Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

273. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, December 30, 1965, 8:02 p.m.

1170. Deptel 1071,² Cirtel 1242.³

1. Top levels here continue to view early organization by GOI of international effort to help India with food situation matter of highest priority. Request that you follow up with appropriate GOI officials this aspect Subramaniam visit immediately, discussing subject with them along following lines.

2. As President and Secretaries Rusk and Freeman made clear to Subramaniam, our readiness to provide food assistance over and above current level related to GOI willingness frankly to inform international community seriousness Indian food situation and to vigor with which it seeks international help. Organization of international effort will require considerable initiative and ingenuity. Subramaniam indicated that he recognized importance of such an effort, that he would discuss FAO role with Sen of FAO during Rome airport stop and would take up subject with PM and President upon return. We would be interested in results of such consultation.

3. As to how GOI effort should be organized, most urgent need is bilateral follow-up with countries in best position to provide help with respect immediate food needs. Especially important is effort, through diversions and other means, to utilize Indian port capacity to maximum possible extent next six weeks. As indicated septels, US is backing up Indian effort this regard through own bilateral approaches.

4. However, GOI should begin now effort to provide broader international framework for food and agricultural aid. This important to provide (a) framework within which countries unable to provide immediate food or shipping but able to provide fertilizer, seed and other aid for 1966 crop can be given reasonable assurance their contribution related to longer-term Indian effort deal with its basic agricultural problems; (b) means of coordinating international effort to ensure proper priorities and time phasing; (c) means of dramatizing international support. In broad terms emergency effort should be seen as means of dramatizing and moving toward international effort to support GOI solutions to longer term problem.

5. After having considered alternative approaches to organization of international effort, we believe best mechanism would be creation by GOI of coordinating committee of potential donor governments and donor international agencies, sitting in Delhi and including representation from FAO and World Bank. Indian designated to head international effort should be person of prominence, preferably Subramaniam himself. Other representatives on committee might be ambassadors in Delhi or special representatives sent to Delhi for purpose. Job of committee would be to support GOI efforts, as detailed para. 4, to muster international help of all kinds relevant to immediate crisis and next year’s crop; to coordinate effort; and to dramatize international aspect. Chairman would play leading personal role.

6. In order achieve its important and urgent objectives, such an arrangement should be promptly established, hopefully within a week. With convening of US Congress, upcoming Presidential messages to Congress, etc., it essential that we have soonest some indication of GOI plans and initial actions so that US effort can be placed in broader international context.

7. Most important to any effort that GOI make clear to potential donors urgency of situation.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SOC 10 INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by R.H. Johnson and Handley; cleared by Farr (AID/NESA), Deputy Assistant Secretary Walter M. Kotschnig (IO), Laise, Terrell E. Arnold (E/TEP), Jacobson (USDA), and Special Assistant to the Secretary for Food for Peace Richard W. Reuter; and approved by Hare. Repeated to London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Karachi.
2. In telegram 1071 to New Delhi, December 16, the Embassy was informed that U.S. readiness to provide special assistance to India over and above P.L. 480 assistance was related to the willingness of the Indian Government to inform the international community of the seriousness of the problem and the vigor with which it sought international help. The Embassy was instructed to make the U.S. position clear. (Ibid.)
3. Circular telegram 1242, December 30, addressed to 13 posts in Europe and Asia, summarized Subramaniam’s visit to Washington and emphasized the importance of a broad international effort to meet the food crisis in India. The Department indicated that it intended to call in representatives of the 13 countries to which India had made informal soundings asking for help. The Embassies were instructed to weigh in in support of that approach. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–8 INDIA) The Department sent additional messages to London, Ottawa, and Canberra stating that the United States considered that the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia would play major roles in helping India meet its critical food needs. (Telegrams 3744 to London, 717 to Ottawa, and 504 to Canberra, all December 30; ibid., SOC 10 INDIA)