Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

483. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)¹

Washington, February 10, 1968, 2349Z.

CAP 80402. For Ambassador Bowles from Walt Rostow. We were delighted to receive your message reporting Morarji Desai’s assurances on the Conte amendment.² It is very good to know that we will not have a serious problem on this score at least through the end of the fiscal year.

As you know, both the Conte and the Symington Amendments reflect deep concern among the Congress and the people that we exert all the influence we can against arms races between poor countries, particularly Latin America and South Asia, and against diversion of resources from economic to military purposes. I know that nobody feels these concerns more deeply than you do.

I would hope, therefore, that this successful experience on the Conte issue can be followed up with a special effort to make it clear to Morarji that our ability to come through with the economic aid we all agree India needs depends heavily on the shape of the defense budget he will announce on February 29. The President has just sent to the Hill an aid request $600 million higher than what he got last year despite (1) serious risk that it will be sharply cut, and (2) crying domestic needs for which he has a better chance of getting the money he requests. To make this act of courage worthwhile we will need equal courage in Delhi.

I know that U.S. influence on Indian budget decisions is a very touchy problem. Still, I think it is very important that we try to find a private way to get across one simple fact of life: If the Indians could possibly manage a decrease in the defense budget this year, we would have an additional major weapon in fighting for the foreign aid appropriation we need. If, on the other hand, there is a major increase, we will put a powerful weapon in the hands of those who would have us abandon India to her fate. I realize that Morarji has already ruled out a decrease in a public speech, but I wonder whether your personal intervention might not get him to reconsider. In any case, we should make certain he is absolutely clear on the importance of restraint in terms of the situation here.

Once the budget is announced, I would hope we could follow through with the general defense talks that you and Morarji have discussed in days past. The Conte-Symington business is not, I am convinced, a transitory phenomenon. Both we and the Indians are going to have to get used to sharing our knowledge and our planning on these delicate matters. The sooner we start, the better.

My best to you and Steb. I know things must be hectic with UNCTAD in town. Elspeth sends her regards.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. X, Cables, 8/67–2/68. Secret; [text not declassified].
2. In telegram 9881 from New Delhi, February 1, Bowles referred to the assurance offered by Desai that no contracts or agreements for acquisition of military equipment of the type envisioned by the Conte Amendment had been entered into or were contemplated from January 2 to June 30, 1968. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 5)