230. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1
Pak/Indian Affairs. The situation is still confused. The cease-fire is still tenuously holding as more UN observers appear on the scene. But the latest Indian attack in the Chhamb sector is thoroughly arousing the Paks, and could lead to resumption of full-scale hostilities. We’re pressing the SYG to act.
In any event withdrawal to the 5 August positions will be a tricky matter. The UK believes the UN must press for it immediately, lest the [Page 438] war erupt again. The British feel the SC must take a tough stance, including sanctions if needed. But the Paks are insisting that withdrawal go hand in hand with the creation of machinery for Kashmir settlement. India’s counterploy is to hint that the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line is no longer valid.
Meanwhile Goldberg is conferring about an SC Commission of the four big powers (US, USSR, UK, France) to help the SYG work out a Kashmir settlement. The USSR is reluctant, and the Indians too.
Pak Attitudes. Ayub’s attitude toward us seems to have hardened; we’re not quite sure why. But he’s now made clear he can’t come here for 6–8 weeks at least; perhaps he wants to soften us up first through such devices as the squeeze on our installations.
Meanwhile, the Paks are allowing the almost wholly government-controlled media to feed the growing anti-US and pro-ChiCom sentiment in Pakistan. Our Embassy and USIA reports US prestige is at an all-time low. The risk here is that Ayub may paint himself into a corner, and lose his ability to move back toward us even if he decides to do so. There is also a distinct risk that the frustrated die-hards may yet force Pakistan to go the ChiCom route, even at the cost of US support. We are simply not in effective communication with Ayub at this critical moment, so if he’s unable to come here it may now be important to send someone there.
Pressure on US Installations. The Paks have now closed up practically everything but Peshawar itself. There’s evidence that we did use walkie-talkies illicitly from the Lahore sites in the early days of the war. But this was three weeks ago, so the consensus still is that the Paks are pulling a pressure play on us. Ball is still considering what retaliatory action, if any, to recommend; some argue that this is no time to goad the Paks further lest we help push them off the deep end, while others feel that a prompt, quiet reaction would cool the Paks off rather than the reverse.
Indian Attitudes. Embassy Delhi emphasizes that Indian success has united the nation and produced a new surge of nationalist fervor. Bowles and his UK colleague flatly assert that in this mood the Indians are highly unlikely to compromise on Kashmir. Instead continued hold-up of US aid is rapidly being interpreted as political pressure on India to give up Kashmir.
Embassy Delhi contends that if we hold up everything much longer it will dangerously stimulate the growing sentiment to go-it-alone in Delhi, which will only benefit the Soviets. According to Bowles, we face a critical opportunity either to maximize US influence in a newly self-reliant India or to face a rapid decline in this influence and an accelerating shift towards the USSR.
We here feel that Bowles’ fears are probably premature, but that we do face a growing dilemma. There is little doubt that our decisions [Page 439] at this moment of truth in both India and Pakistan can have basic implications for our further influence for many years to come. We are trying to get the basic issues formulated to put before you, because we inevitably face some decisions shortly, whether or not Shastri or Ayub come here.2
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret.↩
- A handwritten note by Johnson at the end of the memorandum reads: “Bob—Please see that Arthur Dean is kept fully informed and have him come here for consultation as often as advisable.”↩
- McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer’s signature.↩