125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
2518. Ref New Delhi’s 3523, info London 909, Karachi 805.2 Despite disappointing Indian response to latest British proposals and British discouragement in Delhi at near impasse reached there, it looks to us that British are far from dead end in current negotiating effort. While Indian position is more rigid, we note from complete rundown given by British here that Paks continue to be more flexible on points of difference, i.e., patrolling and disengagement. (This confirmed by NPR 793.)3 British here also indicate CRO considering alternate ways of [Page 267] resolving disengagement impasse and that James4 has specifically recommended that USG not intervene at this time. James says U.S. might help push agreement on disengagement later on but should do so in support of British proposals and not as separate initiative.
We continue to see prospect that British effort may continue for some time with considerable hope for success. While Shastri may not have authority to negotiate with Ayub in London, we doubt either side will burn bridges before then especially as there are signs that both appear to be genuinely concerned about avoiding misstep that could have serious consequences for both. Following Commonwealth Conference there will be visits by Wilson to subcontinent later in summer. Knowledge of forthcoming visits should help prevent either side from breaking off discussions and visits should be occasion for further negotiation. In short, there seems to be time for further British efforts; two parties seem to want to find a way out of escalating conflict; and therefore there is room for further progress toward agreement.
We doubt that US would be in better position than UK to bring Indians and Paks to agreement on disengagement at this time. In fact, we believe that so long as British effort continues, our participation in separate initiative would complicate British diplomatic task and lessen prospect for their success. US intervention on this issue in both capitals (particularly in Delhi) is not likely to be very effective at this time; even our bona fides are sometimes questioned. For example, Embassy suggests we use security assurances and military aid as leverage. Credibility of assurances has been seriously challenged in both countries (e.g. see Embtel 3518)5 and Indians, whose negotiating position would suffer most by disengagement, are already questioning value of our military aid. Finally it seems quite unlikely that US initiative could be kept secret. Leak would put great political pressure on Shastri, particularly because of current attitudes about US in India.
In light of above we have reached conclusion that US should not take up separate initiative on subcontinent at present time.
Ambassador Bowles concurs.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Schneider on June 2, cleared by Cameron, and approved and initialed by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and London.↩
- In telegram 3523 from New Delhi, June 2, the Embassy noted that the military confrontation between India and Pakistan was likely to become more dangerous if allowed to drift. Arguing that U.S. interests in the subcontinent would compel the United States to become involved if the situation became more heated, the Embassy proposed direct U.S. involvement in the search for a settlement before a more dangerous confrontation developed. (Ibid.)↩
- Not found.↩
- Sir Morrice James.↩
- Dated June 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 18 UN)↩