Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

289. Memorandum for Record¹

Washington, February 2, 1966.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with Indian Ambassador Nehru

The President greeted Ambassador Nehru warmly, saying that he thought the new cabinet was off to a good start. He well understood India’s succession problem, having gone through the same tragic situa tion himself. Nehru replied that Mrs. Gandhi was touched by the President’s message² and sent warm greetings to him. The President commented jocularly that with a woman Prime Minister in India, the pressure was now on us. We would have to do something more for our women. Nehru riposted that the women of India were “impossible” now.

Commenting that talks were long overdue, the President was anxious to see Mrs. Gandhi as soon as possible. He was troubled because he had an incipient revolt on his hands in Congress. He did not want to go to Congress on future aid to India till he had talked things over further with Mrs. Gandhi. In the meantime he had asked our best people to get up a program; then he would ask the Congress to join in it. The President wanted to go this route because he was getting tired of the charges that he was running everything, even though he kept asking for Congress’ views (as on Vietnam).

The President then discussed multilateralizing our aid, including food. He didn’t wholly agree with Senator Fulbright on doing everything via multilateral rather than bilateral means. The best argument against multilateralism, as the AID people kept claiming, was that we didn’t get credit for the aid we gave. Yet given the UN’s success in dealing with the Pak/Indian cease fire, he wondered if it might not be best to use the multilateral route in meeting Indian food needs. We might make a substantial contribution to the World Food Program or the UN itself and ask every other country to come in appropriately. We put in 50% of the World Food Program now. We could even say that we would increase this proportion if others would do the same, not necessarily in wheat alone but in its equivalent. The Ambassador commented that the US was the only country which had food to spare, and it didn’t cost the US anything to send it abroad. The President bridled at this, retorting that we did have to pay for every nickel’s worth of wheat or other commodities. He had just seen figures from the Budget Bureau indicating that we had to pay $60–80 per ton for wheat.

The President wanted to sit down with the new Prime Minister and discuss what he could do for India as well as vice versa. Then he would tell the Congress what he wanted to do in bushels and dollars. This had not been budgeted yet. He noted that he was being severely criticized right this minute for feeding Vietnam refugees, while cutting out $600 million in military construction here. We could get results from the Congress if we consulted it. Congressman kept claiming that they were not consulted enough. Senator Fulbright kept saying that when the President acted without the Congress he was being ostentatious and dictatorial.

The President then raised the question of promises vs. performance. He described how in 1961 we had committed $300 million to Brazil for social projects. The Brazilians were to do several things in return. They passed a number of resolutions, but didn’t perform on a single one. Then he, President Johnson, had doubled aid to $550–600 million, but Senator Morse claimed that we were less liked in Latin America now than ever. The President suspected that a good deal of this problem was our “image”, created by Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. So we had to figure out—the quicker the better—what to do for India and then put it up to the Congress. He was trying to get a five-year authorization for aid, but doubted that he would get it in an election year.

The President told Nehru to evolve—with Komer and others—a sensible program. Then we would send our people—including Secretaries Rusk, Freeman and Gardner—up to testify. The first program we would undertake under the new AID/Food Message was the Indian emergency. At the moment the President thought we should act through the UN, perhaps after an interim allocation to keep things going. Senator Fulbright was right that we got no credit for what we did bilaterally.

Ambassador Nehru interjected that handling food this way was difficult. But economic aid had to be given with conditions, which were more acceptable if exacted through multilateral agencies. Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to say that she would like to come in the second half of March. The Indian Parliament would still be in session then, but she thought she could get away. The President asked the Ambassador to tell her that there was no one in the world who understood her problem in taking over better or with more sympathy. Mrs. Johnson and he would see her on no notice at all, at any time she could come. It was essential that they meet as early as possible so he could get ahead with what he wanted to do. Nehru should tell Mrs. Gandhi just to wire when she was coming.

The Ambassador mentioned that Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to tell the President how much she appreciated the peace moves on Vietnam. She was greatly disappointed at the lack of response. Nehru commented on India’s contribution through talking with Kosygin at Tashkent. He added, “I don’t know if you know yet, but we also made some approaches through our Consul General in Hanoi.” However, the North Vietnamese were not responsible [responsive?]. We also sent our ICC Chairman to Hanoi. He reported that there were two parties in the NVN Government. The moderates were gaining ground but were still in the minority. Nehru repeated that Mrs. Gandhi was “very distressed” at the lack of response to these approaches.

The President then explained at length our decisions on the pause and the many efforts we had made to establish contact and generate a response. He explained how the Soviets and others had said something would come of a pause if we stopped ten days or so, but it didn’t work. He “appreciated very much” what Shastri said at Tashkent with Kosygin. However, the net of the whole exercise was that the President was worse off than a month ago. His basic problem was not with the peace lovers but with those who argued for a yet tougher line.

The President indicated that he was “terribly proud” of what India did at Tashkent in moving toward reconciliation with the Paks. “Shastri died the right way in the cause of peace, not at the end of a gun barrel.” Ambassador Nehru replied that Mrs. Gandhi had asked him to tell the President that “India was going all-out to make Tashkent work.” The Indians hoped to withdraw well before 25 February. They were also proposing resumption of ministerial meetings and of transit overflights. Meanwhile, anti-Pak propaganda had been stopped.

The President discussed Ayub’s problems, remarked that one of these was that he had ended up almost an “advocate of India”. But Ayub had many difficulties with his own people. When he came to the US he was a chastened man, but also a proud one. He didn’t rebel or even argue, when the President told him he had to settle with India. Nehru remarked that what the President had done with Ayub had had considerable effect on Tashkent. The President hoped that Ayub wouldn’t lose his job as a result; Bhutto and others seemed to be a serious threat. Nehru said that the Indians realized they had to help Ayub, but India had a few problems of its own at home with hardliners.

The Ambassador then made “two specific emergency requests.” The first was food. The US had given India 1.5 million tons in December, and the last would be shipped this week. Could the US give a firm public commitment on more, to cover at least till the end of June? If the US were unable to make a public commitment, it would promote hoarding and riots—as in Kerala. Of course, the Kerala crisis was partly food and partly politics. He explained that if the Indian people lacked confidence that sufficient wheat was coming, they would not give up their own stocks of rice and wheat for distribution. If India could have 5 million tons of wheat now, “it would take us up through June.” Second, the Ambassador claimed that there had been a freeze on all US aid, including what was pledged last year—about $500 million was outstanding. The Indian economy was running out of raw material. Factories were operating way below capacity and unemployment was up. Since it took eight months between the signing of a loan agreement and the actual arrival of the goods involved, India’s economic problems were bleak unless aid was started up again. These two problems were so urgent that the Prime Minister had asked Nehru to take them up right away. India also intended to talk with the World Bank shortly about its broader economic problems.

The President replied that he understood the urgency of these matters. His problem was whether he could borrow on his own prestige by going ahead without the Congress on these matters. He didn’t know how soon this bank would run out. So his judgment was that he should make no commitments till there was an understanding between our two countries, and till he got the approval of the American people via the Congress. Otherwise, he was just asking for more problems. So on food in particular, he desired to send a message and legislation to the Congress on what we could do and what we thought others should do. To act in any other way would jeopardize the future relations between our two countries—and the President’s own relations with the Congress.

Nehru asked how India’s short term emergency needs could be met in the meantime. The President replied that he might take some action before the Congress moved, but could only afford the utter minimum. He did not want to make new agreements until he could both touch his Congressional base and talk with Mrs. Gandhi. Nehru pointed out that if Shastri hadn’t died, he would have been in Washington this very day. Circumstance had prevented a US/Indian meeting of minds. The President reminded him that we had planned on the 1.5 million tons carrying us till Shastri came, and pointed out that it had lasted till this time. However, he thought that we might be able to make another interim allotment to carry us past the time when the Prime Minister came, because he didn’t want her to be under pressure to come here. He would get the appropriate Congressional leaders together before the week was out, and then announce an interim allotment.³ The President thought that the American people would come through, but the Indian people had to understand that we Americans had our problems too. If the President sent a message to Congress⁴ and there was full public discussion Indians must realize that they were going to be criticized during this discussion. Nehru thought that Indians would understand.

The President then re-emphasized that the Prime Minister should come—the sooner the better. The two of them could work out an understanding. The President would get a food message up to Congress right after, and we would get it through in thirty days.

Nehru again made a plea for economic aid; “defreezing” economic assistance was as important as food. The President said he would talk with Nehru again on this. He had made up his mind that there would be no new aid till we had agreed on a new course with both India and Pakistan. He thought he had such an agreement with Ayub, but had been holding up any new initiatives with Pakistan till the Indians could visit. Indeed, he believed that his talk with Ayub had more to do with the success of Tashkent than almost anything else. Ayub knew from his talks here that war with India or ties with China were “inimical to US interests”. Ayub had said that he would not do anything inimical to the interests of the US.

The President then said that he would deal with the Kerala problem (another interim food allotment) without Mrs. Gandhi asking him. He was going to treat Mrs. Gandhi as he would want her to treat him. He knew her problem better than she might think he knew it, since he had gone through a similar succession crisis. The President then walked Ambassador Nehru out through the Lobby.

R. W. Komer

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VII, Cables, 1/66–8/66. Secret. The meeting took place at the White House on February 2 but the memorandum is dated February 3.
2. See Document 283.
3. On February 4 the White House announced authorization for an extension of the P.L. 480 agreement with India to provide an additional 2 million tons of wheat and 1 million tons of sorghum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India’s Food Problem, Vol. I) An amendment to that effect to the existing P.L. 480 agreement was signed on February 5 in New Delhi. (Telegram 2009 from New Delhi, February 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15–4 INDIA)
4. On February 10 President Johnson sent a message to Congress “On Food for Freedom.” The message addressed the problem of hunger worldwide and the things the United States could do to help meet the problem and to help the hungry nations of the world become self-sufficient. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 28, 1966, pp. 336–341.