476. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1

2492. Ref: (a) State 87857;2 (b) Rawalpindi 2443.3

In Pindi reftel reported Ayub conversation of December 22 re Peshawar.
With further reference to State 87857:
Regardless of what we say about not linking Peshawar specifically to military supply policy (para 1(b), State 87857) it will be impossible to divorce the two from each other in the minds, tactics, and strategy of GOP and it is a fact that both negotiations must be conducted in the same time frame. The key word of the above reference is “specifically” and we will be so guided.
The GOP will not be greatly convinced of the “considerable continuing value to GOP” of USG military supply policy (State 87857, para 1 (c)) unless either or both:
Such policy produces reasonable quantity end items for GOP on a case to case basis;
Such policy results in measurable reductions in GOI offensive strength.
Admiral Khan’s reference to tanks and Peshawar in same conversation can be construed not as attempt to “force change in military supply policy” (para 1 (d) State 87857) but rather as expectation that positive results will be forthcoming under that policy on a case to case basis.
While it is agreed that we must make clear to GOP that there are limits to what we can do in the field of increasing GOP capacity at Peshawar, this proposition should rest on terms of our own technical security requirements and not on our inability to make major direct contribution to GOP capabilities [6–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
Pursuant to conversation with Ayub will be talking next week both to Khan and to Pirzada. Both will have a substantial intervention in the decision and we intend maintain dialogue with both as well as with Ayub.
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret; Exdis.
  2. Document 474.
  3. See footnote 6, Document 474.