Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

357. Memorandum From Secretary of Agriculture Freeman to President Johnson¹

Washington, July 19, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Agriculture on the Scene Inspection and Review—Japan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India

[Here follows the section of the report on Japan.]

Pakistan

A. Political

President Ayub Khan, as reported in my cable from Pakistan,² was cordial and friendly. He recalled his visit with you with pleasure. He realizes how important agricultural development is to Pakistan. The Pakistani agricultural minister is weak, so I plan to communicate directly with Ayub.

Foreign Minister S.H. Yusuf. I had two long talks with this career public servant of wide experience and now the ranking man in the Foreign Ministry following Bhutto’s departure.³ He seemed friendly and reasonable. He reflected genuine fear of India, citing the Goa takeover. He seemed to be more relaxed about Kashmir than I expected, although bitter that the Indians would not permit a plebiscite. The fact that after twenty years India hadn’t earned the loyalty of the people was frequently repeated. Reference to the Chinese was guarded, but he evidenced no great enthusiasm. The India-Chinese clash he described as a border confrontation. The merits of each side he described as confusing. When I asked about the Russians at Tashkent, he said they had performed earnestly and well. He described Kosygin as running back and forth from Shastri to Ayub like an errand boy, spending an hour or two repeatedly with each. On balance, I would evaluate his attitude as “let bygones be bygones and go on from here.” As he put it, the fact we can’t agree on everything shouldn’t mean that we must be unpleasant.

Ayub and Yusuf expressed high regard for you. It would be my judgment that personal communication with Ayub should be maintained to the extent possible.

B. Indian PL 480 Wheat to Pakistan

As I cabled you in my “eyes only” cable, I had hoped we might please Ayub—bring Pakistanis and Indians closer at no cost to the United States.

Ayub reportedly has a nasty political problem in East Pakistan, triggered now by a crop shortage from flood and drought with sharply rising rice prices. Immediate relief could be had by diverting 50,000 tons of wheat to East Pakistan in ships now waiting to be unloaded in India. Replacement can be made to India from wheat committed but not yet shipped to Pakistan.

It was my estimate that maximum U.S. benefit would come from the U.S. openly arranging the switch. Otherwise, I feared the Pakistanis would be too sensitive to accept help from India. I was advised that the U.S. should stay in the background and let the Indians and Pakistanis come together. I proceeded accordingly and got Subramaniam to agree to make the 50,000 tons available immediately provided that Pakistan would ask for it publicly. Our Embassy at Rawalpindi has been so informed. At this writing, Pakistan is unwilling to ask. We are urging them to do so. I fear the United States has lost a good opportunity.

C. Food Situation

U.S. arrivals under PL 480 have been cut in half, dropping from 1.5 million tons in 1963 and 1964 to about 660,000 tons in fiscal 1966. Pakistan has suffered drought and flood and has experienced a crop short fall. Supply figures and crop estimates are still fuzzy. I arranged for the necessary joint U.S.-Pakistan procedures to review them and develop the best possible members so some solid judgment can be reached quickly. Negotiations for a PL 480 agreement for the balance of calendar 1966 should be undertaken very soon. I hope to send negotiating instructions to Rawalpindi within a week. I am also reviewing the possibility of promptly increasing the current 300,000 ton wheat agreement to 400,000 tons. This would please Ayub and as a practical matter would be charged against the amount to be negotiated for the current calendar year. A final judgment on this should, I think, be withheld until we see what happens on the wheat exchange between Pakistan and India.

D. Agricultural Economic Development

The Pakistanis have made encouraging progress. SCARP, the salinity reclamation project developed and supported by the United States near Lahore, which I believe you visited, is an unqualified success: (1) water table lowered 10 feet, (2) 425,000 acres reclaimed, (3) yield up 30 to 150 percent (wheat 15 to 55 bushels, corn 16 to 70 bushels per acre), (4) land value up from $50 to $1,000 per acre since I visited it in 1961. The Pakistan agricultural growth rate has climbed to 3.5 percent annually, but with a 2.7 percent population increase and an expanding economy the increase is soaked up each year. They must reach 4 percent to hold and 5 percent to gain ground on the food problem. The Pakistanis realize this.

They have a vigorous program, have sharply increased agriculture’s share of the budget, and made more foreign exchange available. Ayub asked us for a list of chemical firms because pesticides are very short. A new 200,000 ton fertilizer plant has been contracted with ESSO. Fertilizer is in short supply. The agricultural sector of the economy is vigorous and in my judgment currently meets the self-help standard of the Food for Freedom Act.⁴ I believe we should keep the pressure on and provide all the technical assistance that can be effectively used to help them. However, we must be alert to ensure that the agriculture sector in their economy continues to command first priority (after defense) on the nation’s resources. PL 480 ought not to be extended at this time beyond the calendar year.

[Here follows the section of the report on Afghanistan.]

India

A. Political

The Prime Minister’s absence (she was visiting the Soviet Union) inhibited conversation on the world political situation. They are, of course, anti-Chinese. S.K. Patil (Boss of Bombay) went way out of his way to be seen with me publicly. He is a former Minister of Agriculture and an old friend. His primary message was that the climate is good to improve U.S.-India relations. He emphasized his strong support for the Prime Minister (heretofore he has been cool) and even praised Subramaniam (a decided change). Patil is one of the top Congress party political operators (allegedly the No. 1 money-raiser), so I was pleased at his outspoken support for the current Indian Administration.

It would be my evaluation that it is correct as generally reported that Subramaniam is very close to and extremely influential with the Prime Minister. He described for me privately (not bragging or name-dropping) the agony of that decision on devaluation. Clearly, he was a strong prime mover in accomplishing it.

President Radnakrishnan sends his warmest personal regards. He urges that the United States unilaterally and without any commitment cease bombing North Vietnam. Then, he argues, the rest of the world would, through the force of world opinion, bring about negotiations. I questioned him fairly closely about this, but could detect no basis for his estimate other than his own subjective opinion. As we prepared to leave him he asked that I carry a message of sympathy to you for the burdens you carry and the extreme difficulty of the situation in Vietnam. He described his feeling of the situation in terms of the Hindu god Shiva—the Power god who takes many poses. One pose is called Nila Kantha or Blue Throat; to wit: the god has a blue throat—if he throws it out he will destroy the world—if he swallows it he will destroy himself.

A public statement I made on arrival in Delhi commanded a lot of attention and dominated my press conferences. To my surprise the Indians have been of the opinion that they would have a five-year grace period under the current soft currency sale terms of PL 480 before shifting to the long-term low-credit conditions of the Food for Freedom program. I think they understand now that although exceptions can be made they will be in extreme circumstances only such as a localized disaster or where the United States itself needs local currency. This has caused some apprehension by the authorities worried about India’s debt load, but even they acknowledge that it makes sense. They are requesting that we make an exception for India, but I was very firm in insisting that the time had come when India must pay in dollars but at generous terms. I think they understand.

B. Food

The shortfall of food caused by the monsoon estimated last December to be 18 million tons has proved accurate. When Subramaniam came to Washington he said that India would tighten its belt to the extent of 5–6 million tons, and he asked 11 to 12 million tons of grain. As of this date the United States has committed 8 million tons. We have exceeded one-million ton a month arrivals several months. India with our help has raised 1.2 million tons of grain from other sources and the equivalent of 1.5 million tons of grain in money, fertilizer or other commodities for a total value approximately $150,000,000. If the 11 million ton figure requested was a minimum to be reached it will be necessary to make available yet this calendar year 1.8 million tons more of food grain. Subramaniam asked for 2 million tons of wheat and strongly urged that we make several hundred thousand tons of rice available by September plus some vegetable oil and cotton. I carefully outlined the current wheat supply situation in the U.S., emphasizing the loss of an estimated 150,000,000 bushels by drought and frost this spring. The contrast between 1961 when I first visited India as Secretary of Agriculture with 1.5 billion bushel carryover, and now with 500 million bushels made the point that we must be frugal.

Last December we set down three requirements if the United States was to give India the necessary assistance. First that the grain be handled expeditiously and reach the needy. Second, that strong and effective steps be taken pursuant to the Rome agreement to strengthen Indian agriculture. Third, that a real effort be made to get help from other countries. It was emphasized that the self-help requirement would be a stern one. On all three counts it is my judgment that India has lived up to her commitments. One of the greatest food movements of all times taking almost 600 ships is being accomplished.

Not all of the agricultural development targets set out last fall have been reached, but the specific actions agreed on have been taken. I am impressed with Subramaniam’s top staff. They are sharp and hard driving. Although very much remains to be done yet by any reasonable standard, I am pleased to report that Subramaniam has fulfilled the economic development commitments he made in Rome. I am not as satisfied with the effort to get help from other countries. France, a wheat surplus nation, denied help. The USSR’s contribution is only 5 million dollars. However, it does appear that a real effort was made and 150 million contribution from some 35 other nations is a creditable accomplishment.

It would be my recommendation then, that the United States promptly begin negotiations to meet the needs of India for the balance of this calendar year. Our supplies of wheat are adequate for this amount. We should withhold agreement for the last half of the current fiscal year to be certain India continues to give agriculture top priority in her economic planning. Then we will have a more clear picture of the Indian need and our supply, both of which are currently subject to uncontrollable contingencies.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Indian Famine, Vol. V, August 1966–February 1967. Confidential.
2. See footnote 2, Document 356.
3. Foreign Minister Bhutto resigned on June 19.
4. President Johnson requested this legislation in a February 10 message to Congress. (Department of State Bulletin, February 28, 1966, pp. 336–341) Congress enacted the Food for Peace Act on November 11, 1966. (P.L. 89–808; 80 Stat 1526)