Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

414. Memorandum From President Johnson to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow)¹

Washington, January 14, 1967.

The purpose of your mission to Asia and Europe as my special emissary is to explain the United States position on future food aid to India and to win agreement of the Indian government and the members of the World Bank’s India consortium for a systematic international program to help India achieve its goal of self-sufficiency in food grains at the earliest possible date and to cover ad interim India’s food deficits. In India, you should stress the importance of India’s taking the lead in making its own case in other capitals.

I. The U.S. Position

I regard our approach to the problem of India as a major component of the policy on food and population stated on January 10, 1967 in my State of the Union Message.² You should make clear my grave concern that the world’s food production is falling sharply behind population growth—that vast areas have for the past 20 years been losing the capacity to feed themselves. You should emphasize that the United States has brought its own domestic food surpluses under control and can no longer be counted on to provide an inexhaustible reservoir of food grains for the hungry as a by-product of domestic policy. Grain stocks elsewhere have also tended to fall in recent years. You should explain the significance of the new Food for Freedom Program whereby the United States decided to use appropriated funds to encourage farmers to produce extra food for food aid programs in countries determined to master their own agricultural problems. You should state that the United States now expects all the other nations of the world—rich and poor alike—to shoulder their share of the world’s fight against hunger and malnutrition. You may cite my view that failure of other nations to join this effort now will leave the world on the road to intolerable suffering.

II. Our Proposal

You should outline my proposal that future food and agricultural aid for India be planned and allocated insofar as possible through the India consortium of the World Bank. With the permission of Mr. George Woods, you may say that the Bank has agreed to accept this responsibility. You should explain our reason for this choice: (a) the interconnection between agricultural and industrial development; and (b) the desirability of assuring that food and agricultural aid complement and, if possible, not undercut aid supporting India’s overall economic development. You may reassure your listeners that this proposal is in no way meant to pre-empt important efforts in other world organizations to find solutions to the world’s agricultural problems.

III. Your First Objective

You should obtain the agreement of the governments of India and the major members of the India consortium to this course. If they cannot give you their final assent, you should take away with you the best sense you can of their probable decision and emphasize the importance of a firm decision within two weeks.

IV. Interim Arrangements³

You may inform those governments in strictest confidence that I plan to announce by the end of January an interim additional allocation of 1 million tons of food grain. Thereafter, I will be guided by the sense of Congress and the response of our associates in determining further emergency allocations. We will expect other governments to help as they can with emergency measures to keep India’s pipeline full during this interim period.

V. Burden-sharing

Our goal for the second half of calendar 1967 and thereafter is to establish a system whereby the U.S. provides no more than half of India’s concessional food aid requirement. This will require other donors—in the consortium and out—to match the U.S. contribution with an equivalent value in food, fertilizer, cash or other materials essential to agricultural production on concessional terms. This aid must be additional (a) to economic aid required to meet consortium goals this year, and (b) to donors’ contributions to IDA replenishment. Your second objective, therefore, is to secure promises of as much additional aid as possible, to estimate how much added aid we can expect and to report to me your impression of how quickly we can move to a full 50–50 split of the food aid burden. You may make clear that this proposal for sharing the food aid burden is not intended to alter already established patterns of assessing proportionate shares of other economic aid within the consortium.

VI. Indian Requirements and U.S. Share

For planning and talking purposes only, you are authorized to say that they (Indians) now estimate India’s import requirements for CY 1967 at about 10 million tons. Without implying any commitment, you may, if you feel it will improve your bargaining position, indicate that the United States might⁴ be willing—with the approval of the Congress—to provide as much as 5 or 6 million tons under concessional terms total in CY 1967 (including 1.6 million already approved) provided other donors do their fair share. You must make clear that these are planning figures which will necessarily be refined as we gain a more accurate picture of India’s spring crop and our own crop later in the summer.

VII. Report

You should report your findings in each capital as you go. I will expect a final recommendation from you on the program to be outlined in my message to Congress about 23 January, or as soon thereafter as possible.

VIII. German Offset

Before your arrival in Bonn, you will receive separate instructions on the extent to which you are authorized to offer to count additional German contributions of agricultural aid against U.S.-German offset arrangements.

IX. Publicity

You should caution the governments with which you talk against premature public or press disclosure of the substance or details of your discussions. You should, however, inform them that the U.S. government tentatively plans to state its position publicly soon after your return.

LBJ

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/Rostow. Secret. The draft instructions were sent to the President on January 14 by Walt Rostow under cover of a memorandum in which he stated that the instructions were moderately detailed to give Eugene Rostow a clear sense of how far he could go in revealing the administration’s plans. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Eugene Rostow Trip, Jan 1967) The instructions, as sent to Rostow, were revised slightly in Johnson’s hand. The instructions were transmitted to Rostow in telegram 118911 to Tokyo, January 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/Rostow)
2. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 2–14.
3. Johnson deleted an initial proposed sentence in this paragraph that read: “You are authorized to say that the U.S. is willing to keep food flowing to India by continuing emergency food deliveries through May–June until the consortium can organize its effort.” After marking that deletion, Johnson noted that the remainder of the paragraph was “OK.”
4. Johnson underscored the word “might” and changed the text to read “to provide as much as 5 or 6 million tons” from the original reference to 6 million tons.