Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

363. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 1, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Follow-up on NSC Discussion of the Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem

Secretary Rusk has sent the paper² you requested at the NSC meeting of June 9 on the Indian nuclear problem. He sees no dramatic steps to discourage the Indians from starting down the nuclear route that would not cost us more than any likely gain would be worth. However, his paper, agreed around town, does recommend a number of steps which together provide some hope of discouraging or delaying an Indian decision.

In the economic field, it recommends a number of steps to impress on the Indians the costs—in development, manpower and Indo-Pakistan relations—of going nuclear. It also suggests we keep an eye on ways to link possible larger economic assistance in the future to a firm Indian commitment not to go nuclear.

To meet legitimate Indian security worries, it proposes sharing more systematically our intelligence analyses of the Chinese nuclear threat and the difficulties the Chinese face in making it effective. It also recommends seeking Soviet cooperation in a UN assurance to non-nuclear countries and suggests we continue efforts to achieve arms control agreements which might delay an Indian decision to go nuclear.

It asks for a number of studies, including how best to deal with ChiCom “blackmail” of India or an overt ChiCom nuclear threat to India, how to bolster the credibility of private security assurances to India and how to react if India does go nuclear.

The report also recommends a number of steps to bolster the technological and political prestige of those states which could go nuclear but refrain from doing so.

It requests that a high priority be assigned to gathering and analyzing relevant intelligence, and recommends a long-term contingency study of what we should do in the event that India decides to undertake a national nuclear program.

You will find these recommendations spelled out in the attached³ (pp. 1–4). They do not solve the Indian nuclear problem, but they do represent a good blueprint for making the most of the assets we have. If you approve continuing along these lines, I will sign the attached NSAM to keep the departments moving down this path.

Walt

Approve⁴

See me

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 355, Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, further to NSAM 351. Secret.
2. Reference is to the enclosure to the July 25 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson; see footnote 3, Document 359.
3. The attachment is a copy of the July 25 memorandum from Rusk to Johnson and the attached report.
4. Johnson checked the approval line.