481. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)1
Dear Chet:
Many thanks for your letter of December 222 reviewing the background of Indian defense planning. I certainly agree that in judging [Page 944] Indian activities in the arms field we must not allow ourselves to be governed by our exasperations with India’s uncandid behavior. I think I can say in all sincerity that these exasperations, vexing as they were, have not influenced our consideration of the issues involved.
In discussing the buildup of the Indian Air Force, you suggest that acquisition of the SU–7 and other aircraft is in accordance with the Indian 5-year defense plan (since stretched to 7 years) which was adopted with our approval in 1964. As you know, the Indians both here and in New Delhi have argued from this position. I recall that it was the burden of one of B.K. Nehru’s last calls on me. B.K. went so far as to produce the plan itself to demonstrate that we have no reason to object to the SU–7s.
The argument would have considerable force if we could conclude that nothing significant had happened since May 1964 to call into question the relevance of the Plan in the context of Indo-American relations. I cannot agree that this is the case. The Indo-Pak conflict in 1965 has fundamentally changed the situation and has led us to a basic recasting of our arms supply policy toward the subcontinent. The 1964 Defense Plan, developed against a background of significant US assistance to the strengthening of India’s defenses, cannot at this late date determine our approach to Indian defense expenditures.
This fundamental difference between 1964 and 1968 is further underscored by the mood of Congress. The lawyers are still studying the Conte and Symington Amendments and we have not yet come to a definite conclusion as to how we will interpret them in the administration of our foreign aid programs. What is definite, however, is that both amendments reflect the distaste of Congress toward the acquisition by developing nations of advanced weaponry and a determination on its part to prevent indirect American financing of such weapons.
I am reasonably certain that were we to try to ignore history and the mood on the Hill and seek to justify Indian arms acquisitions in terms of the conditions which prevailed in 1964 our effort would be a non-starter with Congress. I think that influential Congressmen, perhaps even more than we here, recognize that the old pre-1965 era in Indo-American relations is over and that we must work toward a new relationship.
I would hope that one of the achievements in working out this new relationship will be a restoration of candor between the two sides and a frank discussion of where India is going in the defense field. Our telegram 903813 spells out at some length how important it is, in [Page 945] terms of the administration of FY68 funds as well as our discussion with Congress of the FY69 aid bill, that we reach a better understanding of what the Indians mean to do.
I hope that you will devote all your skill toward developing a meaningful dialogue and, particularly, to relating it to the need for restraint on the Indians’ part in total defense spending.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Schaffer in NEA/INC on January 11.↩
- A copy of Bowles’ December 22, 1967, letter to Rusk is ibid. He also sent a copy to McNamara who responded on January 17 along the lines of Rusk’s response. He too felt that the 1965 war had changed the situation on the subcontinent and that the 1964 Memorandum of Understanding with India had been overtaken by events. From that perspective, McNamara felt that the “SU–7 incident was most unfortunate and we must make it clear to the Indians that such actions seriously inhibit our ability to support legitimate economic and military requirements.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, India 1967)↩
- Document 479.↩