449. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Ammunition sales to Pakistan
At Tab A is a draft cable,2 approved by Katzenbach and Nitze, which further defines our policy on arms sales to India and Pakistan. Because of the current problems on the Hill, I thought you would want to review it.
You will recall that last April we announced a new arms policy for the Sub-Continent. Essentially, we:
- —pulled our large military advisory teams out of India and Pakistan, replacing them with small Attaché-type offices;
- —stopped all grant military aid to both countries, except for a little training;
- —banned U.S. sales of military end items to either country;
- —announced our intent to stop any third-country military sales to either country over which we had some control, unless such sales contribute to stabilization and/or decline in their military expenditures;
- —agreed to make cash sales to both countries of spare parts for equipment we have previously supplied.
Neither country threw its hat in the air about his policy, but both accepted it with reasonable grace. The Paks immediately gave us a list of spare parts they want to buy. The Indians asked to buy some machine tools for an ammunition factory and some books and technical manuals about ammunition manufacturing. We agreed to the small Air Force and Navy spare parts request for Pakistan, as well as the sale of machine tools to India. The decision now is whether to agree to the larger ($9.2 million) parts request for the Pakistani Army and the technical data request from the Indians. After a careful analysis, Defense has concluded that the Pak Army request is reasonable, and that the release of information to India on ammunition-making will cause us no problems.
Paragraph 1(a) of the cable raises one additional question—should ammunition be sold under the “spare parts” rule? You know the arguments; if one is willing to supply a breech mechanism necessary to fire a rifle, he looks silly refusing to provide ammunition, which is just as necessary. This must be weighed against the fact that ammunition sales [Page 867] may present a tougher public relations problem than ordinary spare parts. After much soul-searching, Katzenbach and Nitze have decided to recommend that we agree to consider ammunition requests on a case-by-case basis.
On balance, I agree with the recommendation. These are cash sales—not the credit sales the Congress is most upset about. They are to be made under an announced policy which has been greeted pretty favorably in the press and on the Hill. If we refuse to follow through, we will lose much of our influence on military policies and expenditures in Pakistan. We would also cost Ben Oehlert a large part of the initial fund of good will he needs in dealing with Ayub. I would advise you to approve the message.
We have not checked this move on the Hill. With arms sales a hot issue, the chances of a leak and a distorted story are no worse than even. If you think it necessary, however, I can ask Katzenbach to do some soundings with the appropriate people.
Approve message3
Have Katzenbach check on the Hill and then come back to me
O.K. on the spare parts, but tell the Paks we can’t sell ammunition
Disapprove
Speak to me
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Memos, 10/66–7/67. Confidential.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Johnson checked this option and the message was sent to Rawalpindi and New Delhi on July 29 as telegram 14208. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK)↩