Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

44. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, May 21, 1964.

Mac—

Indian Defense Team talks² here have boiled down to two issues, which may be decided when McNamara talks with Chavan tomorrow morning.

A. FY’65 arms credit ceiling. Indian 5-Year Defense Plan called for $1.9 billion foreign exchange outlays 1965–69. By some tall talking about how to get more defense for less and overriding need to protect development program, we’ve brought Indians down to $1.5. We think proper level ought to be about $1.3 billion, a cool one-third cut (but we can probably get Indian Finance Ministry to do this).

Issue turns on whether we should now offer Indians up to $50 million in FY’65 MAP credit sales (on top of $50 million MAP grants we plan). Since Indians will spend foreign exchange anyway, credit offers mean they’ll buy from us rather than Sovs (or Brits, etc.) thus limiting purchases they can make from Sovs (pre-emption in fact). DOD wants to tell Indians now, so they can plan properly. State wants to hold off firm credit offer as lever to bring Indian ceiling down from $1.5 to $1.3. I don’t feel strongly but lean toward State, especially since we could give 3/4% terms which makes Indian mouths water.

B. Should we offer F–104s? We’re convinced Indians won’t buy our aid package of 75 surplus F–6As plus help on HF–24 designed to pre-empt MIG deal. If not, McNamara would like to offer his favorite F–5. But Indians don’t want it; like everyone else they want flashy 104s (Lockheed went out and sold them again). Bob says “never!” From a purely military viewpoint he’s dead right. F–5 or F–6A is cheaper, easier to handle, maintain, etc.

But issue turns on political grounds (and NEA hopes to get Rusk to talk to Bob). NEA would like to tell Indians let’s see if HF–24 deal can be worked out in lieu of MIGs. If not, we’ll help you get alternate 2–3 squadrons of 104s within next 3–4 years, provided you don’t build MIGs. Argument runs:

a. This gives fighting chance of blocking MIG production (1 in 5 is my guess). But if Indians don’t bite, as all too likely, then we at least get the credit for having been forthcoming. We’ve convinced them at least that we don’t regard them as second-rate citizens vis-à-vis the Paks (who get 104s). So we get a free ride.

b. True, 104s are “wasteful,” but they involve no extra out-of-pocket cost to us. All we’d do is substitute 104s for other items, not add them on. Since Indians are going to waste money on supersonics anyway, why not let it flow back to us rather than to Soviets?

c. Bowles is right, after all, that Sovs are mounting a major new Indian aid effort (in response to ours, by the way). We’ll have to live with it, and it partly serves our purpose, but after the big upward push of 1961–63 why let the Soviets gain too much kudos by picking up every option—supersonics, BOKARO, new VOA transmitter—we let drop.

d. We know we’re going to give Paks two more squadrons of 104s, even though we’re playing hard to get just now. Are 104s for Paks more sensible than for Indians? Hell no.

I’ve carried this as far as I can with DOD. Would you entertain calling Bob on this before he sees Chavan tomorrow? Bob’s right that 104s are wasteful, but I think you’ll agree that’s not the point.

At minimum I’d like to see Bob avoid saying “no” till you, he and Rusk could talk with LBJ next Tuesday³ lunchtime. LBJ sees Chavan Thursday. He could make some real Indian mileage by offering 104s in lieu of MIGs, an offer which probably wouldn’t be picked up, which wouldn’t cost extra if it was, and which is no more than we’re already doing for no better reason for Pakistan.

Bob K.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India,Vol. II, Cables, 4/64–6/64. Secret. A note in Komer’s handwriting at the top of the first page reads, “Urgent.”
2. Talks with a team of Indian Defense experts, headed by Defense Secretary P.V.R. Rao and Lieutenant General Moti Sagar, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, began in Washington on May 11. Documentation on the talks is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1 INDIA and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 381 India.
3. May 26.