326. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1
Who Welshed on Whom? I know you’ll forgive an old Pakistani (who likes Ayub too) for saying that we need not feel we failed to honor any commitment to the Paks. The shoe is on the other foot.
As Dean Rusk said, we’ve insisted from the outset that CENTO and SEATO were anti-communist alliances. But the Paks have always regarded them as reinsurance against India, and tried to get them skewed around this way. True, our arming India against China helped push the Paks toward China, but our policy here was quite consistent with the anti-communist purpose of our alliances. Thus, while one can’t blame the Paks for being unhappy with us, it isn’t because we betrayed them; it is because their own policy of using us against India has failed. They know full well we didn’t give them $800 million in arms to use against India (but they did).
Even so, we have built up Pakistan’s own independent position and sinews—to the tune of almost $5 billion in support. We’ve protected Pakistan against India; we had more to do with stopping the war Ayub started than anyone else (just in time to save the Paks). In return, all [Page 625] we’ve gotten is a bit of quite valuable real estate (yet four of our installations are still closed).
So if there’s any history of broken moral commitments, it’s on the Pak side—not ours. There is even a good case that the Paks lied to us about China; for example, did Ayub tell you about getting MIGs and tanks?
But this is history. Our need now is to keep the Paks from going off the deep end. But if we just return to business as usual (and let Bhutto convince Ayub again that he can have his cake and eat it too), we’ll fall into the same trap all over again. We can’t afford to let Ayub return to thinking that he can both get arms from China (and use China against India), while still getting massive economic aid from the US. The answer is to keep dangling the carrot (as you did last December), but to give only enough to whet Pak appetites that they can get back into our good graces if they start playing ball. 2
Granted that this is risky, and that we might lose Ayub (our best hope). But it is less risky than past policy, because if Pakistan keeps sliding down the slippery slope we’ll lose Ayub anyway and Pakistan to boot. This has been the trend, and it was only your tough policy since April 1965 that slowed it down. So I’m for impressing on Shoiab (our best friend and pipeline to Ayub) that sizeable US aid, including military, depends on Pakistan avoiding Chicom arms or ties. In fact, it might be most effective for you to call Shoiab in privately and tell him just this.3
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Aides File, Vol. I, April 1–30, 1966. Secret. A copy was sent to Rostow.↩
- According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Rostow on April 26, President Johnson decided at a meeting with his principal advisers on April 25 to make U.S. assistance to Pakistan conditional on additional requirements. Johnson decided that some movement by Ayub on issues of importance to the United States, such as the closed installations, would be necessary before he would proceed with the loans cited in the April 23 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk (Document 323). The President also decided that an agreement to sell spare parts to Pakistan would be dependent upon an understanding on Pakistani limitations on military expenditures. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 50, Memos (A), 4/1–8/66)↩
- At the end of the memorandum Komer wrote: “I’ll work with Walt Rostow on this matter.” Johnson responded with a handwritten notation that reads: “Walt—bring this to McNamara’s attention.” Rostow sent a copy of Komer’s memorandum to McNamara on April 27 with a covering note indicating that the President wanted him to read it. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Pakistan 1966) In a May 2 memorandum from Townsend Hoopes to McNamara commenting on Komer’s memorandum, Hoopes noted that he and John McNaughton proposed to make economic assistance to Pakistan dependent upon a Pakistani promise to stop the flow of military assistance from China, and to make military assistance dependent upon a promise to terminate Chinese assistance. (Ibid.) Hoopes stated in a May 2 memorandum to McNaughton that he had discussed their recommendations with McNamara, and McNamara had commented that he did not see how the United States could avoid providing essential spare parts to Pakistan unless it was prepared to see Pakistan ally itself completely with China. (Ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 000.1–400)↩