299. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1

SUBJECT

  • Possible Assurances and Nuclear Support Arrangements for India

India may, at any time, decide to embark on a nuclear weapons program. While we do not expect such a decision soon, barring major unexpected changes in the situation the US Intelligence Board estimates that on balance India probably will do so within the next few years. I concur in this assessment. At the same time, it remains in the interests of the United States to curb nuclear proliferation, and an Indian decision to manufacture nuclear weapons would increase the probability that other countries would also decide to do so.

I believe that we should, therefore, attempt to head off an Indian decision to produce nuclear weapons. To do so, we might in time have to be more responsive to Indian security needs, preferably in some way that will minimize our own commitment. However, we must recognize that this response would almost certainly involve an increased and more specific US commitment in the subcontinent and would entail important costs in terms of probable reactions of other states. The enclosed staff study2 reviews briefly our efforts to deal with this problem, defines the issue and sets forth the broad alternatives, and outlines some illustrative arrangements that could be considered if it is eventually decided to offer some form of nuclear sharing to India. I do not propose that you should now decide upon any one of these alternatives. These alternatives, including the possible nuclear sharing arrangements, are intended merely to illustrate for your background the possible general lines of action which may have to be considered.

I propose that when Mrs. Gandhi comes to Washington you let her know that we are sympathetic to her policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, and to her efforts to give priority to India’s economic needs and development.

I believe you should indicate that you agree that nuclear powers should try to work out some arrangements to safeguard the security interests of non-nuclear powers. As she is aware, we have raised the [Page 583] matter privately with the Soviet Union, and it has also been a subject of continuing discussion at Geneva.

I believe you should also say that in any case if a growing Chinese Communist nuclear capability should ever pose a serious threat to India, you hope she would frankly discuss the question with us so that we could examine together possible means to meet that threat without nuclear proliferation and without Indian assumption of the heavy economic and other burdens of a nuclear weapons program.

Implicit in the over-all question of assurances to India is the basic issue of what degree of nuclear support the United States is willing to proffer to non-nuclear nations. In this connection I recommend that you not offer India any bilateral nuclear assurances at this time.

You might also wish to tell Mrs. Gandhi that we are prepared to make available to her periodically (as we did for Prime Minister Shastri) intelligence on the Chinese Communist nuclear capability.

Secretary McNamara and Mr. Foster concur in this recommendation. (The Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer not to offer India at this time any nuclear assurances beyond those given by you in October, 1964.) We would of course wish to continue to examine other possible arrangements outlined in the enclosed study. We will continue to study these alternatives.3

Dean Rusk
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Gandhi Visit Papers, 3/27–30/66. Top Secret; Limited Distribution.
  2. The attached undated 12-page paper, entitled “Possible Assurances and Nuclear Support Arrangements for India,” is not printed.
  3. Airgram A–256 to New Delhi, March 29, instructed the Embassy to report all indications of possible Indian nuclear weapons activity. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–1 INDIA; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, “India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold,” Document 8)