peshawar and military supply policy has been evolved, hopefully during my consultations.

28. At 0830 hours tomorrow morning I will deliver a letter to MOD reading as follows:

“Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, President Ayub informed me this morning that a decision had been taken to purchase 100 M–47 tanks from Belgium in ‘as is’ condition for $12,000.00 each. Reference is made to my letter of May 9⁵ addressed to the Minister of Defense, particularly to the following portions:

1. Reference to previous undertakings on page 1.

2. Reference to estimated price on page 1.

3. Comments on pages 3 and 4.

I assume that this mission will in due course receive a formal communication from your government confirming its intention, setting forth estimated cost of purchase and rehabilitation, confirming the previous undertakings referred to on page 1 of my letter of May 9, and requesting the approval of my government for the indicated transaction.”

Oehlert

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Telegram 173271 to Rawalpindi, May 29, instructed Oehlert not to take a specific position concerning renewal of the agreement governing the Peshawar facility during his scheduled conversation with Ayub. Such a position, the Department noted, had yet to be defined. (Ibid., DEF 15 PAK-US)
3. Government of Belgium.
4. Telegram 173125 to Rawalpindi, May 29, summarized a conversation between Pakistan Country Director Spain and Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly that dealt largely with the recent visit of Soviet Premier Kosygin to Pakistan. At the conclusion of the conversation, Hilaly asked for an early response to the hardware list he left with Assistant Secretary Battle on May 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 USSR) For the list referred to by Hilaly, see Document 495.
5. Not found.