Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

297. Telegram From the Embassy in New Zealand to the Department of State¹

Wellington, February 20, 1966.

490. To the President. From the Vice President. Subject: Notes on the Vice President’s visit with Prime Minister Gandhi at her home Thursday evening, February 17, 1966.

Present were Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Ambassadors Harriman, Bowles, and the Vice President.

The earlier conference, 3:00 to 5:00 p.m.,² which covered all aspects of our economic and political relations with India, left some matters indefinite and requiring a more responsive and definitive answer from the Prime Minister and her Ministers. Earlier in the day we had met with the Ministers of Agriculture, Planning, Finance, and subsequently with the Minister of Defense and the Chief Military Officers, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In each of these conferences I had reviewed in detail the Honolulu Conference, my observations on Vietnam, my discussions in Thailand, Laos, and Pakistan. I had underscored the growing threat of Chinese Communist militancy in all of Southeast and South Asia. I had further emphasized the importance that President Johnson placed upon the development of human resources and the concept of self-help. I had pointed out that we were going to give particular emphasis to education, training, health and health facilities, agricultural production and the modernization of agricultural techniques through technical assistance and education. I had emphasized the importance of the allocation of greater resources by the respective countries to these fields. I made it manifestly clear that the quantity of our aid would be related directly to the amount of self-help undertaken by the respective countries.

Of course, there was a detailed discussion of the Communist activities in all of these areas, and particularly the intrusion of North Vietnamese troops and trained political cadres into the Southeast Asian area. In each conference we had spelled out our conviction that the attack in Southeast Asia was but the first manifestation of Communist militancy in a war-like posture which could easily spread to other areas. In other words, there was and continued to be a threat to all Asian countries from the aggressive militant attitude and policies of the ChiCom regime. In our earlier conference with the Indian Prime Minister and her advisers, I had the feeling that she was aware of these matters but that her young adviser, Mr. Singh (not the Foreign Minister), was more or less an apologist for a neutrality that leaned to the Russians and even tried to explain away some of the Chinese Communist activities in Southeast Asia. It should be clear that all Indians were very much aware of the Chinese Communist threat to India. But their thinking had not taken them to the position that the ChiCom threat extended all the way across the bottom of Asia to the southeast. I pounded away at the interrelationship of Communist activities in the subcontinent and Southeast Asia.

Now, in order to pin all of this down, and particularly to get some specific positions by the Indians on a number of matters, I asked Mrs. Gandhi to sit with me on the occasion of the dinner at her home to go over a few matters. Here are some of the questions I asked and here are the answers:

1. I pointed out to Mrs. Gandhi that we had reviewed in detail the matter of Indian commitment to improved agricultural production. This had been discussed with the Ministers of Agriculture, Finance and Planning. I asked her directly, “Will you support the position of your Minister of Agriculture on the allocation of resources to the agricultural sector, and will you give your commitment to support the agreements arrived at between Secretary Freeman and Indian Agricultural Minister Subramanian?” Her answer was a clear and unequivocal yes. She added that the GOI would not only do this, but was actively supporting family planning and also actively supporting agricultural research in new crops and expanded production.

I explained to Mrs. Gandhi that there was a limit to what India could expect from the public treasury of the United States. We had serious problems on foreign aid. In fact, I made it clear several times during the day that while India had her problems with her parliament, we had ours too. I also said that what India needed was capital and techical know-how. Most of this was available in the private sector of our country and other countries. Therefore, does India welcome and, indeed, encourage the injection of inclusion of private resources into her economy? Has India revised her laws and regulations so as to create a favorable environment for private investment? This, of course, refers to investment in fertilizer plants, machinery, and other lines of equipment. The Prime Minister assured me that the necessary changes in laws and regulations had been made to create a favorable environment. I asked for specific answers. She and the Foreign Minister promised us a paper which would outline in detail the several changes in laws and regulations which added up to a favorable environment for investment by private capital from other countries. I made it clear that I was not speaking for U.S. capital alone, since we were concerned about the outflow of U.S. capital and its effect on our balance of payments deficit. What I was talking about was a general policy which could and should encourage private investment from Japan, Germany, France, England, etc., as well as the United States. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister gave an affirmative response. The Prime Minister did add that it was the feeling of their own people that insofar as possible, Indian resources should be used and outside capital should be a supplement. With this we had no disagreement. She mentioned the problem of foreign exchange required for repatriation of profits. I replied that if the enterprise was profitable and investment climate friendly, the companies would most likely reinvest profits in India.

2. Now on Vietnam. During the late afternoon conference we had a long discussion on Vietnam. I was not fully satisfied with the responses of the Prime Minister and her advisers. I had a feeling that Mrs. Gandhi recognized that India should be cooperative with the U.S., but her young adviser, Mr. Singh, seemed to indicate doubt and at times a contrary attitude. Therefore, I admonished Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers that the least India could do if she disagreed with some of our policies was to express that disagreement discreetly in the channels of diplomacy rather than in public statements and in the press. Both Averell and I spent a great deal of time going over our position in Vietnam—why we were there, our objectives, namely the right of people to make their own choice; and that we were going to stay until the job was finished. We made it unqualifiedly clear that America was committed to the defense of South Vietnam. I pointed out that we did not seek to escalate the war. To the contrary, we were using limited power for limited objectives. Our bombing of North Vietnam was under very careful control, directed at routes of infiltration, military depots, bridges, etc. I assured her that you personally were giving daily attention to all military operations in order to avoid any act that might precipitate confrontation with either the Chinese or the Russians. I did stress, however, that we were determined to resist and beat the aggression. We would not retreat. I informed Mrs. Gandhi the opposi tion in the U.S. was mainly vocal—a limited number, and in no way represented the majority view of the American people. These assurances seemed to satisfy her and she appreciated the burdens you were carrying and our desire for peace.

She then asked what India might do to be of help. And I responded that we would appreciate their good offices with the Soviets and if possible to use their contacts in Hanoi. I reminded Mrs. Gandhi that India was a member of the ICC and we wanted India to act fairly and objectively in that capacity. She and her Foreign Minister insisted they were acting fairly, but did point out that if India was to have any influence on the Russians, she would have to be wise and somewhat quiet in her ICC role.

Mrs. Gandhi expressed deep concern over Communist China’s aggressive policies. I reminded her that it was the same Communist China that attacked India which was aiding North Vietnam and the Vietcong. She agreed to this. And, therefore, I suggested that we had a common cause in stopping Red China. I asked her to think through what India would do if Communist China should attack us in Vietnam. Would India move her forces into Tibet as a diversion? Would India continue to pin down large Chinese armies on her frontier by maintaining or increasing India’s military forces on her northern frontier? I asked for no immediate answer, but simply wanted to have the Indian officials think through some of these potential situations. In other words, I faced the Indian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister with some hard realities.

It is my view that Mrs. Gandhi is yet somewhat uncertain in her leadership position. She depends a great deal on her Ministers. Our friends in Australia who know her, however, say that in a short time she will be in command. She is bright, experienced in the ways of politics, tough-minded, and knows how to use power. This is the view of Lord Casey, Governor General of Australia, who has known her a long time.

I informed Mrs. Gandhi that she had to be prepared for some frank, down-to-earth discussions when she arrived in Washington. I told her we were deeply committed to Indian freedom and independence and Indian security, but we would expect the same commitment on India’s part to the U.S. It would be well for her and her Ministers to think through the cooperative relationships between India and U.S. in the defense against Communist China in Southeast Asia and the subcontinent.

I would say the visit was helpful. The President of India is a realist. He promised to use his good offices to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets to exert more influence on Hanoi for peace. He is well aware of the Chinese Communist threat and plans. He is friendly to the U.S., and our Australian allies have a high regard for him.

Favell

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Top Secret; Flash; Literally Eyes Only for the President. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, which was received at 2:23 p.m. and passed to the White House at 3 p.m.
2. In his earlier conversation with Gandhi, Humphrey had discussed the food crisis in India, and had informed her that the United States was prepared to negotiate a $100 million non-project loan with India. He also indicated that he told the Defense Minister and the Chiefs of Staff that the United States was prepared to consider commercial and credit sales of nonlethal military equipment, and that if progress in the spirit of the Tashkent Declaration continued, it might become possible to discuss other aspects of military assistance. The conversation was mainly devoted to a discussion of developments in Vietnam. Humphrey stressed the danger of Chinese aggression and asked that India use its good offices whenever possible to try to facilitate negotiations to bring an end to the fighting in Vietnam. He asked Gandhi to restrain judgmental public pronouncements by Indian officials on the conflict. The United States was not asking for an endorsement of its policies in Vietnam, and it welcomed private exchanges concerning the conflict, but Humphrey said it affected relations between the two countries if Indian officials continued to throw “dead cats at the U.S.” (Memorandum of conversation, February 17; ibid.)