Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

411. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 12, 1967.

SUBJECT

• The Indian Food Package

We now have a Rusk-Freeman-Gaud proposal for internationalizing the Indian food problem (Tab A)² and a recommendation from Congressman Poage’s group (Tab B)³ on the size of an interim allocation pending Congress’ response. I am also attaching State’s draft message to Congress (Tab C)⁴ describing your Indian program as the next important step in your War on Hunger. We’ll edit the message and adjust the numbers further once we have your guidance. Here are the main points in this complex set of recommendations:

1. The Secretaries propose to throw Indian food aid into the World Bank’s India consortium, and the Congressmen generally agree. If you approve, I’ll have to get final and formal agreement from George Woods and we’ll have to get the Indians and other consortium members aboard.

2. The Secretaries underscore the importance of careful consultations with India and other consortium members before we publicly announce this approach. They have two reasons:

a. Other consortium members resent unilateral action. The chances of persuading them to take on food in the consortium will be greater if we tackle them privately first.

b. Quite frankly, Bill Gaud feels chances of getting as much as we’re asking from other donors are slim. We all feel you should have a realistic picture of the odds before you take a strong public stand.

The Congressmen naturally do not address this operational point, but it is crucial in launching your program the right way. The big sticking point will be the consortium members who have avoided food aid so far. We may be able to move Germany, if it counts against the offset, to which State and Defense are agreeable. But the others will be tough. With the Bank doing the accounting, we would try to persuade other aid donors to match our special emergency food contribution in the second half of CY 1967 by giving food, fertilizer or cash. We would expect their contributions to be over and above: (a) their already planned pledge in the Indian consortium and (b) their contribution to IDA replenishment. The special contribution in new aid for food would be at least $120 million in this calendar year.

It will take some pretty tough high-level arm-twisting to persuade these already strapped governments to do that much more. Therefore, the Secretaries recommend you send scouts to sound out the consortium capitals before you send your message to Congress.

Since this will require the highest-level emissary we can field, I’d suggest trying to get Doug Dillon. If he’s not available, Gene Rostow’s responsibilities and intensive work on this problem in recent days would make him a natural. Whoever goes will have to get going this week.

3. The Secretaries believe we should plan on 4.4 million tons more for the rest of CY 1967. The Congressmen do not specifically address the total CY 1967 need since they’ll address this later when they have your message. However, they have figured their interim allocation from the same 10 million ton estimate of Indian need that the Secretaries use.

The Secretaries looked hard at 3 million and seriously doubt it would do the job:

• —They believe the higher figure is necessary to give us a workable negotiating posture with our consortium partners. They feel that asking other donors to increase their total aid to India while we stay at the same level in economic aid and cut our food aid in half (8.3 million in 1966 to 4.6 this year—1.6 already approved plus 3) is an untenable negotiating position. They know it will be an uphill fight to get any more aid at all, so we need to put ourselves in the best negotiating position possible.
• —If we gave 3 million tons and others matched us, the total of 8.3 million (including 2.3 million already on the way) would still fall short of India’s estimated need of 10 million. A low figure now could have adverse political effects in India before the election and could discourage US farmers from planting.
• —With 4.4 million tons, we’d still be reducing our proportion of food aid from 90% in 1966 to 60% in 1967; and, with luck, we would be laying the foundation for moving to 50–50.
• —The higher figure of 4.4 looks reasonable, yet is still pretty tough to match. If you wish to stick to an overall US figure of 3 million tons now, you could buy some flexibility by promising a mid-summer review after our crop is in; although that would weaken our negotiating posture and worry the Indians as they go to the polls.

4. The Secretaries agree with Poage and his colleagues that an interim allocation is urgent. The Secretaries propose 2 million tons to cover the pipeline while we’re swinging the World Bank into action and waiting for the new Indian government to be formed. To do this we would have to cover Indian needs at least through the end of May, because we won’t be able to negotiate an agreement with the new Indian government until mid-April. The Congressmen urge 1.7 million.

The Secretaries could live with 1.7 million provided we recognize that the Congressmen’s figure will not carry through to the end of May unless there is more grain available from the spring crop than we anticipate or unless India receives unexpected contributions from other nations. (The Congressmen are figuring that India needs 800,000 tons a month—a figure from a public Indian document—while Subramaniam privately fixes the need at 900,000.)

5. Whichever figure you approve, timing will be important. Here are the main alternatives:

• —Postpone your message until the end of January, well before the Indian elections, but late enough so we can complete consultations and so the Congress won’t have to let it be unanswered too long. (We won’t want Congressional debate before the election.) To delay this way, we would have to announce an interim allocation immediately. The main advantage of this approach would be to settle the pipeline problem for awhile and give us ample time to complete high-level talks and still avert a new round of press speculation about the pipeline. The Congress would like it too because it does not want to hold off acting on your message too long.
• —Send your message as soon as we can warn other capitals and announce the interim allocation in the message. We could probably get a preliminary reaction from other consortium members by about 23 January, but we couldn’t expect anything firm. Chance of press leaks increases once we start talking in other capitals.

In either case, the Secretaries favor a message before the Indian election, though we would want to avoid Congressional debate in the first two weeks of February right before the Indians vote.

Here, then, are the decisions to be made:⁵

1. Get George Woods’ final and formal agreement to take on Indian food aid.

2. If Woods agrees, get the Indians aboard and then start talking with other consortium members.

3. For this mission:

• Try to get Dillon
• Send Gene Rostow⁶

4. Set a planning level for the rest of CY 1967.

• —As Freeman-Rusk-Gaud recommend: 4.4 total, 2 million interim and 2.4 later
• —Alternative to bow to Congressmen: 1.7 interim and 2.7 later⁷
• —Your initial thought: 3 million in the message with promise of a summer review

5. Timing.

• —Interim allocation immediately, rest in the message 23 January or later
• —Interim allocation and total figure both in the message by 23 January⁸

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, August 1966–February 1967, Vol. IV. Secret.
2. Reference is to a joint memorandum sent to the President on January 11; not printed.
3. Reference is to a letter sent by Senator Miller and Congressmen Poage and Dole to Freeman on January 11. Poage sent a copy to Rostow on the same day; not printed.
4. Undated; not printed.
5. Johnson approved recommendations 1 and 2.
6. Johnson checked this option.
7. Johnson circled “1.7 interim” among the choices at this option.
8. Johnson checked this option.