Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

287. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 1, 1966, 5:30 p.m.

Pak/Indian Interim Steps. Here is the list you requested today of the interim steps I’d suggest taking now with both countries. I’ll also work up the best formula on food sharing that I can.

These proposals may be more forthcoming than your own thinking as of this moment, but I feel that the momentum we’ve achieved in moving Paks and Indians our way (Tashkent, troop withdrawal, new Indian agriculture program) is so promising that we ought to show just enough responsiveness to keep the process going.

A. Steps to help Ayub. We ought to do enough for Ayub to avoid undermining his position that his visit here was successful, especially when his Tashkent reconciliation policy is under fire. So I’d favor the following steps parallel to whatever we do for India:

1. An interim PL 480 agreement. Pakistan is much better off than India, but is pressing for food too as it sees India getting so much. We could move pronto with an $18 million extension of the old agreement, or make a new 3 month deal for $26 million (300,000 tons wheat and 25,000 tons of oils).

2. $50 million program loan for fertilizer and raw materials to speed up Pak economy would be a major gesture and good economics too. We’d tie stiff economic conditions (same as for India below).

3. Ease up on military sales. Ayub himself just raised this issue. The Pak military are hurting and disgruntled; we want to ease their pressure on Ayub and guard against the Paks buying a lot from the ChiComs. It’s hard to justify restoring MAP yet (this would also be ticklish with Congress). But we could lift our ban on non-lethal military commercial sales, plus telling Ayub we’ll entertain requests for MAP credit sales once the 25 February troop withdrawal takes place (the Paks want to buy two civilian C–130s, have about $3 million in orders for commo equipment stacked up, and need a lot of spare parts).

4. Hornig Medical Mission you promised Ayub will leave soon, and be a good gesture hopefully costing mostly surplus rupees.

This package should hold Ayub for at least two months (till after a Gandhi visit), but still leave at least $30 million in FY ’66 aid, $85 million from EXIM for the Karachi steel mill, and more PL 480 to be doled out later. I’d dress it up via a letter to Ayub. Later you could send out Arthur Dean to discuss terms and conditions prior to further help.

B. Package for India. The following is carefully graduated to give Mrs. Gandhi a clear sense now that we want to help, but again save the bulk of our AID money and PL 480 for later bargaining. So when BK Nehru comes in tomorrow with an urgent plea for famine relief and emergency economic aid to keep India’s faltering economy going, you could respond with:

1. Another interim PL 480 Allocation. Mrs. Gandhi will doubtless have told BK to plead for a pledge covering the whole emergency period.² Our problem is to be responsive enough so that no one can say we’re being niggardly, but not let India off the hook. So I’d tell him you’ll allocate 1.5 to 2 million tons to keep the pipeline full, and may seek a Joint Resolution endorsing a major US anti-famine effort if others will join in appropriately. But you could emphasize that any further major US contributions will depend on what others do. We can’t carry the whole load. So India better get humping.

2. $100 million Program Loan. India’s industry is running down badly owing to lack of raw materials. So a loan now would reap dividends, while still reserving the bulk of our aid ($85 million from FY ’65 and earlier, at least $70 million from FY ’66 and massive PL 480) for later parleying with Indira. As a means of bringing home what we expect, we’d tie on stiff conditions: (a) India must match our $100 million; (b) the money must be used for revving up existing capacity, not to start new projects; (c) reassurance that India won’t siphon off too much for defense; and (d) reopening of India’s dialogue with the World Bank, which is our ally in getting better Indian performance.

3. Ease up on military commercial and MAP credit sales. This will help Pakistan more than India, but ought to be symmetrical.

4. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

5. Last, I’d authorize Freeman to tell the Indians that we’d reimburse them out of any future PL 480 if they go ahead now and buy wheat with their own foreign exchange. This involves no commitment or added cost, since we’re going to give them some future PL 480, but has the great virtue of getting them off their duffs instead of sitting around waiting for a handout. This isn’t a gimmick to get more food for India—in fact it lets us play a tougher game.

The above steps are in accord with current State,³ DOD, and AID thinking. We’ve had remarkable success to date in Pak/Indian policy and made both countries sing our tune. I’m convinced, as your guy who watches South Asia closely, that the time has come to ease up enough to keep Paks and Indians moving the right way, while retaining plenty of chips to play yet another hand when Indira comes. And we’d tie everything to performance.⁴

R. W. Komer

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 19, Jan. 19–Feb. 4, 1966. Secret.
2. The magnitude of the emergency was underscored by the report of the food grain survey team that was submitted by C. R. Eskildsen to Freeman on January 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (US) 15 INDIA) Freeman summarized the report in a memorandum to President Johnson on February 1 and noted that India’s request for 11 million tons of food grains to meet the emergency was accepted by the team as a “bare bones minimum.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, India’s Food Problem, Vol. I)
3. Department of State proposals for policy initiatives relating to India and Pakistan were outlined in two February 1 memoranda sent to the White House entitled “Scenario for Pakistan: Next Steps in Our Relations” and “Scenario for India: Next Steps in Our Relations.” The tenor of the proposals in the memoranda accords with Komer’s recommendations. (Ibid., Country File, Pakistan, Vol. VI, Memos, 1/66–9/66 and Country File, India, Vol. VII, Cables, 1/66–8/66, respectively)
4. McGeorge Bundy added a handwritten note under Komer’s signature that reads: “This is quite a package, but I am strongly for it—sooner or later we’ll have to show a carrot to match our stick, and compared to the size of our whole strategy and our planned commitments, these are small decisions.” Johnson responded with a handwritten marginal note that reads: “I don’t agree—Don’t make any promises to anyone until we can talk further.”