Office of the Historian

248. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson1

Washington, November 16, 1965, 7 p.m.

Here are the papers Arthur Dean mentioned today.2 Since aid to India and Pakistan is so central to the FY 1967 foreign aid problem now under review for you, we made a special effort. The attached papers are the result, and we are shooting them at your tough-minded friends.

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We’ve made every effort to be hard-nosed, to put the alternatives coldly, and to give you a basis for choice. But we just can’t get around two basic propositions: (1) that India is (with Japan) one of the two really key countries in Free Asia—so merits a comparable investment almost despite the Indians; (2) that Pakistan can complement our effort in India, or greatly complicate it if it goes the ChiCom route.

Because these two big programs are the key variables, you may want to read parts of the argument before the aid review. If you wish to scan only the key portions, these are:

  • On India
    • pp. 5–7 which argue that India has actually done reasonably well with our money, and is basically going our way. Thus our real problem is less India’s basic outlook than its performance.
    • pp. 8–10 on how we can’t “buy” a Kashmir settlement, even if we throw all our aid in the balance. So we can’t afford to make this the keystone of our policy.
    • pp. 16–19 which say that what we need is a new policy—not in content but in method—which would directly bargain continued massive aid for sharply improved Indian self-help. We would make this bargain self-enforcing by adjusting aid flow to Indian performance—especially in agriculture.
    • pp. 21–22 on how this sort of bargain can be struck by you and Shastri at the summit—the earlier the better.
  • On Pakistan
    • pp. 1–4 which describe our cruel dilemma—how just when our economic aid begins to pay off we find ourselves on divergent political courses.
    • pp. 7–11 on the urgent need for a meeting of minds at the summit and the political bargain we must insist on if our aid is not to be wasted.
    • pp. 16–19 on how it makes sense to support Pak development if we can reach a political understanding, and how tactically we might handle Mr. Ayub.

R.W. Komer
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret.↩
  2. Reference is to a 29-page paper dated November 8 entitled “A United States Assistance Strategy for India,” and a 21-page paper dated November 9 entitled “United States Assistance Strategy for Pakistan.” There is no drafting information on either paper, but a covering memorandum by Komer, November 10, forwarding the India paper to the President states that it was drafted by “us ‘soft on India’ types.” (Ibid., Country File, India, Vol. VI, Cables, Memos and Miscellaneous, 9/65–1/66) A copy of the India paper is ibid.; a copy of the Pakistan paper is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 092 Pakistan)↩