Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

346. Summary Notes of the 558th Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, June 9, 1966.

The Problem of Indian Nuclear Weapons

The President: indicated that this was the first of a series of NSC meetings to be devoted to the discussion of complex problems requiring careful exploration before they were to come to him for discussion. He expressed his concern about the growing pressures in India favoring the nuclear route. Its own economic progress and the stability of the whole area depended on India not going nuclear. The Paper² admirably summarized the problems. He invited Mr. Ball to lay out the issues.

Mr. Ball: briefly summarized the Interdepartmental paper of June 7, 1966, on this subject, giving the pros and cons of the suggested alternatives³ (Plowshare⁴ was not mentioned). Although his presentation was even-handed, he appeared to favor some form of multilateral approach which attempted to deal with India’s real security problems.

He recommended further—and urgent—staff studies.

Mr. McNamara: agreed and thought recommendations could come forward for Presidential consideration within two to three weeks.

Mr. Foster: Stressed the urgency, since disarmament meetings resume in Geneva in June, and the U.S. must have an improved position within a month or six weeks at the outside. He thought the two or three principal alternatives now under study (in the Committee of Principals) could easily be staffed out and recommended within a month.

Mr. Marks: Urged (a) a conference of world intellectuals to stress the economic costs and security liabilities of nuclear weapons; (b) using the 20th anniversary of the Baruch proposals⁵ as the occasion for a bold new U.S. initiative.

The Vice President: Stressed how little additional expenditure would be necessary beyond that already invested for India to go nuclear. He preferred a UN umbrella with private U.S. reassurances to India. This leaves the door open to the Soviets without forcing either the Indians or Russia to take a public stand.

Ambassador Goldberg: Stressed the urgency of deciding on any such arrangement, since it would require soundings with the Russians well in advance of the opening of the UNGA in September. Also necessary would be precise commitments to the Indians.

Mr. Foster: Cited Minister Banerjee, the Indian Minister who had officially indicated that “for a period, a General Assembly resolution would be adequate.”

Mr. Rostow: Urged:

a. the urgency of our own explorations but reminded the Council of the complexity of decisions countries must face before they chose to go nuclear. Our problem was to buy time until the Indians came to accept the necessity for Western assistance;

b. the nuclear issue was so complex that it could not be dealt with solely by the specialists concentrating on arms control or by the country or area specialists. We must find ways of combining these two types of specialists in the study of this problem.

The President: Instructed the Department⁶ to speed the study of the Indian nuclear problem and said he would issue a NSAM shortly.

Howard Wriggins ⁷

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, 6/9/66, The Problem of Indian Nuclear Weapons. Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. Those attending the meeting, in addition to the President, included the Vice President, Ball, McNamara, Rostow, Raborn, Bell, Goldberg, Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler, ACDA Director William Foster, AEC Director John Palfrey, USIA Director Leonard Marks, and JCS Chairman General Earle Wheeler. (List of attendees for the 558th NSC meeting; ibid.)
2. Reference is to an interdepartmental policy paper entitled “The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem: Current Issues,” which was circulated to NSC members June 7 under a covering memorandum from NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, India 471.61)
3. The alternatives suggested in the policy paper as having the potential to restrain the development of an Indian nuclear device included economic pressure the United States could bring to bear, the dampening effect that an arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union would have on an Indian nuclear program, and a bilateral or multilateral security arrangement to guarantee India against a nuclear attack.
4. Plowshare was the program being developed to demonstrate the peaceful potential of controlled nuclear explosions.
5. Reference is to U.S. proposals for the international control of atomic energy put forward in a statement on June 14, 1946, by Bernard M. Baruch, the U.S. representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission. For text of the statement, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents: 1941–1949, pp. 865–871.
6. An apparent reference to the Department of State. See Document 359.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.