Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

270. Memorandum for Record¹

Washington, December 20, 1965.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with Indian Food Minister Subramaniam²

PRESENT

• The President
• Secretary Freeman
• Mr. Komer
• Minister Subramaniam
• Ambassador B.K. Nehru

The President cordially welcomed Subramaniam, saying that he had looked forward to Subramaniam’s visit. Secretary Freeman had filled him in on the Rome discussions and Subramaniam’s program; in fact, Freeman was a wonderful public relations man on this matter.

Subramaniam said he brought the best wishes of Prime Minister Shastri, who looked forward to his February visit. Subramaniam too thought there had been good discussions in Rome. He felt that Agriculture now had first priority in India’s Fourth Plan, and he appreciated the US support.

The President replied that he too looked forward to Shastri’s coming. By then he would have submitted to Congress various proposals on food, health, population and other fields which would be of mutual interest. Freeman had reported how Subramaniam had exerted real leadership on India’s food problem. This was very good. Perhaps Freeman should go out to India soon to see the situation for himself.

The President then mentioned the Ayub visit. He said that Ayub had made no criticism of anything we were doing for India. The President had deliberately authorized the $50 million fertilizer loan before Ayub came so that he wouldn’t misunderstand our policy. In fact, Ayub realized that he couldn’t write our Indian policies for us. Ayub didn’t indulge in any ancient history, which made the meeting much easier. The President had asked him if he could use some of Pakistan’s ports if necessary to move in food for India. Ayub had replied that if this was practicable, it would be manageable. The President thought that something along these lines would be an excellent means of promoting Pak-Indian rapprochement. Subramaniam agreed.

The President then developed his own thinking on how to help meet the Indian food crisis. We ought to look at everything we could do to help, not just at making food available. The whole problem of shipping, port facilities, transportation and internal distribution “ought to be attacked just as if we were in a war”. He asked Secretary Freeman to move as fast as possible on these matters—and to talk to our best people in such fields. The President remarked that he had seen a press story about extensive storage losses in India. Subramaniam replied that this was overdone; it had actually been a local problem. He described the new “safe grains” movement to cope with this problem.

At this point the President described the motivations behind US policy. We were not interested in disciplining anyone, in becoming the masters of anyone, or in dominating anyone. All we wanted was India’s friendship. Nor were we cocky about our own economic successes, because 25% of our people still had all sorts of needs. We had a poverty problem, a Negro problem, an urban problem, a health problem, etc. The President explained how he was trying to do something about all of them. And our interest did not stop at our boundary. We wanted to do something about health, education and poverty all over the world. One of the key things the President was going to try and do during his term of office was to achieve new results in the field of food and agriculture, health, population, and education abroad as well as at home. We would exercise whatever persuasion we could toward these ends. We wanted to provide incentives too. He told Subramaniam that “you gave us an incentive in your new program. If you can keep this program going we can help you more.”

Subramaniam thanked the President. He then raised the special importance of taking extra care of children. They were the future. He felt that India should have a separate children’s program in this crisis, so that India could say that children had equal opportunities. The President responded warmly to this idea.

The President then explained how his postponement of the Shastri and Ayub visits had nothing to do with Indian and Pakistani criticism of the US. He simply wanted to have his money in the bank before he talked aid matters. However, the postponement had led to misunderstandings. Both Subramaniam and B.K. Nehru assured the President that these were matters of the past and that there was no residue of concern at all.

The President mentioned three points which he thought were important to US-Indian collaboration. First, if we could find some way to get Kashmir considered and out of the way, this would help us to get on with much more important things. Second, he hoped that India would get other countries to help meet the food crisis. The more that others could do in some kind of international consortium the more helpful we could be. Third, he had to give the US people some hope that India would be able to take care of itself and even to help others in due time.

So the President urged that the Indians and ourselves put a food consortium together. This would help mightily with Symington and others in Congress. He was proud of the way in which he had gotten the aid bill through with fewer cuts than at almost any previous time. In fact, he had gotten about 85% of his legislative program through, but the honeymoon was over. The President also pointed out that he had never criticized Shastri. Indeed, the whole American press was remarkably free of criticism of India.

The President summed up by telling Secretary Freeman to see what we needed in a crash program, to see that our wheat and that of others got all the way to the Indian people who needed it most. We must try to avoid any holdup because of inadequate ports or distribution. He told Freeman to follow every sack of wheat from the US silo to the Indian stomach. Second, he said “let us get others in the act. Let us tell others what they can contribute.” He thought that he might raise this matter with Erhard, and described his difficulties in getting the British and Germans to contribute to the Asian bank.

The President ended by urging Subramaniam to meet the press in the West lobby. He and Freeman should describe the general tenor of the discussions and also indicate that we had discussed some of the problems which would be taken up at the President’s meeting with Prime Minister Shastri.

RWK

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables/Memos/Misc., 1965–1966. Secret.
2. Subramaniam was in Washington at Freeman’s invitation to discuss the food crisis in India. Subramaniam also met with Freeman, Bell, Rusk, Vice President Humphrey, and a group of Congressmen. In his meeting with Rusk on December 22, Subramaniam said that the drought was the worst India had known since the 1890s, and that unless special measures were taken starvation was inevitable. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, SOC 10 INDIA)