Office of the Historian

17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

Washington, February 21, 1964, 6:51 p.m.

1086. We are transmitting by separate messages Secretary’s January 16 Memorandum to the President on “Military Assistance to India and Pakistan” and National Security Action Memorandum of February 82 [Page 37] giving President’s approval with certain caveats. Following represents our thoughts how best proceed within above policy guidelines. (Separate instructions being sent Embassy New Delhi.)3

In view para 4 of NSAM, we can go no further now than to pass to you our preliminary thoughts about communicating our decisions to Ayub. As we see it, this process involves four distinct steps:

1.
A signal to Ayub that our thinking on military aid is well along and that we hope to be able to talk in greater detail before end of March. Deptel 10454 authorized you to take this step with Ayub in your conversation on Feb. 13 and we see from Embtel 15305 that you have done so. Our thoughts behind this instruction were:
(a)
Since we plan convey our decisions to GOI within near future but to GOP only after estimating effect Chou visit, it was urgent to give a signal to Ayub that we still planned to move ahead roughly in parallel.
(b)
In the event info of our approach to GOI reaches GOP, the fact that we had given a signal to GOP could be helpful in dampening its reaction. If leak occurs you could also remind GOP of statements about US military aid to India made by General Taylor to Ayub (Embtels 1189).6
(c)
Conceivably our signal could exert some moderating influence on GOP during Chou visit.
2.
An assessment of the results of the Chou visit in terms of US-Pak-ChiCom relations would be second step.
3.
Third step would be a formal approach to Ayub setting forth the political framework within which we are prepared to engage in long-term military assistance to Pakistan. This step would take place as soon as practicable after completion of step two and certainly before visit to Pakistan by General Adams (JCS 4526 from CJCS for MG Ruhlen).7 Intent of formal approach will be to use prospect of continued military assistance both as a carrot to demonstrate value of continued alliance relationship and as a lever to get from Pakistan the necessary assurances that it will limit its relationship with Peiping and pursue policies in general which will not be adverse to US interests. We expect to insist on a genuine meeting of minds on these issues, and continuing performance, as the condition for this aid.
4.

The fourth step would be technical discussions on military level about planning for five year program. Believe General Adams might initiate these discussions.

[Page 38]

We will count on you and Hong Kong to give us your best judgment on results Chou visit. We shall then send you instructions on carrying out steps 3 and 4.

FYI. We have already told Paks in December that we intend going ahead with longer term aid. In fact, by our indicating general magnitude of $50 million, the Paks now know more of our intentions than we are as yet able to tell Indians.

Therefore, if US–GOI talks raised with you before you are able to have full discussion with Ayub, you should take line that (1) GOP already informed in December that we are going ahead with military aid program for India and general thinking within Executive Branch about its scope, (2) we are having discussions this future program, (3) GOP will be kept informed when talks with GOI come into clear focus, and (4) we hope to hold parallel discussions with GOP on appropriate occasion before end of March. End FYI.

Ball
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Cameron; cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs John P. Walsh, Solbert, Harriman, and Komer, and in draft by Dean, Frazier Meade (BNA), Joseph Norbury (SOV), Howard Meyers (G/PM), William S. Gaud (AID/NESA), and Hirshberg (AID/PC); and approved by Talbot. Repeated to London, New Delhi, CINCSTRIKE, and Hong Kong.↩
  2. In telegram 1084 to Karachi, also sent to New Delhi as telegram 1687, and telegram 1083 to Karachi, also sent to New Delhi as telegram 1686, both February 21. (Both ibid.)↩
  3. Document 18.↩
  4. Dated February 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK)↩
  5. See footnote 2, Document 15.↩
  6. Dated December 21, 1963. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961–63, ORG 7 JCS)↩
  7. Not found.↩