Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, October 2, 1965, 5:19 p.m.

619. Your recent tels such as 829² have given us most perceptive and useful view of atmosphere in India. Your recommendations touch fundamentals of US policy and are under study. In meantime, stance we are adopting with regard India takes into account this atmosphere and its implications for Indian policy. This stance is based on recognition that India has emerged from recent ordeal with strengthened unity, sense of national purpose, and status as the dominant power on subcontinent. This is distinct plus. At same time, however, believe we are justified in reminding India of its responsibility to help solve problems peacefully in troubled times ahead; this means that India must recognize that Pakistan has major problems in its relations with India which are being exploited by ChiComs. Therefore it is reasonable to ask India, in its own interest as well as ours, to engage in creative efforts to help lessen Pakistan’s problems as a way of reducing Indo-Pak tensions and frustrating Chinese designs. It will be difficult for us to resume assistance until we are assured conditions exist on subcontinent which make development feasible.

With these thoughts in mind we have prepared following talking points for use by officials meeting Indians here in immediate future. Hope you will reinforce our efforts here in similar talks in Delhi.

India-Pakistan Dispute

1. We recognized that India is the larger power on subcontinent, with considerable force at its disposal.

2. Force, however, constitutes no solution in this day and age. As the larger power India in its own interest and in interest of world peace must take account of aspirations of people of Pakistan, quite apart from question of rights and wrongs. Recent conflict settles nothing and indicates Kashmir will not fade away. The longer it is allowed to fester, the more India runs danger of encouraging destructive Pakistan policies which can be exploited by Communist China.

3. We hope India will recognize desirability of availing itself of all the instruments of diplomacy to achieve better Indo-Pak relations and to give evidence of a willingness to do so.

4. We wish to assure India we recognize that a solution can only evolve from political compromise and accommodation of positions of both parties. It cannot be imposed from outside. However, we do consider that as fellow member of UN we have right to urge that process of unconditional talks within an agreed framework should be started in order to work toward peaceful settlement of outstanding differences. We all have stake in outcome.

Economic Assistance

1. Although we have been continuing shipments food and other commodities under our existing economic aid agreements, even with passage aid appropriation we are committed to consulting with Congress on situation in subcontinent in connection with making new economic aid loans or grants to either India or Pakistan. As we prepare for these considerations we will wish consider number of matters.

2. We will need to have idea of the effect of fighting on Indian economy.

3. Prospects for development will also be affected by future allocation of Indian resources between development and defense. We will also therefore need to know effect of GOI’s proposed military expenditure on prospects for economic development.

4. More broadly, we will need to be assured that economic development in subcontinent, in which we have invested so heavily, is not again to be disrupted by fighting between India and Pakistan. It would appear to us therefore that there is a need for military disengagement and establishment of a process of negotiation which will provide a basis for peace in subcontinent.

5. Aside from new problems arising out of fighting, we are aware of the basic economic problems India faces in its development effort. We attach critical importance to policy measures India will take to make maximum use of its own resources and foreign assistance.

Military Assistance

We are committed to consulting fully with appropriate members of Congress regarding situation on subcontinent on conditions under which military aid might be resumed. We do not see how we can resume military aid or sales at the present time, particularly since fighting is still going on.³

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret. Drafted by Schneider, cleared by Laise and Popper, and approved by Raymond A. Hare. Repeated to Karachi, London, and USUN.
2. Among the points made by Bowles in telegram 829 from New Delhi, September 29, in sketching the political environment created in India by the war was the “hard political fact that no Indian Govt. could agree to yield to Paks by negotiation what Paks have attempted and failed to gain by military force.” He also noted that the Indian military would never yield the strategic Kashmir Valley to Pakistan, since that would cut their lines of communication with Indian-held Ladakh. Bowles emphasized that “no international pressure short of direct application of military force will induce India to yield on this particular question.” (Ibid.)
3. The Department sent a similar set of talking points to Karachi on October 5, urging a withdrawal from military confrontation and unconditional negotiations with India in search of a political settlement. The telegram also explained that resumption of economic and military assistance was contingent upon assurances that the assistance would not contribute to or be wasted in a military conflict on the subcontinent. (Telegram 595 to Karachi; ibid., POL PAK-US)