250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
2919. U.S.-U.K. talks conducted November 16–182 covered British assessment of situation in subcontinent, of positions of India, Pakistan, Russia and China, and consequences for British policy. Sir Patrick Dean led off for Brits in meeting with Acting Secretary Ball and tabled paper3 which will be pouched. Purpose of talks and visit of Pickard and Belcher seemed to be to convey to U.S. that gravity of situation and special circumstances (including substantial investment) which characterize U.K. relations with India and Pakistan have led to British assessment that it is in our common interest for U.K. to move ahead with economic aid and selected military sales. One area of doubt was question of supplying Gnat components to India and on this point U.S. views were specifically requested. Implicit in British presentation was hope U.S. would relax its current aid policies in both India and Pakistan. In their view both countries realize U.S. arms embargo had had profound effect on Indo-Pak conflict which had greatly benefited India. Realities of this situaton necessitated at least sales of spares to Paks, particularly for Air Force.
Constant British refrain was pessimism about progress on Indo-Pak front and risks to Western interests of aid being used to extract political concessions. Brits held political pressure would, in present mood of two countries, be likely to drive each to act illogically and against its own national interest. Pakistan might move decisively toward China; India might elect economic stagnation and dependence on USSR. End result could be chaos and beyond retrieving by any efforts we might then make. Pickard thought situation in Pakistan already so explosive and Ayub under such severe pressures from military that it was difficult to see how satisfactory Washington conversations could take place unless Ayub were to go home with arms [Page 473] and/or guarantees against India and some agreement on Kashmir. If U.S. were to pay his price, however, impossible problems would be created for Shastri visit. U.K. has concluded it can best contribute to our common objective by maintaining complementary rather than parallel aid policies, thus trying to maintain what little influence it has and using it to reduce risks and to create reasonable political climate in which more massive U.S. leverage can be used to good effect.
Acting Secretary Ball stated that U.S. posture is to take very hard look at very important but complicated situation which exists on subcontinent. Before continuing to pour very large resources into subcontinent that makes development difficult for itself by its actions, we would want some assurance both on political side and on economic measures for self-help. We have had difficulty explaining to Congress why we were pouring our diminishing surplus stocks into an India that is not moving toward self-sufficiency. To continue to do so may be doing them a disservice. Pakistan has done better on this score but we still face problem of whether it is prudent and wise to provide resources to two nations which are more obsessed with each other than with their own development. These are questions which need answering.
Difference between U.S. and U.K. approach appears to be one of timing—how soon we should move and what should be understandings connected with these moves. Mr. Ball noted that U.S. is expecting Shastri and Ayub. He anticipated that visits would take place before February. We are very much looking forward to having frank talks. Out of these we will have clearer view of what we can expect of each other. We are not keen on rushing back and putting resources into an area where we do not know what is going to happen. Acting Secretary expressed hope that U.S. and U.K. could have sufficient agreement on requirements to move together. In light of this, resumption of sales of military equipment by U.K., particularly components for Gnats, frankly concerns us and it will intensify Pakistan anxieties. Therefore, it seemed desirable to reach some common conclusions on timing.
Throughout talks U.S. officials emphasized U.S. policy was unchanged for present and lack of parallelism of U.S.-U.K. policies would create problems for us. At conclusion of talks we confirmed to Brits that U.S. hoped U.K. would defer action on allowing sales of Gnat components to India until after Ayub, Shastri visits. In farewell conversation with Department officer Pickard stated on basis of what he had just learned about Indian deals with USSR and Czechs, he thought U.K. could pin holding line on Gnats to this new development.
Memcons follow.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Laise on November 20; cleared by Judd, Hare, and Handley; and approved by Ball. Also sent to New Delhi and Karachi, and repeated to USUN.↩
- Memoranda of conversation on these talks, which took place in Washington, are ibid., POL 27 INDIA–PAK, POL 2 ASIA, and POL 2 ASIA SE. The U.S. participants in the talks included Ball, Mann, Hare, AID Director Bell, and McNaughton (DOD/ISA). The British participants included Ambassador Dean, Cyril S. Pickard, Superintending Under Secretary for the Asia and Atlantic Division of the Commonwealth Relations Office, and Ronald H. Belcher, Under Secretary of the Asia Division of the Ministry of Overseas Development.↩
- Not found.↩