195. Memorandum for the Record1
The President’s Meeting with Indian Ambassador B. K. Nehru, 6 p.m. 9 September 1965 (off the record)
Ambassador Nehru gave the President a letter dated 7 September 1965 from Prime Minister Shastri.2 After the President had read it, Nehru explained that he had asked for a meeting so that he could stress certain points in the letter. First, “we want peace not war”. Second, “The only way to stop Pakistan’s attack in Kashmir had been to counterattack in the Punjab.” This was the only reason why India had responded as it did. Third, India genuinely wanted a cease fire and withdrawal; its reply to U Thant’s appeal had been badly “misunderstood”. But India had to have all of the people shooting at Indians up there in Kashmir stop firing and withdraw. It couldn’t just be the uniformed forces. India had to cross the cease-fire line in the first place to stop such infiltrators from causing havoc.
Nehru then gave the President a copy of Defense Minister Chavan’s 8 September speech3 with certain passages marked, saying these indicated that India acted purely as a defensive measure. For example, India would not take any action to escalate the war in East Pakistan. He also showed the President a copy of the Secretary General’s report4 with passages marked citing Pak infiltration into Kashmir. He said that he wished to make such points clear at the top level to the President.
Nehru went on to say that two additional points disturbed India. One was the use of US arms against them. India had based its whole defense policy on US assurances that it would not permit Pakistan to use US arms against India. Otherwise it would have armed much more heavily. This assurance had not been honored, but Nehru admitted he didn’t see what could be done about it. Then he complained that the State Department kept saying that both sides were using US arms. This was just not so up to the present. Mr. Komer mentioned, in response to the President’s inquiry, that this had occurred once but that he believed that it was inadvertent and had not been repeated.
[Page 374]The President stated with vigor that this war must be halted somehow. Neither side could win anything in any way commensurate with the risks involved. The stakes were far bigger than Kashmir now. We were going to “put all our chips behind U Thant.” We had also made strong representations to Pakistan about the use of US equipment. We had made clear that we could not accept this.
Nehru asked about the China problem. He said that his government had no firm evidence, but that it felt there was a clear Chinese-Pakistani-Indonesian understanding “to put a triple squeeze on us.” Perhaps the Chinese would not go to war, but at least they would use political pressure. If the Chicoms did come in, what do we do?
The President said this was “giving us gray hairs right now.” We were worried, but we just didn’t know what the Chicoms would do. The cardinal point was, however, to keep Pakistan from going the Chinese route. For all we knew, Pakistan might have some kind of agreement with China. Nehru interjected that India thought the Indonesian contribution might be to take the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India couldn’t stop this; it had no navy.
The President reiterated that we must all back U Thant in order to get peace. The whole future of Asia was at stake. However, stronger US public noises about the Chinese Communist threat might only provoke Peiping.
Raising the Kashmir question, Nehru said that a nation under attack could not even talk about a Kashmir settlement at such a time. That would mean surrender. “We can not let them shoot their way into getting Kashmir.” At this point the President raised the question of our aid bill. He was afraid that the India-Pak mess might kill the aid bill. He had managed to ram it through the House, but the Senate was another matter. Other countries didn’t seem to realize our problems on these matters. Those who criticized our lack of sophistication or our policies didn’t realize that Congress might just listen to them and stop aid.
Then the President described how Shastri and Ayub visits last spring would have been at precisely the wrong time. Congress was always looking for awkward statements by foreign leaders or for the President himself to make mistakes which would permit them to cut aid. Then recently we were within one week of passing the aid bill when war broke out. He regretted that the delays in postponing the earlier visit scheduled for Ayub, and then the leak, had made it difficult for us to notify Shastri in time. Nehru assured him that there was “no ill will left” about the visit postponement. The President had no need to worry. Indeed Shastri had hoped to come in October, but this was probably impossible now because of the war.
The President summed up by saying that what was urgently needed was (1) all-out support for the Syg; (2) rush the aid bill through; [Page 375] (3) tell both sides not to use our equipment; and (d) watch the Chinese. He had spent two hours on this problem today, and stressed that we “must find the solution”. We would do everything we could. The future of Asia is at stake. Recalling his 1962 visit with pleasure, he said he had the warmest feeling for the people of India. We were anxious to do everything we could in the hope that India one hundred years from now would be like the United States.
The President said that “what I am doing in this country this year, I would like to do worldwide. My foreign policy is the Great Society.” He described how there were only four bills left of all those that he hoped to get passed this year. When he got these passed, his domestic job would be largely done. Foreign aid was the toughest, though. The US had spent $800 billion on armaments since the end of World War II. One could remake the world with $800 billion. The President then took Nehru to meet various members of his staff.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65–9/65. Secret. Prepared by Komer.↩
- In the letter, Shastri reviewed the conflict with Pakistan and argued that India’s involvement was a defensive reaction to deliberate provocation. (Ibid., Shastri Correspondence)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 192.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 181.↩