Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

332. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, May 2, 1966, 9 a.m.

Ambassador Bowles has asked that two long cables of his be called to your personal attention. They are attached.² But let me try to summarize them.

• First, he sees us entering a period of acute competition with the USSR for leverage in India.

  Straws in the wind indicate that the Soviets are trying hard to undercut the new Indo-US cooperation generated by Mrs. Gandhi’s visit here and subsequent progress on economic programs. The attack focuses on the wide range of economic reforms we and the World Bank are pressing, which the Soviets and their Indian backers see as a threat to socialism. While we have a lot of momentum, Soviet prestige is high, and many Indians are uncertain of our intentions, so the battle will not be one-sided.

• Second, Bowles sees military aid as an important key to this struggle. This is where the USSR can put the heat on most effectively, and where the Indians are most sensitive. We think Soviet deliveries of military equipment have already slowed. Bowles fears resumption of US military aid to Pakistan would play right into Soviet hands.
• Third, Bowles has long felt that our military aid to Pakistan has been a mistake. India is the big power in the subcontinent, and it opposes China. He feels we muffed our opportunity in 1963–64 after the Chicom invasion by not moving into India with large-scale military aid to pre-empt the Russians, and he feels our unwarranted concern for the Paks led us down that false path. He would like to see us resume limited military aid to India now, but says that resuming lethal aid to Pakistan—even spare parts—would undo all the progress we have made with India in the last few months. He would not resume any military aid to the Paks unless they renounce Chicom aid and cooperate in the defense of the subcontinent against China.

Our view is: 1, India is, indeed, more important than Pakistan. But 2. It is the Indian interest as well as ours to keep a Western option open to Ayub.

In this spirit Secretary Rusk is considering an instruction to Bowles (which he will check with us) suggesting he discuss frankly with the Indians how we keep that door open for Ayub without endangering India. The Indians have to recognize that our dilemma is theirs because they have a bigger stake than we do in where Ayub and Pakistan go.

Most of the town feels we will have to get back into at least selective sales to both sides when we have established a better political and economic framework, and agreed force levels.

We are not, therefore, asking you for a decision now. We will wish to make some concrete progress towards limiting military spending on both sides before we put some operational choices to you.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1–8/66. Secret.
2. Reference is to telegrams 2914 and 2931 from New Delhi, both April 28, which were retyped for the President and attached to this memorandum. Copies are also in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–INDIA and POL 1 INDIA–USSR, respectively.