Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

401. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, December 13, 1966, 1:23 p.m.

101529. For Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Indian Food Crisis

1. U.S. Government is seriously concerned over food situation in India which for second year in row is faced with drought and substantial short-falls in food production. Situation is aggravated this year by near-famine conditions in northeastern India involving approximately 75 million people. While India has made considerable progress in its agriculture development program, this effort has been undermined by unfavorable weather. Until next major crop is harvested in October 1967 India’s need will be great.

2. To meet last year’s crop failure, we supplied eight million tons of foodgrains (about $500 million). Our response to India’s needs last year was facilitated and endorsed by a Congressional resolution which authorized President to provide these PL–480 foodgrain shipments to India. The last shipments under that authorization are expected to arrive in India in January.

3. To cope with its pressing needs, Indian Government has approached us and several other major food-producing countries for further assistance. Canadian Government has already responded generously with $21 million food grant. It plans seek appropriation of another $75 million for food assistance, involving total grant of a million tons of wheat. We have hopes Australia will also supply wheat on grant or generous concessional terms.

4. We wish to do what we can but supplying India’s needs this year will strain our diminishing foodgrain resources. Our wheat carry-over is lowest in years. We have had to expand acreage under cultivation to meet additional demands at considerable budgetary cost. It is apparent another long-term foodgrain assistance program will require Congressional support. Accordingly we consider it important that all industrial countries, especially members of India Consortium, as well as food-exporting countries generally share in this responsibility.

5. Actions such as India’s self-help efforts, Canada’s, and hopefully Australia’s, are steps in this direction. Foodgrain-exporting nations however cannot be expected carry entire load. Industrial countries generally should be expected assist, not merely by token shipments of food, etc., but also by contributing funds to buy wheat or other grains in world market or by providing shipping, fertilizer, etc.

6. You should consult with your Indian colleague and support his efforts to obtain assistance from host government. FYI: GOI is being urged to issue such instructions.² End FYI. If your Indian colleague seeks your support you should urge host government to respond generously and quickly with food, money to buy food or equipment and supplies. Capability of USG to continue to extend substantial food assistance to India will depend to considerable degree on India’s self-help efforts to buy foodgrains and solicit assistance from others and on response of latter to humanitarian crisis which India faces.³

Katzenbach

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SOC 10 INDIA. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Heck on December 12; cleared by Handley, Macomber, Wriggins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations H.G. Torbert, Jr., and Brown (USDA), and in substance by Fried; and approved and initialed by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bern, Bonn, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Helsinki, London, Madrid, Mexico City, Oslo, Paris, Rangoon, Rome, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, and Wellington and repeated to Karachi, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, USUN, and Paris for the Secretary.
2. The Embassy in India reported on December 15 that Food Secretary Dias had offered assurances that India would explore every genuine source of assistance. (Telegram 8648 from New Delhi; ibid.)
3. On December 19 Benjamin Read sent to Rostow a summary report on the replies received in response to circular telegram 101529. Read’s covering memorandum characterized the responses as disappointing. (Ibid.)