Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

443. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, May 13, 1967, 2:04 p.m.

194039. For Ambassador from the Secretary.

1. You have seen the President’s statement in his most recent letter to PriMin Gandhi (State 192874),² that further increases in Indian and Pakistani defense spending would intensify his difficulties in mobilizing support for economic development in either country. I am counting on your making sure that the proper people in the GOI have fully considered the implication of our position and that this will be reflected in the budget to be presented May 25. I know you have already done missionary work on the subject, but hope that during the critical days ahead you will do everything you can to persuade the GOI that the new defense budget should clearly demonstrate India’s intention to limit and cut back its defense spending.

2. I am well aware of the hazards of asserting this kind of influence. You may assure the Indian Government that we have no desire to embarrass it; while there is no secret about our general position on Indian and Pakistani defense spending, we consider the specific representations I am asking you to undertake, and the President’s letter, as highly privileged information. Obviously whatever steps both governments take in this regard, they will want to present them as their own considered decisions and not the result of our pressures.

3. You may assure the Indian officials to whom you make these representations that we are working on their Pakistani friends with equal vigor. You might point out, however, that since the Indian budget will be the first of the two to be presented, the Indians through chronological necessity will have to set the pattern: a unilateral cutback, not made publicly contingent on a matching Pakistani response.

4. Should the GOI raise questions such as the interrelationships of this matter to Kashmir, Pak-Chinese collusion etc., you should indicate we are also sensitive to these issues but tying them together deflects us from the matter at hand: defense budget levels. We must start somewhere and this is the time and place to begin to break the vicious circle.

5. I hope that the GOI is correctly interpreting the care with which we are looking into their proposed purchase of U.S.-equity Hawker Hunter aircraft from the UK as another sign of the seriousness of our intention to implement our new military supply policy towards both Pakistan and India in a manner that will inhibit either from actions that could fuel an arms race.³

6. FYI: Ambassadors Nehru and Hilaly will be called in next week to be given the same message.⁴ End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Coon on May 12; cleared by Heck, Spain, Handley, and Battle; and approved by Rusk. A handwritten marginal notation reads: “OK/L,” suggesting that the telegram was cleared with the President. Repeated to Rawalpindi.
2. See Document 441.
3. In telegram 16938 from New Delhi, May 18, Bowles responded that he and the rest of the Embassy staff had been pressing the Indian Government for several months to reduce military spending. He added that on receipt of the Secretary’s cable he had met with Morarji Desai for another discussion of the subject. Desai agreed with the arguments put forward concerning the importance of reducing military expenditures, but pointed to the difficulty of doing so as long as China remained a serious threat and Pakistan maintained an unyielding attitude on the issues which troubled relations on the subcontinent. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 INDIA)
4. Assistant Secretary Battle called in Ambassador Hilaly on May 20 to discuss Pakistan’s defense expenditure. Battle referred to upcoming Indian and Pakistani budgets as a unique opportunity for both nations to begin cutting defense spending. He stressed long-standing U.S. concern on the subject at the highest levels, and pointed out that any increase in Pakistan’s defense spending would make the task of mobilizing support in Congress for economic development funds for Pakistan very difficult. (Telegram 199452 to Rawalpindi, May 22; ibid., DEF 1 PAK)